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Abstract 
In most academic writing on state sovereignty, it is considered as a special, abstract 
form of independent power. This thesis considers sovereignty from a historical and 
anthropological perspective, arguing that it is a certain form of social and political 
organisation through which the state’s power is performed and maintained as natural. 
This organisation and maintenance rests on particular, powerful ideas, for example on 
the assumed unity of territory, government and population, and on certain values 
about what constitutes politics and a fulfilled human life.  
By analysing the management of Iraqi migrants in Damascus through state and 
humanitarian institutions, this thesis shows the daily-life bureaucratic and violent 
practices through which state sovereignty became a reality in this context. The 
analysis emphasises that state sovereignty exists as an imagined ‘ideal’, as reflected in 
international law or world maps, and as a much more complex, context-dependant, 
lived reality. The differences between the way that humanitarian agencies considered 
Iraqi migrants from the perspective of the ‘ideal’, and the way Syrian state institutions 
governed Iraqi migrants according to very different standards, highlighted this 
distinction.  
Methodologically, this thesis calls for, and attempts to provide, a hermeneutic 
approach to social inquiry, in which empirical evidence underpins arguments about 
theory. Ethnography and interviews in Syria were used to collect in-depth information 
about the lives of Iraqi migrants, and the interventions and programmes through 
which Iraqi migration was being managed, in 2009 and 2010. 
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Chapter 1 
State Sovereignty in the academic Literature 
 
 
This thesis analyses the social production of state sovereignty in a particular setting, 
that of Iraqi migration to Syria. Its analysis draws on international relations and 
political theory, anthropology, historical sociology, human geography and regional 
and migration studies. Ethnographic data collected during long-term field research 
provides the empirical base. This multi-disciplinary approach has a clear goal: to 
combine theoretical and empirical investigation in order to answer the key research 
question: how was state sovereignty maintained as an idea and as a lived experience 
in the management of Iraqi migration to Syria? 
The ethnographic fieldwork conducted for this study necessarily localizes it in a 
particular, geographical place, that of Damascus, Syria. However the international 
interventions taking place in the field of Iraqi migration mean that this study also 
allows for the drawing of some wider conclusions about the agents and practices that 
maintain sovereignty globally. These interventions involved numerous states 
participating in the resettlement of Iraqi refugees, receiving Iraqis as skilled migrants, 
or funding aid programmes aimed at Iraqi refugees. Further, the UN’s High 
Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), which played a central role in the 
management of Iraqis in Damascus, brought to bear the global, humanitarian, refugee 
regime, which contains a large body of legal, moral and technical regulations based 
on state sovereignty. The framing of Iraqi migration as a humanitarian crisis led to the 
involvement of a small but significant group of international NGOs, whose writings 
and programs also reflected the beliefs and practices of the global humanitarian sector 
and its understanding of sovereignty. 
This thesis aims to overcome the difficult ‘inside-outside’ distinction that sovereignty 
creates; ‘inside’ referring to the domestic and ‘outside’ to what lies beyond. Academia 
usually replicates this sovereign divide, reflected in the two disciplines International 
Relations (focused on the ‘outside’) and Comparative Politics (focused on the 
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‘inside’). But these two abstract spaces are created by and within the same system of 
meaning - state sovereignty - and it is this system of meaning, and its maintenance, 
that needs to be studied in itself, if a stronger understanding and theory of sovereignty 
is to be developed. Replicating the inside/outside distinction by accepting it as a 
starting point, as so many international relations and political science scholars do, will 
necessarily limit any analysis of sovereignty, which straddles the divide. Instead, what 
this thesis does, is to show the practices and beliefs through which inside and outside 
are produced as separate spheres of action, and how state sovereignty is constructed 
quite differently in each sphere, and serves distinct (yet connected) power structures. 
The inside (or domestic) sphere is constructed through context dependent state-
government-population relations that create distinct forms of governance on the 
territory of different states. The outside (or international) sphere is constructed 
through much for standardised and ritualised interactions based on the sovereign ideal 
and its underlying myths of popular self-determination and the equality of all states.  
A crucial element in this conceptual ‘straddling’ of inside and outside is the idea of 
the nation. The globe’s ‘national topography’ retains a powerful hold on domestic and 
international political imaginaries, and provides an important intellectual and 
emotional justification for state sovereignty. This thesis provides insights into how 
national identity was enforced and wielded as a fundamental marker and distributor of 
rights in the programs of some organisations focused on Iraqis migrants. Yet it also 
demonstrates the contradictions that daily life in Syria presented to national identity, 
which, in practice, often mattered little to Iraqi existence in Damascus. Most notably 
Syrian state institutions, but also other actors, did not mobilise nationality as a 
defining feature for Iraqi existence abroad. By examining such ‘peaks and valleys’ of 
the national topography, the thesis is able to argue that while the idea of the nation 
indeed forms a basis for the sovereign ideal, and is a crucial element for the 
international bureaucracy of sovereignty, it played a much weaker role in Syria’s 
domestic space, where daily life was rather shaped by other forms of power that 
applied to all persons on Syrian territory regardless of their nationality.  
State sovereignty, and the particular way that it is understood at this moment in time, 
is a political rationality that structures people’s lives and that is a currently hegemonic 
form for exercising politics. This thesis thus considers sovereignty as a form of social 
and political organisation that relies on entrenched ideas about the social relations that 
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make up political space. These include, for example, ideas about the relationship 
between territory and government, about the location and legitimate exercise of 
power, about the unity of a national population. The development of sovereignty’s 
imaginary of modern politics can be traced back to the European absolutist 
monarchies of the middle ages, and to social changes through which the power of the 
monarch became linked to an increasingly defined and limited territory. These 
medieval origins, which rested on ideas about divine law, can also help explain the 
sacred and religious motifs that still attach to the sovereign and sovereign power, 
noted by contemporary theorists as a political theology. In this thesis, sovereignty is 
not thought about as a mysterious and difficult to identify moment of absolute power, 
as which it is often analysed and questioned in political theory. Instead sovereignty is 
understood as a particular way of ordering political society on a global scale, from a 
perspective informed by international sociology and historical materialism. 
Sovereignty exists as an ideal, contained in abstract concepts reproduced in perfection 
on political maps of the world, or the set-up of the UN general assembly. In these 
constructions, borders, territories and governments appear as clearly defined and 
separated, each representing a state, which, as it possesses all these hallmarks, is 
sovereign. But in daily life, sovereignty appears as a huge array of human actions that 
confirm or undermine sovereignty. Sovereignty ‘on the ground’ is created through a 
continued, enormous field of activity that constantly allocates to humans around the 
world rewards, identities, documents and punishments in accordance with 
sovereignty’s assumptions. 
Herein lies the physical performance of the inside/outside divide: located in different, 
geographical places humans have to perform different actions, depending on whether 
these places are designated as their ‘inside’ or their ‘outside’. Showing a passport and 
buying travel insurance are actions that designate the ‘outside’. Paying taxes, voting 
in national elections and obtaining a passport are actions that designate the ‘inside’. It 
is through differing (and necessarily localized) human actions that, in the physical 
world, we learn whether we need to imagine a  geographical place as an ‘inside’ or an 
‘outside’. In this way the ideal of sovereignty is translated into a daily lived 
experience that has become, where states are strong, so well-established and accepted 
that it is understood as natural and unquestioned.  
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But what happens when a large number of human beings decides to ignore the actions 
required to maintain the physical manifestation of the sovereign ideal? As is so often 
the case in research, the production of a social norm is most easily observed when it is 
called in to question. Migration, people on the move, is an aspect of human life that is 
not easily integrated with the behaviour and activities required by sovereignty, and 
challenges both sovereignty’s ideal and its physical reality. Migration weakens a 
number of powerful assumptions and imaginations on which the ideal of sovereignty 
rests, and undermines control over borders, territory and population, which present 
the most fundamental attributes of sovereignty. It is not surprising therefore that the 
management and suppression of migrants is a key concern for even the strongest 
states, which mobilize large administrative systems and brutal violence to ensure that 
only desirable/legal migrants reach their territory and that those, which disrespect the 
laws of sovereignty, are kept outside. 
Iraqi migration to Syria provided an extraordinarily interesting setting to observe the 
production of state sovereignty. The reason for this case’s particular relevance was the 
confluence of a number of social arenas in which the production of sovereignty was 
being carried out in an occasionally conflicting manner. Of relevance to these 
contradictions was the post-colonial character of the Syrian state, which made the 
Syrian state itself suspect from the point of view of sovereignty. As will be explained 
in this thesis, the Syrian state’s weak bureaucracy, its heterogeneous population and 
the prevalence of regional, rather than national identities meant that Iraqi migrants fell 
into a category that, from the perspective of sovereignty, was vague: neither citizens 
nor foreigners, with hardly more or less rights than Syrians, but greater access to 
further migration through their acquired identity as refugees. Considering how Syrian 
state practices managed and integrated Iraqis into the Syrian body politic, Iraqis 
blurred sovereign categories of population and borders in a number of ways.  
The interventions mounted by UNHCR and international NGOs to manage Iraqi 
migration reproduced sovereign categories differently than Syrian state structures, 
mobilising more strongly sovereignty’s abstract ideal. Unlike the Syrian state, 
UNHCR and most NGOs operated fully within the system of meaning prescribed by 
modern sovereignty and many of their programmes aimed at ‘normalising’ Iraqi 
migrants into this system. These programmes revealed techniques of governance used 
by different actors to structure the lives of Iraqis in accordance with the political 
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rationality of sovereignty. The interventions also revealed how norms and practices of 
sovereignty were exercised on Syrian territory by other states and the UN, and how 
they differed from those prevalent in Syria previously. The burgeoning humanitarian 
sector in  Syria showed interesting examples of how norms are diffused via the 
humanitarian sector in a post-colonial setting, and showed that sovereignty, rather 
than waxing and waning, was constantly reconfigured through changing policies, 
regulations and applications of authority. Given the simultaneously domestic and 
international character of these interventions they were an especially rich site to study 
how sovereignty was performed to structure these two spaces. 
Definitions and understandings of sovereignty used in this thesis 
In academia and in every-day political discourse, the term ‘sovereignty’ refers to a 
variety of ideas, concepts and practices. Sovereignty may describe types of power 
(even here the concept is unclear), for example divine power, or the assumed, 
exclusive control of a state over its territory and population, or, in a Foucauldian 
sense, a power over life and death, wielded in a cruel and spectacular manner. Yet 
sovereignty may also describe actions, such as the sovereign right of a state to issue a 
currency or passports to its citizens. Further, ‘sovereignty’ can be an attribute of 
actors, speaking about ‘the sovereign’ can refer to a monarch (pointing to 
sovereignty’s historical development) or more generally, can describe the power 
assumed to wield ultimate control over a situation, a territory or a population. Often, 
‘the sovereign’, simply refers to a state. 
Going beyond a direct usage of the term, it is important to understand that 
‘sovereignty’ also has a wider, conceptual influence that appears indirectly. For 
example, sovereignty has a spatial dimension. When people refer to ‘Syrian territory’ 
or conversely ‘the international’, they speak about spaces constructed through their 
understanding of how state sovereignty shapes the world. Similarly, when national or 
citizenship identities are invoked, sovereignty’s impact on the categorising of people 
is indirectly mobilised.  
This thesis thus firstly argues that ‘sovereignty’ needs to be understood as a system of 
meaning, for which the hegemonic belief in the existence and need for a type of 
power that is sovereign, is the first, and most important premise. Without the belief in 
(the need for) a foundational, central, all-encompassing and unchanging source of 
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power, sovereignty would be meaningless as a political ordering principle. This thesis 
investigates and analyses how aspects of this system of meaning are maintained 
through hegemonic ideas and daily-life practices.  
Secondly, and more specifically, this thesis focuses on the ideas and daily-life 
practices that maintain state sovereignty in the context of large-scale migration, and 
the national and international management of this migration. As has been highlighted 
by multiple scholars, state sovereignty is constructed through intricate categorisations 
of groups and individuals according to a ‘national topography’, through the bordering 
of territory and detailed forms of exclusion, many of which focus on migrants and 
refugees (detailed further below).1 How such categorisations, borderings and 
exclusions are created and maintained through localised, daily-life practices has been 
identified and highlighted by a number of scholars from various disciplines, including 
by critical, Foucauld-inspired IR authors.  
By focusing on the daily-life encounters between Iraqi migrants in Damascus and 
several national and international actors, this thesis provides significant evidence 
about how state sovereignty was constructed in these encounters.  A key finding of 
this thesis is that state sovereignty was not a power experienced by Iraqis through the 
interventions of a single, centralised source (the state). Instead, as has been argued by 
other critical IR scholars and anthropologists, sovereignty was created through 
innumerable, often small events carried out by state and non-state institutions focused 
on managing Iraqi life in Damascus.  
The ‘definition’ of state sovereignty that this thesis uses is therefore as follows. State 
sovereignty is the hegemonic principle of today’s political and social order, according 
to which the state remains as the central, exclusive power and arbiter of politics. State 
sovereignty is based on certain categorisations, definitions, exclusions and 
constructions of people(s) and spaces, which are created through innumerable, daily-
life events and encounters. Crucially, these events and encounters do not have to 
involve state institutions, but are frequently carried out by public or private non-state 
actors. This latter point reveals that the centrality of the state, on which the order of 
                                                
1 The term ‘national topography’ is coined by the American anthropologist Lisa Malkki in her below-
cited book Purity and Exile : Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania. 
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state sovereignty is allegedly based, is not as consistent as the idea (or myth) of state 
sovereignty would have us believe.  
The position of this thesis in the academic literature and its contribution 
Before the remainder of this chapter sets out in greater detail the interdisciplinary 
readings forming the theoretical background of this thesis, the following paragraphs 
clarify its position within this broad body of work. The arguments that this thesis 
makes about the construction of state sovereignty through daily-life practices, and 
about the influence that powerful, international organisations embodying liberal forms 
of sovereignty have on a local, post-colonial context, position it within the small, but 
significant, post-structuralist literature on international relations.2 This literature is 
characterised by the belief that the origins of the political structures of today’s world 
need to be studied themselves, rather than taken for granted, in order to understand 
the nature and effects of power. A further, uniting factor of these critical IR writings 
is the idea that social reality is constructed through human ideas and behaviour, and 
thus not fixed or natural. It is therefore crucial to investigate, highlight and understand 
such behaviour, changes to it, and how it affects the way people live their lives, in 
order to understand how complex political phenomena such as states, borders and 
sovereignty are upheld. From this position, the techniques of power through which 
humans are compelled and convinced to behave in accordance with sovereignty, 
become an important focus of scholarship. This focus connects this literature with the 
work of the French historian Foucault, whose work on the changing nature of social 
control wielded by European state authorities since the early middle ages, provides a 
major inspiration to many post-structuralist IR scholars working on sovereignty 
today.3 Through its ethnographical investigation of the varying, changing and 
changeable social controls applied to Iraqi migrants in Damascus, this thesis is 
positioned within this Foucauldian tradition.  
Within critical IR literature, migration, and the regimes of control brought to bear on 
migrants, have been recognised as particularly revelatory loci to study how liberal 
                                                
2 Leading scholars in this field include Didier Bigo, Wendy Brown, David Chandler, Michael Dillon, 
Roxanne Doty, Vivienne Jabri, Jef Huysman, Marc Salter, Michael Shapiro, R.B.J. Walker.  
3 Some examples of IR engagement with Foucault’s theories are Vivienne Jabri, "Michel Foucault's 
Analytics of War: The Social, the International, and the Racial," International Political Sociology 1, 
no. 1 (2007); Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal, eds., Foucault on Politics, Security and War 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008).  
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governance functions through bureaucratic routines, bio-political techniques and the 
categorisation of people.4 Migrants provide a particularly complex challenge to liberal 
aspirations to human rights, justice, security and stability. In their attempt to manage 
this challenge, liberal regimes often reveal their limits and the foundational violence 
that they are based on. Further, and of particular relevance for students of the 
international, migrants are a particular focus of (non-military) humanitarian 
interventions by large and powerful humanitarian organisations based on liberal ideas 
of rule. This aspect of migration provides IR scholars with the opportunity to study 
how liberal governance is spread through ostensibly politically neutral actors 
representing the ‘international community as a whole’.  
This thesis engages with the existing, critical IR literature on state power and 
migration, and develops a significant contribution to its arguments by providing 
unusually in-depth and detailed ethnographic accounts of dozens of specific, daily-life 
events and encounters through which sovereignty became present and transformed in 
the context of Iraqi migration to Syria. The thesis’ focus on an international, 
humanitarian effort conducted within a local context in which liberal forms of power 
were largely absent, provides highly relevant insights into the potential spreading of 
liberal governance through international, humanitarian organisations. This approach 
also situates the thesis within the context of critical studies of humanitarian 
organisations as agents of power, rather than neutral deliverers of services to 
marginalised populations.5  
                                                
4 See for example  Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality 
of Unease," Alternatives 27, no. Special Issue (2002); Michael Dillon, "The Scandal of the Refugee – 
Some Reflections on the “Inter” of International Relations and Continental Thought," in Moral Spaces 
Rethinking Ethics and World Politics ed. David Campbell and Michael J Shapiro (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Roxanne Lynn Doty, "States of Exception on the Mexico–U.S. 
Border: Security, “Decisions,” and Civilian Border Patrols," International Political Sociology 1, no. 2 
(2007). Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, New 
International Relations Series (London: Routledge, 2006). Mark B. Salter, "The Global Visa Regime 
and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics," Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 31, no. 2 (2006). Chandler, David et al. “Assessing the Impact of Foucault on 
International Relations Roundtable.” International Political Sociology 4, no.2 (2010) 
5 Examples of such studies are Mark Duffield, "Development, territories, and people: consolidating the 
external sovereign frontier," Alternatives 32, no. 2 (2007); Monika Krause, "The logic of relief: 
Humanitarian NGOs and global governance" (Ph.D., New York University, 2009); Carolina Moulin 
and Peter Nyers, "“We Live in a Country of UNHCR”—Refugee Protests and Global Political 
Society," International Political Sociology 1, no. 4 (2007).  
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The ethnographic approach of the thesis fits with some existing attempts within 
critical IR to produce empirical evidence on the effect of power on people’s lives. Yet 
the thesis goes further than most of this writing in providing rich, detailed and 
convincing evidence from interviews and observations to demonstrate firstly, the 
connection between ideas about sovereignty and its implementation, and secondly, the 
impact of institutional practices on the lives of individuals, shaping them in 
conformity with sovereignty. Through its close interweaving of theoretical arguments 
informed by critical IR writing with ethnographic material, the thesis makes an 
important contribution to the critical IR field and furthers its arguments by furnishing 
accessible and strong evidence for their correctness. The thesis convincingly 
demonstrates that ethnographic method can be an important tool for constructivist 
scholars, as through ethnographic research, the effects of techniques of power can be 
observed and collected.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter sets out the key literature that this thesis 
draws on. This literature selection reflects a dominant training in international 
relations theory; however many sources from other disciplines were used to find ideas 
and inspiration about how to address the complex puzzle thrown up by the research 
questions and methods. The reading for this thesis was guided by three 
considerations: to develop an overview of the intellectual and empirical history of the 
concept of sovereignty, to understand how authors have analysed sovereignty in 
connection with migration, and to gain awareness of anthropological studies that 
investigate the daily practices constructing sovereignty.   
The classic approach to sovereignty: locating and justifying absolute power 
In line with Gramsci’s observation that an epoch’s philosophy always reflects its 
social relations, the Dutch legal scholar Galina Cornelisse argues that since the 
Middle Ages, the history of the idea of sovereignty and the intellectual enquiry into it 
has been linked to changes in the distribution and exercise of political power in 
European societies.6 The growing power of absolutist monarchs prompted 
intellectuals to seek explanations and justifications for royal exceptionalism; initially 
these inquiries were grounded on ideas about divine, and later natural law. A primary 
                                                
6 Galina Cornelisse, Immigration Detention and Human Rights Rethinking territorial Sovereignty  
(Leiden/Boston: Martin Nijhoff, 2010). 
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exponent of these early conceptualisations of sovereignty is Niccolo Machiavelli 
(1469-1527), who was chiefly concerned with strategies to maintain the state and the 
monarch, and who demonstrates an awareness of the body politic as an abstract entity 
on which later ideas about sovereignty rest.7 Yet the first thinker to develop a 
systematic theory of sovereignty as an indivisible, absolute and independent power, 
on which political order depended and without which a state’s existence was 
impossible, was the French jurist Jean Bodin (1530–1596). Although Bodin still 
conflated sovereignty with the personal power of the monarch, who stood above civil 
law, but was bound by divine/natural law, his theory of sovereignty as supreme and 
unbound power formed the basis of the modern philosophy of sovereignty.8 Bodin’s 
locating of sovereign power in a defined, physical location (that of the ruler) can be 
regarded as one explanation for the methodological problems encountered by post-
Enlightenment theorists of sovereignty, who continued struggling to identify the locus 
of sovereignty, even though the structure of the state had significantly changed since 
Bodin’s times. An historical awareness of how recently territories and associated 
rights over people and places could be bought, sold, forfeited and regained by private 
individuals and communities, at a time when sovereignty had not attained today’s 
abstract and unquestionable power, is indispensable for a critical analysis of the 
concept as it defines politics today. As an example, it was only in 1848 that the King 
of Prussia was forced to cede a substantial territory (the Neuchatel area) to the Swiss 
Confederation; Neuchatel had previously personally belonged to the king, not 
forming a part of the territory of the Prussian kingdom.9 
The increasing territorialisation of royal power in the later middle ages, succeeded to 
concentrate previously diffuse popular loyalties on the monarch, presented as a single 
source of state power and identity. Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) theory of the 
sovereign Leviathan presents the intellectual culmination of this development, as an 
unprecedented call for and description of totalizing state power over a defined people 
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and territory.10 Hobbes’ Leviathan does not distinguish between state, government or 
society and bases a government’s legitimacy of rule only on the question of how well 
it is able to protect its subjects. The unity of the body politic and the (stated) absence 
of the divine, which continue as hallmarks of current ideas about sovereignty, are 
recognizable in Hobbes’ writings.  In these ways, Hobbes and his famous 
contemporary opponent John Locke (1632-1704), who developed a theory of 
sovereignty based on constitutionalism and law, signal the approaching 
Enlightenment. Their mobilisation of human reason as the prime explanation for 
social order, rather than god, and the centrality they award to the individual, precede 
the modern conception of men as equal, rational actors.11  
The revolutions in the USA (1776 – 1788) and in France (1789-1799) served to 
anchor the idea of popular sovereignty and hastened the formal passage of 
sovereignty from monarchs to the people. The treaties on popular and community-
based sovereignty that accompanied these upheavals rejected absolutist theories and 
interestingly, although they used the notion of universal mankind, popular sovereignty 
in practice emerged together with nationalism. Cornelisse explains this with the fact 
that the political reformers of the 18th century operated in a pre-existing territorial 
framework, in which Christian ideals of universal humanity had already lost ground to 
territorialising practices of monarchs.12 In the developing framework of modern states 
from the 18th century onwards, nationalism and exclusive citizenship became a key 
source of unity and legitimacy of state rule.  
Yet (post)-Enlightenment theorists from Rousseau to Hegel to Schmitt failed to 
develop a fundamentally new theoretical basis for explaining sovereignty in the 
rapidly changing social and political context of industrialising Europe. Rather, they 
present internal critiques of the absolutist project of mercantilist sovereignty and, as 
anthropologist Ronald Jennings convincingly argues,  “remain locked within a 
political logic that is really meant for breaking down old systems and not for 
imagining new futures, and the reason for this rests largely in terms of this unitary 
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account of power-as-sovereignty in which so much of our thought takes place.”13 
Unfortunately, this critique extends to much of what IR and political science has 
produced on sovereignty in the last two decades. Even critical, constructivist writers, 
who made important contributions to our understanding of the discourse and 
exclusions of sovereignty, display a curiously a-historical and un-sociological 
approach to sovereignty, that allowed sovereignty to retain an ephemeral, quasi-
religious quality.14 The same may be said of the more recent turn by scholars to Carl 
Schmitt, who might help us perceive the ideas on which sovereignty rests, but do not 
adequately tackle or explain how these ideas become translated into political 
structures.15  
Michel Foucault recognized the extreme focus of political theorists on the location 
and definition of sovereignty-as-power in the 1970s, calling it an ‘obsession’ and 
inviting academics to ‘cut off the king’s head’ in their analysis of political power. 16 
To Foucault, the continuing attempts to understand power in terms that were coined in 
relation to medieval monarchies appear as “utterly incongruous with the new methods 
of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by 
normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all 
levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.”17 In his later work, 
Foucault acknowledges the continued relevance of the state as a key mechanism 
through which modern political life is structured, and draws attention to the 
development of national exclusivity as a defining feature of state sovereignty. 
Arguing that in the late 18th century new ways of understanding popular politics, 
which no longer glorified the sovereign, threatened the dominance of states, Foucault 
shows how racial purity became a powerful, pro-state idea and racism a tool to 
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preserve state sovereignty. The idea that national society should be homogeneous, and 
was threatened in its health and purity by infiltrating foreigners went hand in hand 
with this development, foreshadowing the continued relevance of migration 
management for the maintenance of sovereignty today.  
Modern and post-modern explanations of sovereignty 
The important role migrants play in the creation of the exclusion inherent to 
sovereignty was perhaps first recognised by Hannah Arendt, who traces the rise of 
‘stateless’ persons in her book The Origins of Totalitarianism.18 Arendt, who had 
herself been made stateless by the German national-socialist government, also 
reminds us of the historical circumstances that shaped the nation state in the 20th 
century, firmed up its borders and entrenched the ideal that its populations should be 
of a homogeneous nation. She traces the material circumstances as well as the 
imaginations of the time that created the inside/outside of international relations that 
we recognise today.  
Arendt stresses the importance of the sovereign right to bestow and withdraw 
nationality from people and lays out the devastating effects of ‘statelessness’ in a 
world in which one has to rely on one’s national government for the enforcement of 
one's rights. Arendt points out how sovereign exclusion of refugees, while being so 
important for constituting the sovereign state, at the same time undermines and 
destabilises its claim to goodness, justness and truth. The exclusion of refugees by the 
modern, sovereign nation state, argues Arendt, contains a contradiction that endangers 
its hegemony.19 Although not explicitly, Arendt is here already touching on the 
problem that the ‘interstitial’ location of migrants – neither inside nor outside 
sovereignty - creates for sovereign power, as this unclear location constantly 
highlights the intense contradictions and problems that sovereignty creates.20  
Analysing and describing the effects and mechanisms of sovereignty as a domestic 
and international organising principle has been the central focus of international 
relations scholars working on sovereignty throughout the 20th century. Well-known 
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theorists of sovereignty, such as Hans Morgenthau, Hedley Bull and Steven Krasner, 
proceeded from the assumption that sovereignty was an a priori property of states and 
produced a system of anarchy, as all states were formally equal. Consequently, their 
writings are chiefly concerned with the question of how international politics 
produces order from anarchy, and what can lead to a breakdown to this order. While 
Bull pointed out shared norms among states that produced an ‘international society’, 
Krasner referred to power differences between states that led to the formation of 
hegemonic states that ruled over others.21   
However it is only with the post-modern turn in international relations and other 
disciplines that thinkers really began to question sovereignty itself as a historically 
contingent (and not constitutive) form of political organisation and to analyse it as a 
social construct. From the outset of this academic development, the figure of the 
migrant/refugee has been recognised as highlighting the limits and contradictions 
inherent in the narrative of sovereignty.22 These critical and constructivist scholars 
pointed out the methodological short-fallings of previous writings on sovereignty that 
broadly failed to investigate their own assumptions about reality and knowledge. In 
1990, Richard Ashley and Robert Walker published their influential article "Reading 
Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in 
International Studies" which provided a forceful criticism of how positivist scholars 
reified sovereignty as a source of truth and power, and failed to analyse its continuous 
production through discourse.23 Importantly they argue that the stability of 
sovereignty as a legitimate system of meaning rests on a blindness towards and 
marginalisation of people and experiences that destabilise sovereignty’s truths. 
However by carrying their argument that stable truths need to be abandoned in favour 
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of ambiguity and doubt too far, they risk emulating the hyper-liberal discourse 
dominating politics in the late 1990s when they, for example, write that 
“Life depends upon the ability to question and traverse cultural limitations, thus to expand 
the resources that might be put to work in the autonomous constitution of self and selves.”24 
The assertion that life depends on cosmopolitanism appears as extreme and 
doctrinaire, indeed marginalises the life experience of millions (if not billions) of 
people around the world who do not traverse cultural limitations. More critically, 
Ashley and Walker’s philosophical approach can be read as closely related to the 
social conditions, the individualism and liberal multiculturalism of late 20th century 
capitalism and its promotion of constant change and mobility. An explanation for this 
curious lack of self-reflection (given the authors’ perception of this lack in others), 
which is  also apparent in other post-modern writings on sovereignty, lies not so much 
in faulty epistemological foundations, but rather in their research methods. These lack 
any deep, empirical connection with the social processes (discursive and otherwise) 
that are argued to be continuously constructing, undoing and reconstructing 
sovereignty. What is needed in this sense is not a return to positivist empiricism, 
asserting that only what can be measured can be true. Of importance is the realisation 
that it is possible to observe the effect of social constructs on people’s behaviour; and 
that it is also possible to explain people’s behaviour through the existence of 
otherwise intangible social constructs. This means that while it might not be possible 
to measure the impact of, for example, gender stereotypes or indeed sovereignty, it is 
possible to explain certain practices as being grounded on and simultaneously 
producing these abstract, social concepts.25 While post-modern writers often 
acknowledge this point and call for more in-depth, ethnographic research on the 
questions they raise, they themselves unfortunately hardly ever carry through such 
research, particularly in IR. 
It is also curious how little historical depth many post-modern writings on sovereignty 
contain, despite post-modernists’ repeated criticism of (neo)-realists’ unhistorical 
reification of sovereignty as constitutive. Even Cynthia Weber’s seminal post-modern 
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work on sovereignty Simulating Sovereignty does not demonstrate deep historical 
awareness of sovereignty’s evolution as an organising principle of power.26  Weber 
equates the historicity of sovereignty with the “countless forms of state sovereignty” 
that “coexist in modern global political life”, criticising that neo-realists cannot 
explain the “shifting basis of sovereign authority expressed by the displacement of 
monarchical sovereignty by popular sovereignty”. While the latter point is in no doubt 
correct, it is astounding that Weber’s own historical horizon seems to end with 
‘Westphalia’; that she does not appear to be able to escape the image of an 
international system of sovereign entities and that from her writings it still appears as 
if sovereignty, in some form or other, has always existed. As mentioned above, it 
appears that these analytical shortcomings are rooted in the broader failure of 
constructivist IR scholars, who eschew the large-N statistical research conducted by 
their positivist colleagues on epistemological grounds, but have failed to develop 
research methodologies of their own and largely remain mired in purely theoretical 
debates. 
The most recent wave of writings about sovereignty by IR scholars saw a surge of 
interest in the ideas of the early-20th century scholar Carl Schmitt, and in those of the 
contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben (Agamben’s theories about exclusion 
are discussed in further detail below). Schmitt’s writings and the most original of the 
extrapolations from his theories are notable and important because they trace the 
genealogy of sovereignty to its roots in the divine and highlight how certain 
contemporary ideas and practices related to sovereignty still display emotional 
connections to the sacred.27 Other authors focus on Schmitt’s continued relevance to 
the concept of sovereignty space and how the enclosure of territory functions at the 
heart of sovereignty’s form of political organisation.28 Unfortunately, given Schmitt’s 
own concern with locating sovereignty, many Schmittians focus on his most famous 
dictum that sovereignty is located where the decision for the exception (i.e. to take 
exception to the law/the norm) takes place. This frequently leads to the familiar, 
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extremely abstract considerations about sovereignty that may contain some meta-
philosophical value, but tell us little about the politics through which sovereignty is 
maintained.  
Sovereignty, migration and ethnography 
An interesting example of how the existence of refugees destabilises mainstream 
international relations discourse is provided by Emma Haddad who, writing from the 
perspective of the ‘international society’ school of thought, argues that refugees 
disturbs the nation-population-territory nexus upon with sovereignty relies.29 
Refugees are a necessary ‘side product’ of the modern system of nation states argues 
Haddad, who regards this situation as a moral and political disappointment, as it fails 
to guarantee the rights of all citizens of earth. Haddad’s argument is exemplary for 
mainstream IR discourse, because although she touches upon a situation that is 
paradoxical in this discourse’s understanding of sovereignty, its epistemological and 
ontological limitations prevent her from being able to explain the puzzle. Haddad 
writes that sovereignty posits migrants into “the gaps between nation-states”30 , but 
cannot critically examine how these ‘gaps’ are constructed through the self-same 
discourse of sovereignty, “modernity’s dominant spatial story”31 and state-centric 
representation of the world.  Haddad fails to examine in greater detail the concepts 
and imaginations on which the exclusion of refugees from sovereign space rely, nor 
does she investigate enough the bureaucratic routines through which the externality of 
refugees is created and the purity of the inner sovereign space constantly maintained. 
While she points out some aspects of international law and the maintenance of 
borders, she does not look at how the lives and spaces of refugees are structured by 
sovereign practices. Although she write as if the in-between ‘gaps’ that migrants 
inhabit physically exist, she does not identify the puzzle of their location – which 
breaks through sovereignty’s inside/outside -  and of their construction, and what they 
might tell us about the whole, imagined system of sovereignty. 
                                                
29 Haddad, "The refugee: the individual between sovereigns."; Emma Haddad, The refugee in 
international society : between sovereigns, Cambridge studies in international relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Emma Miriam Haddad and European Institute (London School of 
Economics and Political Science), "Between sovereigns: the refugee in international society" (Ph.D. 
(London) thesis 2004 LSE., 2004). 
30 Haddad, "The refugee: the individual between sovereigns.", page 297 
31 Soguk and Whitehall, "Wandering Grounds: Transversality, Identity, Territoriality and Movement.", 
page 676 and 681 
 25 
An interesting example of empirically grounded work about migration and 
sovereignty is the edited volume Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in 
the Postcolonial World by Hansen and Stepputat.32 Most contributors to this volume 
employ a strong element of critical/constructivist theory and at the same time keep a 
firm grip on the historical and current struggles, which sovereign-creating practices 
often consist of. For example, an analysis of a large refugee camp in Tanzania, based 
on long-term ethnographic fieldwork, explains the creation and maintenance of the 
camp as sovereign-producing practice. Through the physical separating out of the 
refugees, clarity of who constitutes the true citizenry is created, “the foundation of 
biopolitical sovereignty”, and through the creation of the exceptional camp space, the 
state can hand over the refugees to others to govern without losing face.33 The chapter 
describes various strategies deployed by the state that maintain the exceptional, non-
permanent character of the camp so that the refugees can continue to be constructed 
as located outside the country's population. Such grounding of constructivist ideas in 
ethnographic fieldwork provides powerful explanations of social phenomena that 
cannot be explained by positivist methods based on rational choice theories, and 
presents a convincing counter-vision of social science research than those presented 
by statisticians. Compared to post-modernist analyses that eschew in-depth data 
collection, these works based on ethnography go much further in describing and 
understanding the construction of sovereignty through practices and discourse. The 
assertion that there is a “’weakness’ of everyday stateness” in post-colonial states, 
which is “often countered by attempts to make state power highly visible” provides a 
useful ‘lense’ through which to understand the Syrian setting in which this thesis’ 
argument unfolds.34 
A similarly inspiring example of applying ethnographic data to an analysis of power 
relations is provided by Ilana Feldman in her book Governing Gaza, in which she 
uses evidence collected in ethnographic and archival fieldwork to investigate the 
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production of authority in Gaza during the British Mandate and subsequent Egyptian 
Administration.35 Feldman, curious about how government was sustained under 
adverse conditions and about how it shaped and was itself shaped by people and 
places, argues that in the absence of legitimate rule, which both the British and 
Egyptians lacked, authority in Gaza was created through the form, shape and habits of 
the daily practices of bureaucracy. Feldman illuminates how bureaucratic practice is 
itself productive of government form, intent and direction and highlights the 
microphysics of power that appear in the most ordinary of actions and prove the 
importance of the mundane. Feldman’s archival research focuses on the system of 
filing installed by the British and continued by the Egyptians, and looks at the rules 
and regulations that ensured conformity in the form and content of files. These 
disembodied rules gave files an authority and also shaped and structured the 
behaviour of civil servants. Further, the large collection of information on the 
population created power, as information about an individual was directly linked to 
state benefits, punishments, employment opportunities and so on.36 While Feldman 
does not specifically focus on sovereignty, her method of data collection and analysis 
is highly applicable to an investigation of power’s “infinitesimal mechanisms”37, 
including those that construct sovereignty. 
While, as shown above, a small number of international relations and politics scholars 
have ventured into ethnographic research to investigate sovereignty, an even smaller 
number of anthropologists have conducted full-blown ethnographies of spaces and 
practices in and through which sovereignty is constructed. A highly thought-
provoking and convincing piece is the study “Sovereigns and citizens in close 
encounter: airport anthropology and customs regimes in neoliberal Ghana”, in which 
the American anthropologist Brenda Chalfin presents her research on “how the aura 
of sovereign ultimacy is sustained and internalized” by customs agents, who 
“configure, replicate, and renew the ability to rule” and “come to be known and felt as 
a source of rule over others”.38 Through adopting a research perspective that looks at 
more than official administrative procedures, and observes the actual practices 
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through which regulations are implemented in human encounters, Chalfin argues that 
“the “sovereign,” as subject, symbol, and sentiment as well as a system of 
sanction…opens up to investigation”.39 Chalfin’s focus on borders, widely recognised 
as a crucial element in the sovereign edifice, also emphasises the challenging role that 
migrants, defined mainly by having crossed a state border, have in the daily 
performance of sovereign practice. Transnational actors, argues Chalfin, present the 
greatest challenge to the distribution of state authority and therefore become targets of 
special interventions. State sovereignty, Chalfin suggests, is produced through the 
intimate knowledge that state agents collect about the mobile citizenry, which allows 
them to translate abstract regulations into concrete techniques of governance, shaping 
the field of action of the travellers. As will be highlighted below, Chalfin’s approach 
is closely inline with the research and analysis methods aimed at in this thesis.  
Aihwa Ong is another American anthropologist working on sovereignty, whose 
empirical and theoretical approach is highly relevant to this thesis. In her analyses of 
the economic integration of the east Asian 'tiger' economies into the global market, 
Ong develops a way of thinking about sovereignty as a “political order produced by 
an assemblage of administrative strategies”.40 Ong shows how states adapt their 
internal policies on population and economic management to the needs of the neo-
liberal world market and highlights the existence of various levels of sovereign 
power. She argues that the “exercise of power depends on a variety of technologies 
that target populations as well as territory in order to solve problems of wealth, 
growth, and security”.41 In her research on the techniques and disciplinary practices 
through which citizenship is created for new Cambodian immigrants to the US, Ong 
finds that they are subjected to bureaucratic codifications and administrative rulings 
that govern how they should be assessed and treated and how they should think of 
themselves. Ong extends her research to cover the immigrants’ interaction with the 
public health service and finds that the migrants resist the American nurses’ attempts 
to convince them to govern their bodies in a particular way.42 
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Anthropological approaches thus demonstrate the possibility to empirically 
investigate the social construction of sovereignty, argued for so convincingly by 
constructivist IR theorists. Such investigation is made possible through the 
observation of certain human practices that can only be explained with reference to 
the sovereign ideal that informs these actions. By researching what kind of procedures 
and encounters individuals and communities, whose identities do not easily fit with 
the narrative of sovereignty are subjected to, it becomes possible to understand how 
sovereignty is upheld in the face of numerous and constantly occurring human actions 
that challenge and undermine it.  This thesis argues that treating sovereignty as a 
purely abstract concept, as even critical IR theory has done, can only be the first step 
towards understanding how sovereign power functions and how the hegemonic 
topography of the state is reproduced in the international. To understand why and how 
state sovereignty remains as a key organising principle, despite social changes that 
have displaced the state from a number of arenas it formerly dominated, the critical, 
theoretical framework of sovereignty needs to complemented with empirical field 
research into the techniques, applied across a range of social domains, through which 
sovereignty is maintained. To date, apart from the realisations that the meaning of 
sovereignty is historically contingent, that it stipulates imagined, ideal conditions 
which are routinely ignored in a game of organized hypocrisy and that sovereign 
entities rely on techniques of ‘othering’ to retain a stable identity, sovereignty is still 
treated as an abstract mystery in IR writings. This work addresses this gap with an 
ethnographic research project that is explicitly based on a framework of critical 
readings of sovereignty from a politics/IR perspective.  
The following sections address two key topics that arise from the above-mentioned 
literature, and which explain important ideas and practices on which the construction 
of sovereignty relies. The first topic concerns exclusion and the way it is mobilised 
conceptually and physically to maintain sovereignty. The exclusion of people from 
particular territories and communities, the exclusion of governments from each 
other’s territories and the exclusion of non-sovereign notions of space are all 
important concepts related to the order of sovereignty. Secondly, there emerges the 
argument, already alluded to above, that sovereign power does not spring from a 
single, central source, but is created through diffuse social relations and through the 
self-governance of people. This point is of particular relevance to the research method 
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of this thesis, and its argument that the construction of sovereignty can be experienced 
and observed in every-day life. Both themes are elaborated in greater detail in the 
following paragraphs, again by drawing on an interdisciplinary range of literature. 
The exclusion of sovereignty 
Critical theorists of modern sovereignty argue that sovereign truths and sovereign 
spaces are based on the systematic exclusion of certain ideas and people, who fall 
outside of the sovereign identity and possibly pose a threat to it. Through exclusion 
the sovereign identity can remain stable. Who and what is constructed as 
excluded/external and by which mechanisms is the target of much scholarly enquiry, 
as critical theorists believe that answers to this question can deliver explanations on 
the workings of power structures and thus for a number of social phenomena, such as, 
for example, who gains access to resources or why states formulate particular 
policies.  
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has perhaps taken the analysis of sovereign 
exclusion furthest and argues that sovereignty includes those that it has to reject, only 
for the purpose of excluding them.43 According to Agamben, in order to function as a 
defined space, the sovereign order not only has to exclude certain life forms, but has 
to highlight and perform this exclusion constantly, otherwise the effect of the 
exclusion as an identity building mechanism would end. Thus, sovereignty is built on 
an 'inclusive exclusion', which constantly constructs certain members of its society as 
external to its order, a construction that re-affirms its stability and truth. Research into 
this question of inclusive exclusion has shown how, for example, it has applied to 
women or colonial subjects, who in the past were part of society but later excluded 
from political participation; their exclusion from it constantly emphasising the 
superiority of those allowed to participate. The situation of migrants and refugees has 
also been analysed from this perspective.44 Scholars have also investigated how 
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sovereign exclusion applies to space, for example with regards to refugee camps, 
which are located on a state's territory but administered by international agencies.45 
The above mentioned anthropologists/sociologists Hansen and Stepputat follow 
Agamben in arguing that the right to exclude is a sovereign privilege and that 
'inclusive exclusion' remains crucial to sovereignty's physical and imagined 
reproduction. Hansen states that  
“The expulsion of someone who used to have rights as a citizen, or simply to categorize 
some individuals in a society as a form of life that is beyond the reach of dignity and full 
humanity and thus not even a subject of a benevolent power, is the most elementary 
operation of sovereign power”.46 
A number of scholars use such insights about exclusion to explain how and why 
migrants violate the notions of nation-space, identity, and security inherent in the 
sovereign state. These authors argue that migrants challenge underlying notions that 
construct sovereign spaces, such as the notion of citizenship, or national homogeneity 
or the stability of human existence as such. Their arguments provide important 
theoretical insights into how the imagination of sovereignty is constructed and 
performed and what categories and concepts belong to it.  Liisa Malkki, in her 
brilliant book Purity and Exile, which concerns the formation of historical-national 
consciousness among Hutu refugees in Tanzania, argues that the “national order of 
things” and refugees are mutually constitutive. For while refugees subvert it, they are 
also “made meaningful by the categorical order itself, even as they are excluded from 
it”.47 Interestingly, Malkki offers an explanation for why there are so few studies on 
refugees and the international: as refugees are not classified or classifiable in this 
order, the literature on nations and nationalism is silent on them. Malkki therefore 
touches on what makes refugees so dangerous to sovereignty and to the fragile 
legitimacy of states based on homogeneous nations: it is the fact that the 
contemporary nation-order always contains the possibility of cosmopolitanism – 
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represented by migrants -, which destabilises nationality as a moral and essential trait. 
Malkki argues insightfully that the international system is based on the nation as a 
culturally hegemonic form, which has become naturalised and is therefore regarded as 
legitimate. The nation, according to Malkki is a “powerful regime of classification, an 
apparently commonsensical system of ordering and sorting people into national kinds 
and types”, it is a “continual, taken-for-granted exercise of power”. She continues 
with several very useful points about the effects of the international system as a 
'hegemonic topography' and a 'powerful regime of order and knowledge'. The national 
order of things is “a class of phenomena that is deeply cultural and yet global in its 
significance”.48  
While Malkki’s analysis of migrants’ position in the international forms only the 
introduction to her book, the political scientist Peter Nyers makes it the focus of his 
entire study.49 Nyers argues that the sovereign state’s claim to monopolize violence 
also includes a monopolization of all that is political. In this sense, sovereign power 
captures and over-codes human existence into its own logic of relations of inclusion-
exclusion. There is therefore a tension between all that is captured, and the ‘political 
excess’, which evades or flees such practices of capture.50 Nyers demonstrates the 
variety of ways in which refugees are allocated characteristics such as speechlessness, 
invisibility and passivity that are the obverse of the sovereign identity of citizenship, 
and argues that this allocation excludes them from sovereignty’s space. Importantly, 
Nyers also argues that the categories, according to which sovereign power/knowledge 
regulates life by classifying only certain persons as citizens and fully human, remain 
ambiguous. This ambiguity remains hidden as long as it is unchallenged; migrants 
bring it to light and unhinge the trinity of state-territory-nation. Nyers believes that in 
the sovereign order only the citizen equates the fully human, and that the presence of 
migrants, humans who are not citizens, shatters this continuity between human being 
and citizen and therefore destabilizes a core tenet of sovereign power: 
As the modern political imagination remains fixated on the citizen as the authentic political 
identity (…) it is not surprising that refugees (as the absence of that identity and 
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subjectivity) are stripped of all political agency and deemed temporary, “emergency” 
situations.51 
The instability that migrants bring to the sovereign state’s position as the supreme 
power over territory and population means that their relationship with state 
apparatuses of control is a particularly relevant site to study the construction of 
sovereignty. Yet although the conceptual tools that these arguments about migrants 
and sovereignty develop are highly useful; in the Syrian context in which this thesis 
unfolds, they only apply to a limited degree. In Syria, the construction of modern 
sovereignty is incomplete and the concept of citizen and migrant not clearly 
demarcated. Indeed, as will be shown, the interventions by other states and UN-
institutions in the lives of Iraqi migrants in Damascus introduced modern sovereign 
practices to Syria, spreading new forms of exclusion and governance.  
As referred to above, a further important aspect of sovereignty’s exclusionary 
mechanism applies to space and territory.52 The principle of territorial exclusivity, 
which rewards sovereign states the right to be the supreme power in their territory 
under international law, is recognised as the basis of modern sovereignty. While in 
practice this principle often does not apply and is not a useful way to understand 
sovereign power, it draws attention to the perceived importance of territorial 
boundaries and territorial exclusion. Arjun Appadurai discusses the importance of the 
social construction of territory in his analysis of the tension between migration and 
the modern nation state.53  Appadurai argues that as nations are being articulated in 
translocal spaces, nation is becoming separated from territory. Although he does not 
focus on exclusion explicitly, his description of sub- and supra-state social spaces 
shows the importance of the social production of space for territorial sovereignty. 
According to the narrative of sovereignty, only as long as a state’s territory maintains 
its hegemony as the dominant social space that people believe in and whose 
boundaries they respect, can territorial sovereignty be maintained. Appadurai argues 
that the social production of locality emerges through people’s attachment to their 
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neighbourhoods, local streets, times and places of meeting and always presents a 
challenge to the needs of the nation-state for regulated public life.  Now, as 
international movement of people and goods has accelerated to unprecedented degree, 
diaspora communities, border zones, refugee camps or migrant hostels all present 
spaces that link localities in different states; they are trans-local. Social activist 
networks or transnational religious formations are further examples of such trans-
localities that undermine states’ claims that their territory and its boundaries are the 
prime locus of citizens’ lives and loyalties. In this situation, territory becomes a 
crucial marker of sovereignty, as states have little else to monopolize. Physical and 
imagined threats that undermine the “isomorphism of people, territory and legitimate 
sovereignty” that is the “normative charter of the modern nation state”, are therefore 
met with severe attempts to control them.54  
Socially constructed exclusions, by marking parts of the population as different and  
unworthy of political participation, or by marking localities as lying outside the 
imagined sovereign space,  thus emerge as a crucial battlegrounds in the struggle for 
sovereignty and open further research avenues to find explanations for how and why 
migration and the spaces in which migrants live are of such importance for state 
control.  
Sovereignty in everyday life 
As a second theme of importance, critical examinations of sovereignty show that 
sovereignty does not spring from a single, central sovereign source, arguing that this 
frequently implicit concept is a fallacy. Sovereignty, according to this argument, 
should not be understood as a centralised node of power, sitting in the ‘middle’ and 
‘above’ society, but rather as being exercised through an infinite number of locations 
and social relationships.  
Writers on this topic owe an intellectual debt to Foucault, whose lecture series at the 
Collège de France in the 1970s launched a critical assault on mainstream 
understandings of sovereignty and state power, which are of continued relevance to 
current theorising. Foucault's arguments about sovereignty only emerge as a side 
product of his analyses of other social phenomena, are scattered throughout his 
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publications and do not present a coherent body of thought. Of importance are his 
explanations of the evolution of state power Europe since the early Middle Ages, 
which argue that new technologies, conquests, population growth, forms of economic 
production and changes to beliefs and philosophy gradually displaced the divine 
sovereignty of God and King as legitimacy and foundation of the state. Most 
famously, he provides an explanation of power as discipline, which is exercised over 
populations through the state apparatuses of security, education, health, law and 
economy, and results in their self-governance. One of the most important conclusions 
arising from the idea of power as discipline concerns the type of research method that 
needs to be employed to investigate power. Discipline is a process in which persons 
learn what behaviour is to be understood as good and will go unpunished; it is highly 
individual and personal, requiring very detailed social interventions conducted 
through close social relations. Collecting evidence of how these interventions function 
can best be conducted through ethnographic tools; either through direct observation 
and interviews, or archival and documentary research of sources in which such social 
interventions are recorded.  
Countless authors have built on Foucault's notion of governmentality in their 
explorations of how states are established as the ultimate power over the individual 
and society.55 One very useful concept of 'social sovereignty' emerges from an essay 
by Robert Latham, in which he argues that sovereignty is more firmly located in 
structures of social relations than in agents (while both are mutually constitutive).56 
Latham argues that the reason that states have become so closely associated with 
sovereignty is their historical development into “remarkable machines for centering 
social sovereign structures around them”.57 Latham introduces the concept of domains 
of sovereignty, such as economy, healthcare or law.  The construction of these 
domains depends on mechanisms (such as technologies, positive law, constitutions 
and administrative tools) and on the capacity of rulers to deploy agents (such as 
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professionals, the military, public servants and so on) to utilize these mechanisms. He 
argues that sovereignty can attach to a wider range of structures than those of the state 
and that it is a body of social relations that shapes spheres of life, which operate 
within or across state boundaries. Crucially he states that  
“Engines that generate social sovereignty involve action that constitutes or maintains 
structures of relations (such as the passing of legislation, the construction of classification 
systems and the collection of statistics). Engines that are generated by social sovereignty 
emerge as repertoires of agency manifested especially in roles and identifies specific to a 
domain (such as tax payer, patient, immigrant or consumer).” (my emphasis).58 
There are a number of problematic points in Latham’s argument; his conception of the 
state and ‘the social’ is confusing and his distinction between agents and structures 
and their relation with the state are unclear. However his points about the close 
connection between ideas, located in codified social relations, and the repertoires of 
agency through which they transform into daily-lived experience are important. 
Latham’s argument clarifies that the site of sovereignty’s reproduction, its diffuse 
source, is located on the one hand in beliefs and in the other hand in the actions that 
these beliefs produce.  
A highly relevant research piece into such micro-strategies through which sovereignty 
becomes lived experience is provided in a paper about the daily workings in a UK 
migrant-detention facility.59 Hall’s paper focuses on how the facility’s personnel acts 
out their roles as the “‘guardians’ of the sovereign frontier between inclusion and 
exclusion” and how the central task of classifying and categorizing the detained 
migrants is achieved through techniques of scanning and scrutinizing.60 In Hall’s 
view, the detention of migrants is a mechanisms that allows the sovereign narrative to 
continue, because it hides the expulsions and violent struggles, the ‘grinding 
mechanisms’ of sovereign power. The actual lived processes through which the 
political status of a migrant, whether s/he is allowed to form part of the ‘inside’ or is 
to be expelled unmourned, is determined, presents sovereignty’s exclusionary 
mechanisms in all their banality and violence. In the detention centre, the ideas of 
national purity, security and stability become translated into the routines of body-
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searching, vigilance and note-taking by detention officers, including the physical and 
psychological toll these processes have on both migrants and their guardians. Hall’s 
piece showcases the combination of critical, constructivist analysis and ethnographic 
fieldwork that this thesis aims for; her arguments combine elements of post-modern 
theory, but show awareness to the particular time and place, with its contingent social 
and economic context, in which her research takes place. This analytic approach 
allows Hall to make use of her data to deliver far more than classic anthropological 
description; she can mobilize it to present convincing evidence for her theoretical 
points.  
A further strong example of research into the small, every-day techniques that 
produce sovereignty is presented in various writings by James Ferguson and Akhil 
Gupta, most clearly in their article “Spatialising States”.61 The authors are interested 
in the construction of state hierarchies, i.e. how the impression that power springs 
from those ‘higher up’ or from the ‘central’ government is created. Arguing that such 
perceptions of verticality and encompassment are created through routine bureaucratic 
practices, they use ethnographic data from a state-run, rural development project to 
illustrate their argument. The data shows, for example, how statistical record keeping 
enables senior state officials, who have access to the records of all projects within a 
district, to survey a large terrain, which produces the impression of encompassment or 
centrality of the state. While senior officials often conduct surprise control-visits of 
local projects, enabled through their possession of a jeep, local project workers can 
only visit headquarters at circumscribed times; through this process the impression of 
the centrality of the state officials is re-enforced. A further important point made by 
Ferguson in various writings is his proposal to “extend the discussion of 
governmentality to modes of government that are being set up on a global scale”.62 
Here, Ferguson is referring to techniques and regulations of institutions such as the 
WTO and the IMF, however arguably his idea can be extended to UN agencies and 
other humanitarian actors. The relevance of these actors to the construction of 
sovereignty lies in their complete adherence to sovereignty’s narrative, including its 
practices of exclusion, identity and spatial construction. As will be shown in this 
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thesis, UNHCR’s programmes of refugee registration and resettlement, which are 
based on the same procedures globally, attempted to produce the identities and 
behaviour of Iraqi migrants in line with the principles of state sovereignty.   
Questions of method 
As already discussed in the sections above, this thesis is broadly located in the 
interpretive tradition of social science enquiry; however also takes some influences 
from critical international relations theory. The following paragraphs will set out the 
epistemological assumptions on which this thesis’ overall approach to knowledge and 
analysis of the human world is based, and will also briefly explain the methods and 
principles followed during field research.   
Interpretive, materialist and critical theory 
Scholars working in the interpretive (or hermeneutical) tradition argue that the social 
world of humans differs fundamentally from the natural world of chemical elements 
and physics, mainly because humans are self-reflective beings of intentional action.63 
From this realisation flows the argument that it is not useful to apply natural science 
research methods to social science enquiry, which has been the dominant approach 
since the 1950s, especially in the United States. This position contains a critique of 
positivist science, which argues that experimental hypothesis-testing can discover 
recurring patterns of human behaviour that are widely applicable across social and 
historical contexts. More broadly, the interpretive position expresses scepticism 
towards the historical process of the Enlightenment and the related unbridled belief in 
human reason, equated with technical manipulation of nature, as a way of bettering 
the world. This is not to say that the hermeneutical position is not also a product of 
the Enlightenment-attitude, which is characterised by a questioning, critical mindset 
towards the contemporary human condition.64 
The search for robust models and parsimonious theories, extracted from large-N 
statistical studies and designed to allow predictions about future actions is deeply 
misled, as such studies necessarily rely on abstractions from history and culture that 
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render them meaningless. Instead, researchers should aim to understand the meaning 
that human beings attach to their actions, through which explanations for social 
phenomena emerge. Foucault in particular calls for an approach that is  “genealogical 
in design and archeological in method”, and urges attention to minute social changes 
rather than focussing on universalising models or structures.65 As it is impossible for 
the researcher to extract herself from the social world she inhabits, the search for an 
objective, neutral position vis-à-vis the human research objective is futile. Aiming to 
discover fixed laws that govern human, social existence is a fallacy, because the 
meaning of human action changes from time to time, from place to place, from person 
to person. The most a researcher can aim for is to interpret human behaviour against a 
particular historical and cultural backdrop and apply her collected knowledge, 
intuition and imagination to present suggestions about how to explain certain social 
phenomena. This last point summarises this thesis’ approach to knowledge about the 
human world.  
The epistemological and ontological bases of interpretive science fit very well with 
this thesis’ methodological outlook. But hermeneutics’ emphasis on inter-subjectivity 
and meaning are not fully adequate tools to support the argument for the social 
construction of state sovereignty, which requires some grounding in a theory of the 
international. Further, the argument that bureaucratic techniques and administrative 
procedures incorporate power relations also transcends the interpretive scholar’s 
search for meaning and involves a theoretical position that takes into account more 
strongly the material existence of humans and how it shapes their lives. A second 
important argument on which this thesis relies is therefore that human life is rooted in 
its material existence; that is to say that human beings’ bodily and historical 
experience places limits on their social life and subjectivity. While Marx’ famous 
slogan that the “Sein bestimmt das Bewusstsein” is too insistent on material 
experience as the cornerstone of subjectivity, his argument that how humans work, 
eat, suffer and play fundamentally influences how they interpret the social is correct. 
The crucial aspect arising from this realisation in terms of methodological debates, is 
that an interpretive position does not necessarily translate into anti-empiricism and 
purely abstract theorising. Although interpretive scholars are necessarily 
constructivists, as they believe that explanations of social phenomena have to be 
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sought in conjunction with what humans believe, many nevertheless ground their 
analysis in an interpretation of empirical material. The crucial connection between the 
physical and the constructed emerges from the position that human beings’ beliefs are 
reproduced or at least stand in a close relation to their physical actions that can be 
empirically observed. This conviction inspires a requirement for in-depth, 
ethnographic field research, which allows the researcher to observe at least some of 
the most basic material relations in the context of study.   
A fantastic example of such an approach is shown in Geertz’ article “Deep Play”, 
which interprets the social meaning of cock fights in Bali.66 Geertz’ argument that the 
meaning of these fights goes far beyond popular entertainment is made highly 
convincing through the in-depth ethnographic material that it is based on. Geertz’s 
observations and participation in these fights, and his consequent analysis, lead him to 
the conclusion that the fights play a crucial social role, as they reflect Bali’s social 
hierarchy and the Balinese way of dealing with emotions and violence. Through 
joining the fights, Balinese men learn and reproduce their social reality, which thus 
gets reinforced. But as mentioned above, the international aspect of this thesis, which 
mainly concerns inter-state relations and state boundaries, requires a theoretical 
grounding that extends inter-subjectivity and the extremely local. Some aspects of 
critical international relations theory, especially its Gramscian-inspired version 
developed by Robert Cox, provide ideas and concepts for how to approach the 
international from an interpretive and materially grounded perspective.   
Eminent IR scholar Robert Cox formulated the basic tenets of a critical IR method in 
a number of essays.67 According to Cox, critical theory questions the origins of 
political order, rather than taking its institutions and power relations as constitutive. 
Instead of subdividing the world into discreet, fixed entities, critical theory seeks to 
understand how the perceived parts and whole of the order are connected through 
processes of change. Importantly, critical theory takes into consideration historical 
experience and development and is aware that theory itself is a product of time and 
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perspective and can never be objective.68 In this it differs substantially from neo-
realist methods, which seek to establish timeless concepts and stable, causal 
mechanisms to explain the world. Cox argues for the possibility of considering the 
world order as a whole, but warns against reifying a world system made up of stable, 
unchanging units (which is how realist international relations theory conceptualises 
states). Eloquently he calls on international relations’ theorists to be  
“Beware of underrating state power, but in addition give proper attention to social forces 
and processes and see how they relate to the development of states and world orders. Above 
all, do not base theory on theory but rather on changing practice and empirical-historical 
study, which are a proving ground for concepts and hypothesis.”69 
This position allows for conceptualising the world order in its complexity, based on 
constant – and of course never fully graspable – human action, change and historical 
experience. While Cox’s critics justifiably argue that he in turn reifies critical theory 
and his ideas about human emancipation (failing to reflect on their historical 
conditionality and hidden values), it is his view of the connection between the 
necessarily abstract world order and human practices that this thesis draws on. Cox 
acknowledges the debt that he owes to Gramsci’s concept of (national) hegemony, 
created through particular social relations and maintaining an unequal power dynamic 
between different classes.70 Extending this concept to the international allows for a 
conceptualisation of how the global spread and continuation of the sovereign-state 
model also has to do with the way it redistributes power and resources (coercion and 
consent) at local levels. In the following chapters of this thesis, this theoretical 
approach enables an analysis, for example, of the way the Syrian state made use of 
Iraqi migration to bolster its sovereignty abroad and the role that the large-scale 
financial flows from donor states to Syria played in maintaining the sovereign ideal.  
Ethnographic fieldwork 
This work is based on a six-month research stay in Damascus, Syria, which was 
informed by one previous six-month and several short-term visits. During this time, I 
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collected information about the general living conditions of Iraqi migrants, and about 
the interventions that the Syrian state, humanitarian actors and other states made into 
Iraqi migrant lives. Such interventions included, for example, the obtaining of 
residency permits, the requesting of detailed personal information by international 
organisations and the resettlement programmes of a number of states. As research 
methods I relied on ethnographic participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews, mainly with Iraqi migrants and UN and NGO professionals. A smaller 
number of interviews were conducted with Syrians, who possessed particular 
expertise or experience of Syrian state power and processes. Overall, information was 
obtained directly and indirectly of around 80 Iraqis and humanitarian experts. 
Although ethnographic research is necessarily carried out in a local setting, a recent 
trend has applied this method to global phenomena, embedding it in the world 
system.71 It is according to this strategy, that this thesis combines ethnography with an 
analysis of the social production of sovereignty. Ethnographic participant observation 
involves structured observation of a particular social setting in which the observer 
participates to varying degrees. A researcher might choose to observe an event from 
the margins (moderate participation), engage in most areas of her informants’ life 
(active participation) or become a full member of the group studied (complete 
participation).72 The research for this thesis made use of all these categories of 
participation, depending on the varied situations encountered. From the outset the 
overall aim was to spend as much time with as many informants as possible to learn 
about Iraqi migrants’ lives in Damascus. The goal to maintain meaningful 
relationships with at least a significant portion of informants automatically limited 
their number.   
Through long-term observation, ethnographers aim to understand and record as 
accurately as possible the daily routines of their informants, the value they attach to 
their activities and why they conduct them.  Participant observation is therefore a tool 
for data collection and a form of analysis, which has as its aim a more systematic 
understanding of the culture of a particular population or site .  The primary way of 
capturing data in participant observation is through maintaining extensive field notes, 
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and during my time in Damascus I recorded  dozens of conversations, impressions 
and interviews . Field notes are of primary importance and much has been written 
about how the notes should be maintained and preserved.73 While continuing as the 
mainstay research method in anthropology, participant observation has also attracted 
criticism from different camps. Debates have focused on three main areas of criticism: 
firstly, the problem of the researcher's own biases and how they affect his or her 
observation, secondly, how the researcher's presence affect people's behaviour and 
thus distorts findings and thirdly, the ethical problems attached to participant 
observation. Arguably, all three criticisms are valid points and cannot be fully 
eradicated, however by using certain techniques, the researcher can minimize their 
impact.74 Different ethnographers will always focus on different aspects of 
observation: while one will perhaps focus on spatial elements of an event and note 
down related details, another will focus on the emotions in an interaction, another on 
the present social hierarchies and so forth.75 As laid out above, the achievement of an 
objective, Archimedean research perspective is neither realistic nor desirable. Instead, 
when presenting results of ethnographic research, authors should describe their own, 
personal position in the field and make the related restraints explicit to the reader as 
far as possible.76 Various authors argue that only by spending extended periods of 
time in the company of informants is it possible for the researcher to develop such 
rapport with informants that they will be at ease around her and be open to nosy 
questions being asked of them and having a stranger in their midst. While this is 
clearly crucial, it is also important to realise that the reaction to and relationship built 
with the observer also forms part of the research and is not an aspect that should be 
hidden or glossed over. Finally, participant observation also poses a number of ethical 
problems, for which it has garnered criticism and of which the researcher needs to be 
aware. The principle problem lies in the tension between developing the above-
mentioned trust and even friendship with one's informants and at the same time 
observing them scientifically for one's research. As a guiding rule, informants should 
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be made aware that they are being observed for a particular research project and 
should be informed as to the nature of this project. During my research in Damascus, I 
was always open with informants and friends about the purpose of my stay, however 
also experienced repeatedly the feeling of cheating or deceiving informants, who had 
become friends, and who probably often forgot that in the evenings, I would record 
what they had told me. By ensuring that all fieldnotes were anonymized and hidden in 
particularly secure software on my laptop, I at least was able to feel certain that 
nothing that they told me could be accessed by third parties.  Researchers clearly 
should be aware of the potentially unequal power dynamic that exists between them 
and their informants and should be wary of any expectations that they might raise, be 
they emotional or material. Finally, many anthropologists urge researchers to share 
their findings in one way or another with the community that they have worked in, be 
it through a workshop with their direct informants or a seminar at a local university – 
a number of such options are discussed in the literature.77 While I hope to share the 
academic results with some informants, in Damascus I volunteered as a teacher for an 
organisation preparing Iraqi teenagers for university in the US and have supported a 
number of informants when they ran into legal problems relating to their residency in 
Syria.  
Conclusion 
As set out above, this thesis presents an analysis of the social construction of 
sovereignty in a particular setting, that of Iraqi migration to Damascus. By drawing on 
writings about sovereignty from modern writers such as Arendt and post-modern 
critics such as Ashley and Walker it establishes sovereignty as a historically 
contingent form of political organisation, connected to particular ideas about territory, 
population and government. State sovereignty developed from the political formation 
of European medieval monarchies, whose sovereignty was understood and legitimised 
by contemporary theorists in reference to the divine and god’s order. In the 14th 
century, the idea of sovereignty as an indivisible and absolute power, without which 
the existence of a state was doomed, first emerged in the writings of Jean Bodin. The 
growing territorialisation of monarchic power in the 15th century, which gradually 
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displaced the complex, medieval web of independent entities to focus all power on the 
king or queen, was accompanied by theories of sovereignty which linked territory, 
population and monarch into a single body politic, which was based on human 
rationality, rather than the divine (see for example Hobbes’ Leviathan). The theorists 
of the popular revolutions in the US and France rejected the previous, absolutist ideas 
about sovereignty, and developed ideas about communal sovereignty and popular 
will. Yet they did not succeed in producing a fundamentally new theory of 
sovereignty to accompany the rapid social changes across the globe. This thesis 
follows Foucault’s dismissal of most current theorising about sovereignty as “utterly 
incongruous” with the forms of power and political organisation on which it is based 
today.  
The critical eye that post-modern IR scholars cast on the scholarship of sovereignty 
since the 1990s led to several important insights about how sovereignty was 
constructed. Ideas about the social exclusion, the physical and intellectual barriers on 
which sovereignty was maintained in politics and the academy began to circulate. The 
figure of the migrant, and migration as a broader social phenomenon, was recognised 
in many of these writings as a crucial site for the construction of sovereign borders 
and exclusions, as migrants challenge a number of important concepts on which 
sovereignty rests. Yet partly due to the inherently theoretical research methods 
employed by most IR scholars, these writings remained highly theoretical and told 
little about the physical practices that maintained sovereignty in daily life. Supported 
by anthropological studies of how sovereignty-related ideas are performed and 
experienced in a variety of locations, this thesis argues that the daily-life practices that 
establish and contest sovereignty can be observed through ethnographic field 
research. Recently, such research has been used to explore, for example, how custom 
officials at an airport translated legal concepts of sovereignty into work routines and 
treatment of passengers,  showing how sovereignty becomes a lived experience and is 
reinforced when challenged by a mobile citizenry that undermines ideas about 
territoriality and nationhood. Other studies have focused on the bureaucratic systems 
through which states exercise sovereign authority or on the categorisation and 
management of space that construct locations as lying outside of the sovereign body 
politic. By recording and analysing the sovereignty-reproducing techniques applied to 
Iraqi migrants in Damascus by states and international organisations, this thesis 
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makes it possible to understand how sovereignty endures and transforms in light of 
challenges such as migration.  
The theoretical approach of this thesis is broadly located in the interpretive tradition 
of social science, assuming that no objective position of researcher towards object of 
study is possible. As meaning in the human world is constantly changing from person 
to person and place to place, the search for fixed rules that govern human behaviour is 
futile. Instead, the researcher has to apply knowledge, experience and imagination to 
suggest solutions for social puzzles against a particular historical backdrop. Yet in 
addition to awarding importance to interpretation and variable meaning, it is 
important to recognise the materiality of life, which fundamentally influences  human 
existence and the way humans understand their world. Interpretation can only succeed 
when it is based on an understanding of the physical life circumstances of the people 
that it seeks to study. From this approach flows the necessity of empirical research 
that this thesis calls for. The six-months fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in 
Damascus using participant observation and interviews with particularly well 
informed stakeholders, mainly Iraqis and employees at international organisations. 
Direct and indirect information was collected from around 80 Iraqis and around 20 in-
depth interviews conducted. The arguments and conclusions set out in the following 
chapters are drawn from hundreds of pages of field notes and interview transcripts, 
analysed through a thematic approach and a close reading of the material.  
The following chapter structure unfolds as follows. Chapter two presents an overview 
of the research setting, and a broad analysis of the phenomenon of Iraqi migration to 
Damascus. By showing the very different practices through which the Syrian 
government chose to govern Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, a first example of the 
construction of domestic and international sovereign spaces through practices is 
examined. Chapter three analyses the role of the Syrian state in Iraqi migrant lives in 
greater detail. The numerous examples of how the Syrian government ensured the 
presence of state sovereignty in the daily life of Iraqis are used to make the argument 
that in Syria, state sovereignty was constructed through very different social relations 
than those assumed by the ‘sovereign ideal’. Chapter four focuses on UNHCR and the 
organisation’s interventions into the management of Iraqi migration from the 
perspective of sovereignty. The chapter argues that UNHCR’s programmes were 
based on the ‘sovereign ideal’ of international law and the unity of territory, 
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population and government and in this way presented a number of contradictions to 
the way Iraqis were integrated into the Syrian body politic by the Syrian state. 
Chapter five considers the involvement of other states, especially of donor states in 
Europe and the US in the management of Iraqi migrants to Syria. An overview of this 
involvement is followed up with a more detailed analysis of the US and of Germany, 
and how each state’s procedures and regulations categorised and governed Iraqis 
through constructions of sovereignty. Chapter six returns to the humanitarian sector 
and analyses the role of international NGOs. INGOs were a new phenomenon in 
Damascus and the interactions between their staff and Syrian ministries gave insights 
into how sovereignty-constructing practices become transformed through the 
interactions between actors, who interpret the meaning and content of state 
sovereignty differently. The way that INGOs portrayed Iraqis according to the 
sovereign ideal is also discussed, due to the illuminating contrast this portrayal made 
with actual reality of Iraqi life in Damascus. 
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Chapter 2 
Damascus, Iraqi Migrants and the Researcher’s Position in 
the Field 
 
 
Before setting out to Damascus to conduct the field research for this thesis, I read a 
number of handbooks on ethnographic research. I had previously lived in the city for 
six months while working as a journalist, and felt that I was already relatively familiar 
with its environment. Yet the literature on ethnography, with its emphasis on the 
importance for a researcher to be aware of, and critically reflect, her own position in 
the field, invited me to reassess my knowledge of the city. Such awareness was 
deemed crucial to avoid accepting personal perceptions as objective knowledge and to 
be aware of how one’s age, gender, marital status, clothing or time would influence 
the research process.78 The relevance of positionality came home to me when re-
reading a field note taken after a first visit to the Damascene suburb Jaramana, where 
I would later live for several months. While the note’s descriptions of the area’s 
physical features contained nothing surprising, the comment that “the longer I walked 
around, the more paranoid I started feeling with regards to being watched by the 
authorities”79 now struck me as very different to the much more relaxed attitude I felt 
after Jaramana had become my temporary home.80 A few weeks after I had walked 
the neighbourhood’s streets on a daily basis, my interpretation of its space had 
significantly changed from what it had been during the first visit. This change surely 
occurred due to my adaptation, but perhaps also due to subtle changes in how 
Jaramana’s inhabitants received me in their neighbourhood once I had become a 
familiar sight. Perhaps also (and perhaps not) local intelligence officers, once they 
had checked my presence and decided that I was of no of importance, refrained from 
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paying the attention they had given me during my first visit. This episode highlighted 
the intensely personal experience of field research and the difficulty with which 
arguments and description are extracted from observations and interviews. While this 
thesis’ key points rely on relatively undisputed events witnessed during research, they 
are nevertheless also an interpretation of these events that another person might not 
have arrived at. To better explain the argumentations’ underlying reasoning and the 
experience that informs it, it is useful to begin it with a ‘thick’ description of the 
circumstances in which field research was undertaken. This thick description is the 
purpose of this chapter.81   
The chapter begins with an introduction to the cityscape of Damascus, and the general 
living conditions it presented to its varied population in 2009 and 2010. The 
challenges of Damascus’ urban sprawl, dotted with government propaganda, were a 
daily reality for every person who crossed the city and spent some days there; so were 
the geographical realities of desert climate and of the dry Qasiun Mountain, hovering 
over the city’s centre. Secondly, the chapter presents a description and analysis of the 
city’s social-scape, with the goal of introducing the way that the expression of social 
identity in Syria was linked to national, regional and global politics, which translated 
into local techniques of governance. Thirdly, an overview of Iraqi migration to 
Damascus will attempt to demonstrate on the one hand the key parameters of Iraqi life 
in the city and on the other the key assumptions that informed the contemporary 
discourse about Iraqi migration to Syria – among Iraqis, Syrians and foreign aid 
workers. Lastly, the fourth section of this chapter discusses my particular experience 
and position in the field, highlighting those elements of which I was keenly aware 
from the start, others that I became aware of during and after research and, naturally, 
leaving out those that did not, and might not ever, occur to me.  
The cityscape of Damascus  
According to the Syrian government’s Central Bureau of Statistics, central Damascus 
and its suburbs, which form an administratively separate area called ‘Damascus 
Countryside’ (‘dimashq rīf’), were, in 2009, home to around 4.3 million people.82 The 
bureaucratic distinction between the two areas stems from a time when Damascus was 
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a compact city surrounded by fields and farms and had not yet developed into today’s 
urban sprawl, in which the now developed suburbs are linked to the centre by 
motorways, lined with low-rise, often illegally constructed habitats.83 Damascus’ 
rapid population growth has not been accompanied by related political or bureaucratic 
reforms, which is also apparent from the city’s overloaded infrastructure and failing 
public services.  
Centre, suburbs and the old city 
The continuing administrative separation between centre and suburbs, which 
privileged central Damascus in terms of government attention and investment, was 
reflected in design and architecture. Whereas central Damascus exhibited quite 
careful urban planning, such as tree-lined boulevards, homogeneous groups of 
apartment buildings and decorated city squares, suburbs were often characterised by 
much rougher infrastructure, unfinished roads and buildings interspersed with 
undeveloped land and narrow, uneven lanes.84  
 
Two extremes – a central and a suburban square 
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Central areas also enjoyed a much better availability of services, such as garbage 
collection, water and electricity supply; of education, health and leisure facilities, and 
public transport. While central streets were swept daily by government employees 
pushing large, metal trolleys, suburban areas were much less well maintained, to the 
degree that in some areas garbage festered in unofficial dumps between buildings. 
Central Damascus was home to the French, German and Spanish cultural centres, 
offering language classes, exhibitions and cinema programmes, a number of high-end 
hotels, private galleries and public museums, and hosted governmental buildings and 
embassies. While some of the wealthier suburbs were served by upscale restaurants, 
and many private schools and universities were also located in new developments out 
of town, in the poorest suburbs all of these services were absent.  
An exceptional urban space was presented by Damascus’ old city, ‘dimashq al-
qadīma’, which in 2009 had shrunk in relative size to a tiny part of the city’s surface 
and lay outside of the centre-suburb divide (administratively it formed part of the 
central Damascus governorate).  The old city’s exceptional position arose from its 
architecture (that of a medieval, walled city), its status as a tourist attraction and as a 
symbol of national pride, and its protection under the UNESCO world heritage 
programme. The area was a popular place for foreign language students to find 
accommodation and to spend leisure time, and, in the past 10 years, had developed 
into Damascus’ entertainment mile, as more and more ancient houses were renovated 
and turned into restaurants, cafes and hotels. These renovations were linked to the 
rediscovery of the old city as a source of pride and heritage, as well as a commercial 
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opportunity, after decades of neglect.85 The old city also housed the Ummayad 
Mosque, a world-famous monument considered the fourth holiest place in Islam, 
which was a focus for tourists and, particularly on Fridays, worshippers (Friday is the 
Muslim holiday). Several of Damascus’ oldest and most famous markets were located 
in close vicinity to the mosque, which were often crowded with shoppers from around 
the world.  These different characteristics of the old city combined to the effect that it 
was much more well-known than other neighbourhoods, and most of my Syrian, Iraqi 
and international interlocutors had visited it at least once, if not regularly. The first 
three months of my fieldwork I rented a room in the old city, sharing with the 
landlady, her mother and two French women. 
Heavy Traffic 
While many of the narrow lanes in the old city were only accessible to pedestrians, 
any person venturing beyond them had to navigate Damascus’ very heavy traffic, 
which only subsided at night and on holidays. Streets were constantly filled with 
yellow taxis, a common form of public transport, mini-busses serving fixed routes, 
picking up passengers along the way, state-owned buses and cars. Large motorways 
crisscrossed the city and motorised transport was the main means of moving around; 
mopeds were a rare sight and bicycles even rarer, generally only used for short 
distances and only by men. Luxury cars such as BMW, Mercedes or Porsche were 
also rare, however their numbers appeared to have been growing since a few years, 
due to recent easing of import restrictions and growing concentration of wealth; most 
cars were Korean imports. Air pollution, compounded by dust during dry weather, 
was heavy throughout the centre; the cleaner air of the more distant suburbs was often 
remarked upon by inhabitants as the key, if not only, benefit to living there. Buildings 
in the city centre were blackened from fumes, emitted by cars and in winter by 
heating stoves, which ran on diesel oil and released the fumes unfiltered into the air.  
Buying a private car was very expensive in Syria, due to a punishing tax regime. As 
an example, one of my Syrian friends with a good job in the private sector in 2009 
bought herself a seven-year old Korean car for USD 10,000 (the monthly average 
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wage for a Syrian civil servant at that time stood at under USD 300).  Many people 
therefore rode privately-operated mini-busses (called serviis or micro), public busses 
or taxis. Trying to squeeze onto a bus at rush hour or waiting as already full micros 
passed without stopping, or eventually hailing a taxi in frustration, was a frequent 
experience for myself and many people I observed and interviewed. While bus or 
micro fares were low at SYP 10 (around 15 US cents), a short taxi ride could quickly 
amount to SYP 50 (around 1 USD), and a ride across town to SYP 100. Taxi drivers 
were considered by all my Syrian, Iraqi and international acquaintances (and by 
myself) as notorious cheats, inflating their prices especially for foreigners, with whom 
it was easier to claim a broken taximeter and to charge a random, inflated price. 
Several of my Iraqi interlocutors mentioned, sometimes laughingly, sometimes 
angrily, that once they had mastered the Syrian dialect, they always pretended to be 
Syrian when riding a taxi, to avoid being cheated. As the transport system was only 
moderately well integrated, walking lengthy distances along busy roads often became 
necessary to access the nearest bus stop or taxi stand. Such trips often added 
significant time to public transport, and contributed to the tiring experience of 
journeying around the city.  
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Traffic downtown Damascus 
Living and shopping 
Generally, Damascene neighbourhoods did not clearly distinguish between residential 
and commercial zones. A frequently encountered neighbourhood design consisted of 
one or two central arteries lined with shops, restaurants, internet cafes, beauty salons 
and hairdressers, from which residential areas fanned out to either side. Although 
commercial activity was concentrated along the main streets, all manners of shops 
would still be found on the quieter streets between apartment blocks. Supermarkets 
offering a wide range of goods were rare and considered expensive; food shopping 
was generally conducted at local shops focused on one item, such as greengrocers, 
butchers, fishmongers, bakeries, sweet and dried-goods shops. Most residential blocks 
also had one small corner shop covering basic needs items. Most personal goods and 
services were thus sold through small, individually-owned outlets, in which the owner 
himself often served, or his relatives. The small number of existing chain-stores, such 
as a small, local chain of upmarket cafes, malls and supermarkets were all located in 
expensive neighbourhoods and catered to the growing numbers of expatriates living in 
Syria, other wealthy foreigners and Syrians. Certain specialised commercial areas 
existed, grouping together dozens of shops all concentrating on the same goods (such 
areas are referred to as ‘markets’ in Arabic). For example, after I had searched 
intensively for a large bath towel all over town, eventually I was advised to visit a 
specialised ‘market’ in the old city; and indeed, once there, found several streets of 
shops selling only towels and linen.  
Propaganda 
One aspect common to all neighbourhoods, whether central or suburban, residential or 
commercial was the presence of presidential and Baʿth party propaganda. Portraits of 
the current president Bashar al-Asad adorned walls, government buildings, billboards, 
murals, shop walls and car windows. Mostly, they showed a portrait of the president 
from the chest upwards, but the style of the portray varied: sometimes, he was shown 
simply wearing a brown suit and tie, sometimes he was in full military gear including 
aviator sunglasses and cap, more recently he was also portrayed against a background 
of Arabic calligraphy, giving him a pious air. The latest development in Syrian 
propaganda art were modern, hard-plastic billboards (the kind that in the UK are 
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integrated into bus stops), which show the president strolling towards the viewer, 
waving, together with a slogan such as “we are all with you”.86 Painted images or 
photographs of Bashshar al-Asad’s late father, Syria’s former president Hafiz al-
Asad, and Bashshar’s late older brother Basil al-Asad were also frequent; Hafiz al-
Asad was occasionally presented in form of a statue or bust. Frequently, Hafiz and his 
two sons were shown together, wearing military caps and looking stern. Another, less 
frequent image was a joint-portray of Bashshar and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of 
Hizbullah; this one I only ever saw adorning cars and as smaller posters. Another 
rarer image showed Bashshar as the family man surrounded by wife and children. 
Many of the presidential images were painted on official buildings and in this way 
highlighted the frequency of state- and party-affiliated institutions around town. These 
ranged from large complexes for ministries, to smaller buildings for unions, police or 
military stations, schools, training and research institutions and various others, all 
being a constant reminder of the dominance of the president and the party over all 
state and many other institutions governing public life.  
Lisa Wedeen in her famous book Ambiguities of Domination presents an analysis of 
Syrian government propaganda during the 1990s, and her argument that it served to 
‘clutter’ the imagination and the public arena, filling every nook and cranny and 
leaving no physical or mental space for other representations was still valid in 2009 
and 2010.87 To demonstrate the effect of this ‘cluttering’, the appearance of a large 
number of Iraqi election posters in advance of Iraq’s national elections in March 2010 
came as a surprise, if not shock to me. The sudden presence of large photographs of 
politicians other than Asad seemed incongruous and strange.88 A similar feeling of 
surprise overcame me on the two occasions that I travelled by taxi from Damascus to 
Beirut, when shortly after the border large banners advertising various politicians 
appeared. The sudden absence of Asad’s images, and the plurality of pictures, served 
(to me) as a much stronger marker that I had crossed into another state, than the 
lengthy border proceedings. Interested in the long-term effect of the Syrian 
government’s ‘cluttering’, I asked three Syrian acquaintances about whether they 
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were still consciously aware of the propaganda when moving around Damascus. Two 
replied that yes, they always noticed it, one of them pointing out the newest images, 
characterising them as “provocative”. The third however stated that for him, the 
posters and billboards simply formed part of the city’s backdrop and that he never 
consciously considered at least the visual aspects of the propaganda. Although such 
informal answers and observations do not reveal much about the overall effect of the 
propaganda, they pointed out its importance as a technique through which Syrian state 
agents exercised state sovereignty. Apart from images, the visual aspect of the 
propaganda included slogans, mainly those of the Baʿth  party (“unity, freedom, 
socialism”), but also others, often designed to address various particular social 
groups, be it students, Palestinians or…Iraqis: 
  
“I am Iraqi, I have Iraqi citizenship and do not want any other. Only al-Asad and the Syrian people 
opened their doors to Iraqis, the rest of the Arabs ask for an official visa.” 
Climate 
Damascus was founded on the banks of the river Barada, which together with seven 
side arms formed an oasis surrounding the city.89 Today, both river and oasis are 
nearly dry and heavily polluted, due to the rapid increase of the city’s population in 
the past decades. Only when travelling up the north-eastern motorway towards the 
suburb of Qudsīa, along the tree-lined valley cut by the Barada, was it possible to 
imagine how Damascus must have once opened up to a fertile plain, surrounded by 
arid mountains. Old photo books about Damascus showed children swimming in the 
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Barada as late as the 1980s. But at the time of field research, the Barada flowed 
through the city in a concreted canal, often only as a trickle and generally full of 
plastic bags, dead cats and sewage. During the spring of 2009 water levels suddenly 
rose to a gushing stream, as the snowmelt from the mountains came rushing down. 
But this was an exception: water reserves were so depleted that all areas of Damascus 
suffered water cuts at least occasionally and in some areas the provisions were so low 
or of such bad quality that drinking water was bought from street merchants driving 
around in water trucks.90 
Arid plains and mountains of yellowish earth surrounded Damascus to the north, 
south and east; to the west lay the lusher Anti-Lebanon Mountains, which also 
provided the city with rain in winter. Summers were hot and dry in Damascus, with 
temperatures reaching over 40 degrees Celsius in July and August, in winter 
temperatures dropping towards zero, with rain, wind and dusty storms quite frequent. 
My field research was conducted between October and April, which meant that I 
benefited from the most pleasant times of the year in fall and spring, but that I also 
suffered through the surprisingly cold winter. Although the actual temperatures were 
not below anything I had experienced in the past, the poor insulation in the apartment 
I rented made even moderately low temperatures hard to bear. The usual heating 
option in Damascus homes was the so-called Sūbīa, a fuel-burning stove set up in the 
middle of a room with a pipe leading outside. Our flat was equipped with an ancient 
air-conditioning system (considered superior to the Sūbīa) but it often did not work 
and failed to properly heat the flat. All heating options were considered expensive in 
Syria, especially since the governments’ recent reductions in subsidies had led to a 
huge increase in fuel costs, and as nearly everyone tried to save on heating, I rarely 
encountered a properly warm room anywhere during winter.  
The socialscape of Damascus 
Moving away from geography and infrastructure, the following section turns to a brief 
introduction to Damascus’ socialscape, to give an idea of the social environment in 
which my field research was conducted. Social aspects of life and research can never 
be fixed realities to be analysed or understood in their entirety at any point in time. 
The aim of this section is to introduce events and practices that shaped the city during 
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the time of my observation, and to discuss how in turn, the shape of the city affected 
the lives of its inhabitants. This analysis will serve to make the argument that 
practices and space can be explained with reference to the ideas that give rise to them, 
and that vice versa, ideas can be also be explained with reference to observed 
behaviour. This discussion is presented via an analysis of two Damascene 
neighbourhoods, Yarmuk and Jaramana. Firstly, the physical shape and ‘look’ of the 
Palestinian urban camp Yarmuk will be outlined. This ‘look’ was closely linked to 
national, regional and international policies concerning Palestine, which, in Yarmuk, 
were transformed into local action. Here, it became possible to observe the translation 
of abstract ideas, which influenced such local policies, into concrete human 
behaviour. More importantly for this thesis, due to the exceptional place that 
Palestinians occupied in Syria and the region, their lives had become an area in which 
the Syrian government intervened to confirm the Syrian states’ sovereignty both at 
home and abroad. Yarmuk’s space became an arena in which to observe sovereign-
creating practices by the Syrian government. Secondly, the focus moves to the suburb 
of Jaramana, an area that had by 2009 been strongly shaped by recent Iraqi migration. 
The expressions of Iraqi identity in Jaramana and how they affected the urban space 
were again explained with reference to the techniques through which the Syrian 
government was managing Iraqi migrants and implementing Syrian state sovereignty. 
Presenting the analyses of these two neighbourhoods side by side conveys a sense of 
how Damascus as a city was also, and crucially, shaped by its imagined infrastructure 
of social identities, which was connected to, inter alia, divisions in wealth, education, 
the relationship of the local population to the government, and religion. This 
infrastructure was not visible to the casual tourist. But to any person living in the city 
for more than a few weeks, it would become strikingly obvious, from hearing 
Damascenes speak about different neighbourhoods or from experiencing herself how 
her identity changed in different areas: from wealthy tourist, to admired and envied 
cosmopolitan student, or to rejected stranger. Yarmuk and Jaramana were only tiny 
examples of this hugely complex social infrastructure, but serve as good examples, as 
they demonstrate how in Damascus, social identity did not only strongly influenced 
opportunities and choices, but was also tightly bound to and dependent on national 
and regional politics. Many of my research informants frequently referred to 
stereotypes and prejudices against particular social identities or complained about 
being discriminated against on the basis of their religion or nationality. Some 
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interlocutors complained about frequent, intrusive questions about their religion 
and/or nationality by acquaintances, which they found intrusive and rude. The crucial 
point to arise from these identity-related observations is a confirmation of identity’s 
fluidity and of how quickly the mode through which identity is expressed and 
imprinted changes according to circumstance. Often, I could observe how the 
meaning of an interlocutor’s identity changed when narrated against different 
contexts. For example, while ‘being Iraqi’ was regarded by my friend Hassan as a 
source of frustration, discrimination and negativity with regards to his chances for 
education, employment and travel, it became a source of pride when visiting an Iraqi 
restaurant and explaining Iraqi cuisine.  
Neighbourhoods: Yarmuk 
During my second week in Damascus in October 2009, as part of a general 
exploration of changes to the city since my last, long-term stay in 2007, I paid a visit 
each to the Palestinian urban-camp Yarmuk, and to Jaramana, a suburb known for its 
large population of Iraqis. The field notes taken at the time, and the additional 
impressions collected during many subsequent visits show a number of interesting 
differences between the two areas. While a direct comparison between Iraqi and 
Palestinian refugees is hardly useful from a policy perspective, the purpose of the 
comparison here is simply to analyse differences between Damascene 
neighbourhoods, and to show how strongly they are linked to the different roles that 
different population groups played in Syria’s political edifice and in the construction 
of the body politic.  
Yarmuk, a densely populated suburb, lay around eight km to the south of central 
Damascus. Depending on the traffic situation, a public transport journey from the city 
centre to Yarmuk lasted around 30-45 minutes. Yarmuk was created as an unofficial 
Palestinian camp in the 1940s and Palestinian national and political identity continued 
to be expressed in a highly visible, established and explicitly political manner 
throughout Yarmuk. Although at the time of fieldwork most of the area’s inhabitants 
were Syrian, Yarmuk’s streets were dotted with posters celebrating Palestinian 
martyrs and the liberation struggle. Offices of Palestinian institutions such as the 
Palestinian Liberation Army were present on the high street and the Palestinian 
Hospital was a central landmark in the area. Yarmuk’s high street was officially 
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called Palestine Street, many side streets were named after Palestinian villages and 
many shops and offices in the area had explicitly Palestinian names such as al-Quds 
(the Arabic name of Jerusalem). The Palestinian colours were frequently displayed on 
posters and walls and the whole area had a politicised feel with regards to the 
continuing struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Yarmuk’s space served as a link to 
the Palestinian homeland and shaped the way second, third and fourth generation 
Palestinians, born in Syria, experienced ‘Palestine’, its heritage and politics.91 
However Yarmuk’s space could also be analysed as an expression of the way the 
Syrian government chose to integrate Palestinians and Palestine into the Syrian state, 
and how Syrian sovereignty was performed in relation to the Palestinian issue, both 
internally and externally. This issue was highlighted during a conversation with one 
of my Palestinian acquaintances, a man who had worked with various Palestinian 
organisations and had significant experience in dealing with Syrian state agents and 
bureaucracy. One evening, I remarked to him that I had noticed that more young 
Palestinians appeared to be interested in politics than their Syrian counterparts. 
Yazan92 explained that because of the Syrian government’s support for the Palestinian 
liberation struggle, Palestinians, in certain areas, had more freedom to discuss and get 
involved with politics than Syrians. For example, he told me with an ironic smile, if 
his organisation were interested in running a workshop on human rights, the 
government would not allow it. However if the workshop were framed as support for 
the human rights of Palestinians, they would have a much better chance in going 
ahead. Yazan’s point was supported by the fact that displaying support for the broader 
Palestinian liberation struggle was an important element of the Syrian government’s 
foreign and domestic strategy for creating legitimacy. Through portraying itself as a 
protector of ‘Palestine’ in its different manifestations the Syrian government 
reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Syrian state, its existence as a separate sphere of 
control, both overseas and at home. Palestinian identity, life and space in Syria was 
therefore closely tied to and shaped by sovereignty-creating practices of the Syrian 
state. It was in this light that the strong expression of Palestinian politics in Yarmuk 
could be partially explained in the Syrian context, in which public, political 
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statements other than loyalty to the president and Syrian patriotism were otherwise 
not tolerated.  
Yarmuk also had a distinctly conservative, Muslim atmosphere and was a poor area: 
its buildings and roads showed many signs of dilapidation and age. Walking along 
some of the area’s more narrow side streets, I noticed how dirty and poor they were, 
as field notes recall.93 Unlike other parts of Damascus, central Yarmuk had not 
experienced a boom in new buildings, with the exception of a large, recently built or 
renovated mosque. The vast majority of women at the time of my visits wore 
headscarves and many also wore the long, simple and loose jackets preferred by 
conservative families. The growing social conservatism in Yarmuk was mentioned 
during my conversation with Yazan. Referring to this increased piety, he stated that  
“this has been happening since the failure of Oslo” adding that ten years ago, Yarmuk 
had been much less conservative than central Damascus, a situation that had now 
been reversed. Other informants linked the growing piety of Yarmuk’s Palestinians to 
the growing influence of Hamas on Palestinian politics.94 Such observations 
exemplified how national, regional and international policies influenced changing, 
local practices and spaces in Yarmuk. They also highlighted how the Palestinian 
situation in Syria ruptured traditional understandings of sovereignty as a neat division 
between territories, government and populations. Palestinians in Syria were a ‘space’ 
used by different state actors to manifest their sovereignty via a number of techniques 
that continued to construct Palestinians as exceptional in the Syria population. In line 
with this argumentation, it was interesting to note that Syrian government propaganda 
was notably less frequent in Yarmuk than elsewhere around the city. On the other 
hand, the presence of international actors, such as UNRWA, the UN agency 
responsible for Palestinians, and foreign aid donors was more visible, indicating the 
larger amount of international intervention in the area.  
Neighbourhoods: Jaramana 
Like Yarmuk, the suburb Jaramana also lay to the south of central Damascus.  A bus 
journey from central Damascus to Jaramana took around 20-30 minutes. Until around 
10 years ago Jaramana was relatively sparsely populated, retaining fields, small farms 
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and a rural character, and the area had a mixed population of mostly Christians and 
Druze. Since the upsurge in Iraqi migration in 2006, Jaramana had become known as 
a neighbourhood dominated by Iraqis; the influx contributed to a building boom that 
had seen all but a few of Jaramana’s remaining fields vanish. In early 2010, perhaps 
half of Jaramana’s apartment blocks were visibly new and often left unfinished, while 
parts of its previous infrastructure, such as an old water tower, small fields and the 
occasional farm shed, were overtaken by the urban growth and left obsolete. The 
apparent randomness in urban planning, emphasised by the absence of paved roads 
between five-storied apartment blocks and the sudden appearance of parcels of 
farmland or open, sandy squares between brand-new residencies, also gave Jaramana 
an atmosphere of transience and change. Unlike the official and government-
sanctioned Palestinian presence in Yarmuk, in Jaramana the existence of Iraqis was 
made visible only through private means, such as the Iraqi names of restaurants and 
shops and the small-scale sale of Iraq paraphernalia, such as flags or key rings, and 
Iraqi food. Streets in Jaramana were full of such signs of Iraqi-presence, restaurants 
called Mosul or Baghdad were the most easily recognisable, whereas Iraqis also 
recognised outlets of Baghdadi restaurant chains. During my visit in 2007, I had seen 
half-destroyed or covered up shop-signs in Jaramana and had learnt that Syrian 
security forces had demanded that Iraqi shop-owners display their nationality less 
visibly (notably, Iraqis were not officially allows to open companies in Syria). Since 
that time, the authorities’ position on this matter clearly had changed, as Iraqi names 
were now displayed frequently. As my fieldwork progressed and I became more 
familiar with Iraqi culture, I also recognised more practices and signs that marked 
Jaramana as ‘Iraqi’. The sale of Samūn, a type of Iraqi bread, was a frequent sight, as 
were adverts announcing the sale of other, particular Iraqi goods. The large number of 
travel companies advertising journeys to Iraqi cities were further signs marking the 
Iraqi character of Jaramana, and, more indirectly, the large number of real estate 
agents pointed to the existence of a transient population seeking rented 
accommodation. Jaramana was also the only place in Damascus where I saw second-
hand clothes shops (the area had two or three), which, as I later learned, were 
connected to the fact that many Iraqis, once selected for resettlement or immigration, 
were keen to sell those goods that they could not take abroad. In contrast with 
Yarmuk, generally no signs of Iraqi political activity were visible in Jaramana and 
there was no sign of any official support for the Iraqi presence from the Syrian or any 
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other government (the above-shown photograph of a pro-Syrian slogan referring to 
the Iraqi situation was a rare, and interesting, exception). Syrian government 
propaganda in Jaramana was highly visible: one of Jaramana’s main squares was 
called ‘President’s square’ (Saḥat al-Raīs, with a bust of Hafiz al-Asad) and it was 
noticeable that along with new pavements and buildings, several of the new-style 
billboards showing Bashar al-Asad had been built along Jaramana’s high street. There 
were no signs or posters that expressed any particular opinion on the American-led 
invasion of Iraq, on the current political situation in Iraq or any other signs of Iraqi 
politics. One day, Jaramana’s Iraqi identity was brought home to me in a particularly 
striking fashion during a visit to a mobile telephone shop. While waiting for the 
attendant to charge my telephone, I noticed to my surprise a rack with accessories 
showing images of Saddam Hussein in leader’s pose. My surprise stemmed firstly 
from seeing such an unusual and blatant display of political preference, as I had found 
that, at least publicly, Iraqis in Syria were generally keen to avoid any form of 
political statement linked to the current situation in Iraq.  Secondly, the violation of 
the Western media’s taboo to praise Saddam, and the realisation that some people in 
Jaramana would voluntarily purchase pro-Saddam propaganda in an environment 
where they were not obliged to demonstrate allegiance, came as a shock to me, 
showing, no doubt, the extent to which I had unconsciously bought into the idea that 
the invasion of Iraq had been a moment of liberation. The point of narrating this 
vignette here is simply to emphasize that the expression of Iraqi identity in 
Jaramana’s space was produced by individual, private action rather than through the 
actions of organisations or state institutions, as was possible in Yarmuk.  
As in Yarmuk, the particular way that Iraqi identity was expressed in Jaramana could 
be explained partly with reference to the way that the Syrian government was 
choosing to integrate Iraqis into Syrian territory and population. Life in Jaramana was 
an expression of how the Syrian government managed Iraqis migrants in relation to 
the Syrian state, and about how the government was intervening in this newly 
emerged Iraqi space. For example, by making it very hard for Iraqis to obtain long-
term, legal residency permits, the Syrian government was not only reaffirming the 
Syrian state’s existence as a distinct and sovereign legal and physical territory, it had 
also struck a particular relationship with UNHCR, which cited one of the central 
reasons for its intervention in Syria the lack of secure residency for Iraqis.  At the 
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same time however, the Syrian government welcomed and encouraged its portrayal as 
a generous host to Iraqi refugees, through which Syria’s moral credentials as a state 
were being boosted on the international stage, and which also ensured gratitude and 
acquiescence of the Iraqi migrants. This combination of precariousness and tolerance 
through which the Syrian government governed Iraqi presence in Syria was reflected 
in the way that Iraqi identity was expressed in Jaramana: private and non-political, 
transient and changing, but visible and vibrant non-the less. As will be elaborated in 
later chapters, such broad, sovereignty-linked interventions of the Syrian government 
were interspersed with marked events, in which Syrian sovereignty would be 
displayed in full force in relation to Iraqi life and space, such as during the Iraqi 
election campaign in March 2010, when suddenly, Iraqi election posters flooded 
Jaramana in an obvious display of Syrian tolerance towards the political process in 
Iraq. It is also important to note the role that Iraqi migrants in Syria played in Syrian-
Iraqi governmental relations, in which they could be used to either express friendship 
or hostility; this point will be elaborate in further chapters. 
With regards to religion, Jaramana had a discernibly mixed character. The residency 
of Druze, Christian and Muslim people in the neighbourhood was visible through the 
presence of differing dress styles, religious symbols worn as jewellery or tattoos, the 
celebration of different religious holidays, differing shop opening times and the sale 
of religion-specific food items, such as halal meat or alcohol. The different degrees of 
piety and conservatism on display on Jaramana’s streets added to the area’s 
atmosphere of openness and lack of coherent community. More than once I remarked 
to acquaintances that Jaramana’s transient or ‘new’ character allowed me to keep a 
low profile as a researcher. For unlike in other quarters, where landlords often lived in 
the same building as their tenants and neighbours knew each other since decades, in 
Jaramana such close social ties were less frequent or restricted to certain roads. As the 
other residents of the newly built apartment block I came to inhabit all appeared to be 
of differing backgrounds and largely ignored each other, the sudden arrival of two 
foreign students attracted less attention than it might have otherwise. Despite the fact 
that Iraqis in Syria had become a key opportunity of foreign humanitarian activity, it 
was interesting to note that the presence of foreign organisations in Jaramana was not 
highly visible. The only identifiable sign was that of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (a 
Syrian government institution), despite the fact that a number of other organisations 
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were active in Jaramana in school rehabilitation and community services. Again this 
situation could be explained with reference to the Syrian government and the way it 
decided to perform Syrian sovereignty, which continued to maintain foreign 
organisations in a situation of limbo and fear, not allowing for obvious signs for their 
activity, and again, ultimately, this decision could be understood in terms of the 
unclear and uneasy space that Iraqis inhabited within the Syrian body politic.  
Iraqi as refugees, migrants and guests in Damascus  
At the time of field research Iraqi migration to Syria was many things. It was a 
discourse, a political development, a human tragedy and a funding opportunity. It was 
an individual and a collective experience, involving Iraqis, Syrians, state officials 
from around the world and humanitarian aid workers. It was a field covering as many 
physical locations as imaginary spaces, creating and breaking through material and 
ideational boundaries. To approach Iraqi migration in all its complexity was 
impossible and emphasized our limited ability as humans to perceive the world in its 
entirety, and consequent desire to categorise, simplify and limit. The following 
sections can only touch on a small number of the myriad meanings of Iraqi migration 
to Syria. The goal is therefore to introduce the reader to the complexity encountered 
during field research, to the various voices, positions and opinions heard and how 
they contributed to the nuanced understanding of sovereignty that this thesis hopes to 
express. The paragraphs run through the key pillars around which the political, 
humanitarian, academic and day-to-day conversations I encountered about Iraqi 
migration revolved, and provide a critical analysis of how these ideas link to the 
sovereignty-creating interventions taking place in Iraqi lives in Damascus.  
Key Issues 
A central issue regarding Iraqi migration to Syria at the time of research was the 
relative paucity of systematic knowledge about it. The UNHCR compiled basic 
statistics about those Iraqis registered with the organisation and had sponsored a few 
smaller-scale studies on particular questions however no large-scale surveying of the 
population had been undertaken. 95 The Syrian government resisted attempts by NGOs 
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to conduct independent studies.96 The most basic fact about Iraqi migration to Syria, 
namely how many Iraqis actually lived in Syria, remained in dispute, as in 2009 it 
became clear that the very large figures published by the Syrian government and 
quickly adopted by NGOs and the UN had been heavily inflated.97 The fact that 
several NGOs in 2010 continued stating figures of 1-1.5 million Iraqis in Syria on 
their websites points to the way such numbers were linked to the funding and 
legitimacy of the humanitarian sector. But mostly, the absence of statistical 
knowledge concerning Iraqi migration and the dispute over the existing figures drew 
attention to the different governing techniques of the Syrian state and humanitarian 
actors. Humanitarian actors relied on as detailed and transparent information about 
Iraqis as possible to determine Iraqis’ ‘needs’ and to mount biopolitical interventions 
targeted at intimate areas of Iraqi life.98 The fact that Iraqis were distributed across 
Damascus and therefore much harder to access than if they had been concentrated in 
camps was a concern for humanitarian actors, as it made such interventions much 
more difficult to accomplish.99 For the Syrian government on the other hand, the 
absence of independent numbers was a means to create a monopoly of knowledge, 
through which funders and NGOs could be influenced. The Syrian government 
largely governed Iraqis through creating a situation of limbo with regards to their 
residency, via bureaucratic and surveillance mechanisms. These techniques did not 
rely on statistical figures, but on a number of other measures, discussed further below 
in this thesis. A further important development regarding Iraqi migration to Syria was 
that since 2007, it had led to the unprecedented opening of Syria to humanitarian 
activity. At the time of field research, around a dozen international NGOs, focused on 
Iraqi refugees, were active, all having registered after 2007. Previous to 2007, Syria 
had been nearly completely closed to the operations of foreign NGOs and this change 
presented a significant political process. While all NGOs were required to sign a 
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Memorandum of Understanding with the Syrian government (via the Syrian Arab Red 
Crescent) and were tightly controlled, their presence nevertheless introduced certain 
liberal governing practices previously absent from Syria. Initially, NGO operations 
were restricted to working with Iraqis only. However in 2009 and 2010 programmes 
began to include services for Syrian beneficiaries, usually expressed in percentages 
(20% Syrian, 80% Iraqi beneficiaries, for example), as it was a widely accepted 
principle that programmes focused on refugee populations should also deliver aid to 
underprivileged local people, to avoid fuelling resentment.100 Notably, only smaller 
NGOs had been allowed to operate and no large American or any British NGO had 
been granted licences.  
When thinking about Iraqi migration to Syria it was important to be aware of its 
financial aspect. While both the Syrian government and the humanitarian sectors 
stressed that Iraqi migration had been a burden for Syrian state budgets and 
consumers, due to the increased consumption of subsidised goods and rising real 
estate prices, the impact of Iraqi migration on the Syrian economy had not been 
thoroughly assessed and was not possible to estimate, due to a lack of economic data. 
From observations it was clear that Iraqis brought with them enormous amounts of 
cash and investment, and that for every Syrian paying higher rent, there was also a 
Syrian collecting it. From anecdotal evidence it was also likely that Iraqi migration 
contributed to increasing trade between the two countries.  And whereas there was no 
clear evidence that the Syrian state had had to heavily invest in building new 
infrastructure for Iraqi migrants, humanitarian aid flows have been substantial, 
amounting in 2009 to at least USD 130 million.101 As this money paid the salaries of 
international and Syrian employees in the aid sector, and funded clinics and schools in 
Syria, it also created interest in its continual flow, which partially explained some 
elements of the discourse surrounding Iraqi migration.  
The humanitarian sector 
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The humanitarian sector’s discourse about Iraqis was dominated by its view of Iraqis 
as refugees, as people who were in need of protection, aid and a durable solution.102 
This vision was captured in the words of Janet Lim, UNHCR’s Assistant High 
Commissioner, speaking during the launch of UNHCR’s regional plan for Iraqi 
refugees in January 2010: 
“Despite very difficult circumstances and their large numbers it can be said that 
Iraqi refugees have received the basic protection and assistance…that they so 
urgently needed when they fled and which they continue to need today. … The 
majority of Iraqis displaced in the region have the possibility to remain albeit 
temporarily and to have the protection space. They have access to health and 
education services and the most vulnerable have access to limited financial 
assistance…and in some cases to solutions such as resettlement, while the others 
wait for the possibility of return.” 
This focus on vulnerability not only blended out those Iraqi migrants who had not 
registered with UNHCR, but also led to a curious blindness of humanitarian actors to 
those elements of Iraqi migrant lives that emphasised integration, self-help and 
continuation. For example, it was curious to hear several UNHCR officials repeat that 
Iraqis could not survive in Syria because they were not allowed to work, as in my 
daily observations, I constantly came across Iraqis who were employed despite the 
official ban. Similarly, I knew of and had seen many Iraqis running restaurants or 
shops, or receiving substantial rent payments from the Iraqi state and who were 
materially not worse off than Syrians in a similar situation. Further, the strong focus 
on vulnerability also led to an inflated interest among humanitarians in instances of 
extreme deprivation among Iraqis, such as the focus on prostitution of Iraqi women 
and children, regarded as the most vulnerable and most difficult to access 
beneficiaries. On the other hand, there was a clear reluctance on behalf of 
humanitarian actors to tackle questions regarded as political, first and foremost the 
pressing issue concerning the absence of long-term residency rights and the 
occasional deportation of Iraqis. A further analysis of these puzzles, which can only 
be mentioned in passing here, is provided in chapter three on UNHCR.  
Syrians and the Syrian state 
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Syrian speech, writing and behaviour towards Iraqi migration I encountered was often 
contradictory, reflecting a mix of feelings and opinions of Arab solidarity, xenophobic 
prejudice, regional politics and tolerance. One of the most notable facts was that both 
Syrian government officials and other Syrians rarely used the Arabic word ‘refugee’ 
(‘lājiʾ’) when talking about Iraqis. While the government’s news agency SANA 
regularly used the term ‘refugees’ when reporting on Iraqis, in public appearances, 
Syrian officials referred to Iraqis as brothers or guests; the unease about the term 
‘refugee’ was possibly linked to fears that it could have implied a comparison with 
the Palestinians in Syria, the original refugee population, and, therefore might have 
conferred a certain status onto Iraqis, and the impression that the Syrian government 
accepted Iraqis to stay long term. The official position of the Syrian government in its 
interactions with other governments and international agencies, was that Iraqis were 
expected to return or move on elsewhere. Yet apart from the support for UNHCR’s 
resettlement programme and the opening towards NGOs, actions by state institutions 
in Syria’s domestic space rather signalled greater tolerance and patience.  
The single speech witnessed during fieldwork in which a Syrian state official referred 
to Iraqis as refugees made an explicit comparison between the ‘two occupations’ in 
the region – that of Israel in Palestine and that of the US in Iraq.103 Despite this 
couching of Iraqi migration in such terms of Arab solidarity, the Syrian government 
also frequently portrayed Iraqi migrants as a financial burden and a threat to social 
peace and prosperity. For example, an article by Syria’s deputy foreign minister 
Faisal al-Miqdād begins by stating that 
“This heavy number of arrivals has had an extreme effect on all facets of life in Syria, 
particularly on the services which the state offers to citizens. There has been a sharp 
increase in the cost of living and the unexpected weight of numbers has had dramatic 
impacts on the infrastructure and the economy.”104  
Government documents also made reference to increasing crime rates, associating this 
development with Iraqis.105  
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In casual conversations and interviews, Syrian acquaintances and friends showed a 
mix of unease about Iraqi migration and feelings of pity and solidarity. The following 
comments of two female, Syrian interlocutors demonstrate these mixed emotions in 
exemplary form. Both women regularly interviewed Iraqis during their work with a 
local, catholic charity and the International Organisation for Migration (‘IOM’).  One 
of the women first talked about Iraqi suffering in a compassionate tone, stating that 
she “saw young Iraqi teenagers, 13 years, arrested for prostitution and actually she 
was trafficked and in a terrible situation, traumatised”. A few minutes later she 
chimed into her relatives’ description of Iraqis as notorious cheats and liars, adding 
that “Iraqis lied incredibly often”, “more than the Lebanese when they were 
displaced during the 2006 war” and that even she, as a lawyer, “was fooled by them 
and had to be very smart to know whether they were telling the truth”.106 The 
meanings Syrians, in both official and private capacity, attached to Iraqi migration 
were thus ambiguous, reflecting quite neatly the government’s political standing on 
the matter. Xenophobia did not translate into widespread anti-Iraqi violence, however 
conversations often revealed mutual distrust and a common Iraqi complaint concerned 
their experiences of being cheated by Syrians, who were aware that as foreigners, 
Iraqis were ignorant of local prices.107 Interestingly, the reasons for the sudden 
increase in Iraqi migration were rarely mentioned spontaneously by Syrians during 
my conversations, neither the US-led invasion, nor the sectarian civil war.  
Iraqis 
Given the large variety of wealth, education, religion among the Iraqi migrant 
population in Damascus, and the different life experiences of men and women, 
teenagers and children, general statements about how Iraqis viewed their lives in 
Damascus during 2009/2010 were hardly possible. This brief section reflects on the 
comments that I heard from or about around 80 Iraqis living in Damascus or 
travelling regularly to the city. The vast majority in this group belonged to an urban, 
moderately privileged class, valued education and only expressed moderate degrees of 
sectarianisms and religious piety.  Common to all were feelings of regret, anger, 
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sadness and incomprehension about what had happened in their country and their 
neighbourhoods, and most had lost relatives and friends through violence. Many had 
also experienced violent incidents directly and had lived through various stages of 
displacement, often in different locations before arriving in Damascus. The dominant 
presentation of Iraqi experience in Damascus that I encountered among Iraqis 
themselves was one of lack of perspective and stability, reflected in the two often-
repeated phrases of ‘mā kū mustaqbal’ (‘there is no future’) and ‘mā kū mustammara’ 
(‘there is no long-term settlement, i.e. residency’). Similarly the lack of good 
employment opportunities, which mostly relegated Iraqis to seeking relatively 
unskilled labour and barred opportunities for many engineers, doctors and lawyers to 
work in their profession, was often emphasised. Aside from these predominant 
worries, which often combined with a planned departure from Syria either through 
UNHCR resettlement or further migration, interlocutors also offered positive 
assessments of the overall situation in Syria, such as frequent comments about the 
security of Damascus, the lack of sectarian discrimination and the freedom available 
for women to move around without being harassed. Few interlocutors associated their 
stay in Damascus with opportunities; such a perspective was found, for example, 
among those who had arrived in the city specifically to participate in aid programmes, 
or who conducted cross-border trade with Iraq, or concerned those families in which 
male relatives worked in Iraq while the rest of the family stayed in greater safety in 
Damascus.  
Reflexivity and positionality 
This last section briefly describes and analyses personal experiences during fieldwork, 
and the intellectual and emotional responses to it. The reason for adding these 
paragraphs are not a desire to use the fieldwork experience as a self-finding exercise, 
but to provide the reader with a thicker description of the context in which my 
findings were taken.108 This will not only allow for a smoother unfolding of the 
narrative of this thesis, as later chapters can reference background material set out 
here, but also better explain the paths taken by the research, why some people were 
spoken to and not others, and why some questions were asked, but not others.  
                                                
108Jennifer Robertson, "Reflexivity Redux: A Pithy Polemic on "Positionality," Anthropological 
Quarterly 75, no. 4 (2002). 
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A few months into the field research, I was surprised at how much tension and 
discomfort I was experiencing, and how strong the ethical dilemmas I had read about 
proved to be in practice. As already referred to above, I considered myself relatively 
familiar with Damascus and relished an increased confidence, due to my better 
language abilities and increased age and confidence. But although overall, measured 
by the gained material, knowledge and friendships, the fieldwork was a success, I 
look back on it with feelings of regret, sadness and unease. A simple explanations of 
these associations could be that I absorbed the negative situation that many of my 
informants found themselves in. However it appears these emotions are better 
explained with reference to the particular tensions presented by ethnographic 
research, exacerbated by the challenges posed by the environment in Damascus.109 
Although I was committed to conducting my research in an ethical manner, I was not 
so naïve to believe that I would be able to completely overcome the structural 
hierarchy between researcher and informant. I was keen to offer reciprocity to the 
Iraqi migrant community, however was also wary to maintain some emotional 
distance from the extreme suffering that some of my informants had experienced. My 
aim was to conduct research in a careful, transparent and respectful way, not 
endangering my participants through unnecessary exposure and avoiding the raising 
of expectations that I would not be able to follow through on. Despite this quite 
practical attitude, I soon began feeling disempowered and unable to steer my research 
according to these principles. The following paragraphs will illustrate some of these 
tensions by running through four moments of the research process: gaining access, the 
experience of paranoia, the blurring of research and friendship, and navigating 
conflicts within the community of research informants.  
Gaining access 
Before travelling to Damascus, I felt confident that I would be able to establish a field 
site relatively quickly, as I already had a small network of contacts and had conducted 
research in the city before. I was aware of the entry of a number of foreign NGOs to 
Syria and had thought that their presence should significantly ease the research 
process, and planned to offer voluntary work in exchange for research access to Iraqi 
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migrants. For reasons of paranoia (set out below) I did not contact any NGOs before 
departing for Damascus. Within two weeks of arriving and after conducting a number 
of initial meetings I realised that my assumptions about being able to work with a 
foreign NGO had been false. The foreign aid workers I encountered were very fearful 
of engaging in any behaviour that might draw the attention and/or wrath of the Syrian 
authorities and were not willing to push the boundaries of government control, which 
precluded even meetings with foreigners not approved by the government. I reacted to 
this discovery with incomprehension and anger, as I interpreted the foreign NGO 
workers’ behaviour as hypocritical acquiescence by organisations describing 
themselves as agents of democracy and positive change. Due to my previous 
experience of working in Syria I thought that I had a better understanding of what 
kind of activities could be conducted within the ‘red line’ than the aid workers, who 
had often only spent a few months in the country. I also had a hunch, later confirmed 
through a number of conversations, that some NGO employees to a degree relished 
the excitement of working in an atmosphere of state repression, as it lent an air of 
drama and excitement, and therefore importance, to their work.110 Their behaviour 
struck me as self-important and cowardly, especially given that Iraqi migrants, in an 
infinitely more vulnerable situation, were happy to meet me and give interviews. 
More importantly, I now faced the obstacle of developing a network of Iraqi 
informants without any institutional affiliation. After not making good headway for 
several weeks, I fell into a state of panic, thinking that my research might become a 
failure. Eventually, through support from my supervisor, some lucky turns and 
perseverance I managed to pull through, however my initial confidence that I would 
be a successful researcher was shaken.  
Blurring boundaries and paranoia 
In accordance with my ethical guidelines, whenever I encountered a potential research 
informant I clarified my position as a research student focusing on Iraqi migration. As 
I did not possess a research permit, such openness carried a certain risk of discovery 
and expulsion by Syrian security and immigration officials, but based on 
conversations with experienced Syrian friends, I decided that a degree of 
transparency, coupled with a low profile and good reputation, would be a more useful 
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strategy than creating a web of lies. Despite this openness about my intentions, the 
boundaries between friendship and research soon began to blur with those informants 
I began spending significant amounts of time with. Sitting down to take notes on 
conversations and events, I felt a sense of betrayal, as I was convinced that my 
informants were not considering that I would be doing this regularly. The act of 
creating written knowledge about people who trusted and liked me highlighted the 
hierarchy between us and felt cold and uncaring. Worse, it felt close to what I 
imagined the spies and informers of the Syrian intelligence services would do; I had 
at least one friend whose career had been badly affected after someone in her office 
had filed a ‘report’ about her. 
Ethnographic handbooks recommend that researchers remind informants about their 
activities by brandishing notebooks or mentioning their university affiliation 
repeatedly in conversations as reminders.111 Although I often remembered this advice 
during informal conversations or observations when boundaries began to blur, I 
guiltily refrained from following it, in order not to disrupt the flow of information and 
trust. Over time, especially after I began investing time and effort into voluntary 
teaching and provided other help to a small number of informants, these negative 
feelings faded. Nevertheless, a degree of guilt about not using my privileged position 
to do more, and using my informants’ time to advance my own career lingers to this 
day.  
As all Syria-focused researchers who I know, I experienced phases of paranoid fear of 
surveillance by the Syrian intelligence services. At its worse, such fear manifested 
itself in the conviction that I was being followed, believing that my mobile phone was 
tapped or that my landlady or other superficial acquaintances were watching and 
informing on me. After an unpleasant incident at the border while travelling back 
from Jordan, when I was accused by border guards of having travelled to Israel and 
nearly refused re-entry, I experienced nearly two weeks of heightened fear and lack of 
productivity, as I hardly wanted to leave the house. The more I tackled situations 
previously thought of as difficult and risky, the more confident I became in my 
research, and after around three months rarely felt consciously paranoid. But the 
pervasive fear of surveillance that formed part of everyday life in Syria at that time 
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contributed to an overall feeling of lack of control and powerlessness that gradually 
developed during my fieldwork.   
Politics vs. Research 
When conducting ethnographic research in a cultural environment different from 
one’s own it occasionally becomes necessary to hide elements of one’s personality or 
beliefs to avoid offence or surprise.112 In Syria, the social taboos I had to adapt to 
chiefly concerned questions of religion, gender, and politics. Through previous, 
negative experiences, I had, for example, learned in Syria not to share freely the fact 
that I was not baptized and did not believe in god, nor that I was tolerant of 
homosexuality or extra-marital sexual relations. Not only did I not volunteer such 
opinions, during interviews and conversations I occasionally also agreed with 
statements that mildly differed from my opinions in order to create a positive 
atmosphere and to avoid lengthy explanations. Occasionally I noted, but not 
contradicted, statements that I felt were morally wrong and that in other 
circumstances I would have felt morally obliged to oppose. Continuously performing 
a personality different from one’s own is mentally exhausting and unsatisfying and, 
unless one finds other elements of common ground to bond over, leads to insincerity 
and deception. I experienced, in different degrees, all of these aspects during 
fieldwork.113 The most difficult situation in this respect arose when I became involved 
in a conflict at an NGO where I volunteered as a teacher, and at which around a dozen 
of my informants were students or directors. The NGO was a small organisation 
providing education services to Iraqi high school graduates, helping them to apply to 
US colleges with scholarships. After around two months of observations, I noticed 
strong, unspoken tensions between the directors and the young Iraqi students, which 
culminated in the dismissal of an Iraqi girl from the programme, who had become one 
of my closest acquaintances of the group. As I interpreted the events surrounding the 
dismissal as an abuse of highly unequal power relations between the NGO directors 
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Ethnographic Research*." 
 75 
and the Iraqi students, I felt a strong responsibility to intervene and express my 
concerns to the NGO directors, especially as they constantly spoke about their belief 
in equality and democracy. On the other hand I was aware that such a step would 
endanger my access to this carefully developed field site and lead to open conflict, 
which was stringently avoided at the organisation. Wracked with anger and pity for 
my friend, who was distraught at the news and felt that her future had been destroyed, 
I eventually decided to write an open letter to the organisation, which led to a 
complete severance of contact between the directors and me and my immediate 
dismissal as a voluntary teacher. The purpose of narrating this episode is to clarify the 
type of emotional tension and conflicts of conscience and responsibility that can occur 
during ethnographic research, which necessarily requires close personal relationships 
with informants. While it certainly formed an apex, the episode points out the wider 
context of field work, in which I constantly had to renegotiate my understanding and 
acceptance of certain gender roles, religious beliefs, sectarianism and other 
worldviews, often in contradiction to what I believed was morally, factually or 
intellectually correct. The continuous, conscious and unconscious questioning of my 
identity, ability and knowledge, I believe, is one of the key reasons of the mixed 
emotions that I associate with the field research today.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a thick, analytical description of the context in which the field 
research for this thesis took place, and in which its key arguments unfold. To 
understand sovereignty as lived, localised and individual power relations, it is 
necessary to understand at least aspects of the rich empirical context that these power 
relations occur in. Further, to remain true to the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological beliefs presented in this thesis, it is necessary to alert readers to the 
individual experience of the researcher and theorist, which made up her position 
towards research matter and analysis. 
Damascus’ urban landscape formed the physical reality in which the thesis’ field 
research was undertaken. Its landscape and social-scape were characterised by 
different levels of wealth, service provisions and governance between town centre and 
periphery, all aspects reflected in architectural styles, urban design, the amount of 
garbage on the street and the type of buildings located centrally and in the suburbs. 
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Heavy traffic and government propaganda in the form of posters, billboards and 
statues pervaded all of Damascus, however the degree of both also varied from 
neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Finally, the city’s desert climate and its waning 
water resources were aspects of life experienced by everyone living in the city. 
Overlapping and intertwining with these physical aspects of Damascus was the city’s 
‘social’scape, the hills and valleys of different classes, different religions, different 
nationalities and different relationships with the Syrian state. These social identities of 
people and entire neighbourhoods stood in a dynamic relationship with the ‘look’ of 
these neighbourhoods, as they influenced the kind of shops, street names and 
symbols, religious institutions and so forth present in an area.  
Of particular importance to the arguments of this thesis were the varying ways in 
which individuals and communities in Damascus stood in relationship to the Syrian 
state. As an example, this chapter analysed how the presence of Palestinians and 
Iraqis, both migrant communities, yet with a very different connection with the Syrian 
state, was expressed in the two neighbourhoods of Yarmuk  and Jaramana. Life in 
these neighbourhoods showed how forms of distinctively Palestinian and Iraqi 
expression were closely linked to the way the Syrian government had chosen to 
integrate both populations into the Syrian body politic. The different techniques used 
by the Syrian government to govern Palestinians and Iraqis demonstrated the Syrian 
state’s sovereignty, as they produced Syrian territory as a distinct sphere of influence 
and controlled the population living on this territory in a particular way. Iraqi life and 
identity, and the field of Iraqi migration, were constructed differently in the discourse 
of humanitarian actors, the Syrian state and Iraqis themselves. As the following 
chapters will argue, given that a person’s way of life was closely connected to how 
her identity related to the Syrian state, and therefore their place within the system of 
sovereignty, its production was a key, sovereignty-creating moment. For example, 
UNHCR’s framing of Iraqis as vulnerable refugees in need of protection posited them 
in a different relationship with the state than the Syrian state’s frequent portrayal of 
Iraqis as brothers, or as a drain on resources. While the extremely varied Iraqi migrant 
population in Damascus made it hard to put forward generalisations, the frequent 
declarations by Iraqi informants that their life in Syria lacked stability and a future 
highlighted the techniques of opacity and unreliability of rule on which the 
government relied to govern Iraqi migrants.  
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Finally, this chapter outlined aspects of my personal experiences while conducting 
fieldwork, pointing out a number of important ethical dilemmas and challenges posed 
by the research environment in Damascus and by the ethnographic method. 
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Chapter Three  
The States on Syrian Territory I: Syria 
 
 
From the perspective of the ‘sovereign ideal’, which dominates most thinking about 
the international, it was the things that the Syrian government did not do with Iraqi 
migrants, which were perhaps of greatest relevance. Unlike what is stipulated, implied 
and assumed by international migration law, humanitarian rhetoric and much policy 
and academic expertise, Syrian state bureaucracy did  not clearly categorize Iraqis as 
migrants, and Iraqis were not slotted into defined bureaucratic procedures that would 
produce them stringently as foreign citizens, as the ‘outside’ of sovereignty. As was 
the case in other areas of state rule in Syria, Iraqis’ relationship with the Syrian state 
depended on individual characteristics, rather than standardised regulations, and was 
treated as a political, rather than a technical relationship. Rather than rely on 
pervasive bureaucratic processes to distinguish clearly between national and 
foreigner, Syrian authorities enforced the same, essential ‘red lines’ of behaviour 
towards Iraqis as they did for Syrians, or other foreigners. Considered from the 
perspective of the ‘sovereign ideal’ of the nation state, this was remarkable, especially 
as Syria and Iraq were not enjoying particularly positive inter-state relations or had 
signed agreements on the free movement of people. In fact, in other policy areas, the 
Syrian-Iraqi border was strongly enforced and controlled, for examples concerning 
the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq via Syria. As will be repeatedly argued in this 
chapter, absence of predictable and standardized bureaucratic state procedures was a 
key element of the broader governance techniques through which the Syrian 
government mobilised and enforced domestic sovereignty. 
By focusing on the sovereignty-constructing practices of the Syrian state towards 
different actors, located at different ‘levels’ of the sovereignty/state imaginary (at the 
‘grassroots’, or the ‘international’), this chapter demonstrates how Syrian state 
sovereignty, and the domestic/international divide, was produced as an effect of these 
practices. Importantly and interestingly, Syrian sovereignty-constructing practices in 
the domestic realm were based on different social relations than those assumed by the 
sovereign ideal, which focused on citizenship, representation and the independence of 
 79 
the law. Conversely, towards international, extra-territorial audiences such as UN 
representatives, foreign donors, the humanitarian community or foreign journalists, 
Syrian government agents positioned themselves firmly within the liberal ‘refugee’ 
discourse, that is part of the sovereign ideal, and referred to the standard staples of 
this ideal. In these instances, Syria appeared as a unity of territory, government and 
national population and as a generous sovereign, who, out of humanitarian impulse, 
had decided to shelter the threatened Iraqi foreigners from the dangerous realm 
beyond Syria’s borders. Through this behaviour, Syrian state agents produced the 
Syrian state as a sovereign member of the international community, that respected the 
norms and laws of this community and that therefore had be recognised as a 
legitimate sovereign. Further, this chapter analyses the role that Iraqi migration played 
in the inter-state relations between the Syrian and the Iraqi state, as well as the effects 
of the humanitarian sector on Syrian sovereignty. These different agents managed 
Iraqis in different ways and thus created transforming, overlapping power relations, 
through which they not only governed Iraqi lives, but also each other.  
The absence of routine and standard in Syrian state institutions lies at the centre of an 
important difficulty, which concerns the relationship between the Syrian government 
and the Syrian state. The practices implemented by Syrian authorities were so varied 
and personalised that the institutions of state, government and individual became 
difficult to define, compartmentalise or separate. This characteristic of Syrian politics 
has been recognised in the literature.114 The constantly moving location of 
state/government power could not and should be understood as fixed, as it changed 
from request to request, from person to person, from official to official, always 
depending on the particular power relationships at play in a given situation. The 
malleability and unpredictability of  the government-state-individual relationship was 
a key element of governance in Syria; it was crucial to accept it as constantly 
changing and to accept that in certain instances, it was not possible to fully separate 
the three elements in this relationship.  
The Syrian state clearly existed as an independent entity through physical structures 
(ministerial, military and other institutional buildings, border posts, the Syrian flag 
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etc), through relatively constant human relationships and activities (parliamentary 
elections and meetings, ministerial posts, army service, cabinet meetings, presidential 
speeches etc), and through state-owned economic assets (state-owned enterprises, 
customs revenue, weapons/army assets, public hospitals etc). Cabinet reshuffles, 
enforcement of military service, intensive bureaucratic procedures to legally open a 
business, passports and state-wide educational procedures marked the existence of the 
particular, territorially limited order of the Syrian state that was independent of 
personnel changes or individual power. These structures, which were those of a 
modern state, modelled on the structures of the former colonial state France, all 
signified and produced Syrian state sovereignty.  
But considering the internal institutional procedures within these state structures 
showed that processes (such as the obtaining of a residency permit, or of a particular 
document, or signature, or stamp) were not consistent and not defined by routine 
bureaucracy or the law. Instead, outcomes were often highly influenced by 
idiosyncrasies, for example by a person’s status. Or it could be the case that a 
particular clerk was not too sure what the correct procedure should be, so he requested 
different actions from one ‘citizen’ than a second clerk would ask from another, to 
complete a particular bureaucratic routine. Or a particular clerk might feel benevolent, 
or assess a situation differently, or have a better/worse relationship with superiors and 
therefore act differently. The relationship between the state, present through 
institutions and legal procedures, and the individual, present through human activity 
and human relations, was highly blurred in the Syrian context. The personalised 
aspect of Syrian state structures created a particular form of governance and a 
particular form of integration of Iraqi migrants into the Syrian body politic, and thus a 
particular form of state sovereignty. The highly individualised way that state power 
was applied in Syria resulted in a situation, in which a person’s nationality was not 
the defining feature in his/her relationship with the state, unlike what was assumed by 
the sovereign ideal.  
The blurring in Syria between government, individual and state culminated in the fact 
that the occupancy of the presidency, Syria’s highest executive office, was 
independent of state procedures and had been captured by a single family, through 
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personal power relationships.115 This capture ensured that the person occupying the 
presidency, an element of the governmental structure as designated by the state, 
enjoyed extraordinary personal power and, crucially, did not change.116 Of importance 
for this blurring of individual, government and state structure was the fact that the 
Syrian constitution had been suspended for 40 years and the country was under 
emergency rule, justified by the latent state of war between Syria and Israel. The 
emergency law provided a veneer of officialdom to the arbitrariness of law 
enforcement, and allowed for the recourse to questions of national security by the 
government, when arresting and convicting opposition figures.117  
The arguments and description in this chapter unfold within a theoretical framework 
that draws on a variety of academic writing. Ideas and arguments about sovereignty in 
post-colonial settings are an important inspiration, as are critical interrogations of 
sovereignty-construction taken from development studies and post-modern IR 
theory.118 Syria-focused literature, both academic and policy-focused, is an important 
reference, as are analyses of governance in the Middle East, which do away with the 
dichotomy of democratic/authoritarian, and approach Middle Eastern states from a 
historical sociology perspective.119 The chapter is organised into two broad sections. 
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The first part focuses on the interactions between the Syrian state and Iraqis, looking 
at different bureaucratic and political elements in this relationship. The second part 
focuses on the interactions between the Syrian state and several international actors 
also engaged in the management of Iraqi migration. The conclusion draws on both 
parts to posit the argument that the transformations to Syrian sovereignty occurring 
through Iraqi migration were part of a broader -  if unclear, hesitant and stuttering – 
move of Syrian sovereignty towards neo-liberal forms of power.  
Syrian state sovereignty in the context of post-2003 Iraqi migration 
In the months leading up to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, mass-displacement of 
Iraqis into neighbouring countries was predicted as one of the many possible 
disastrous effects of the war. Highlighting the central importance of population 
control and management for the construction of legitimacy and sovereignty, the 
Syrian government reacted harshly to foreign articles and suggestions that it was 
preparing camps and emergency supplies to receive Iraqi war-refugees. This rejection 
was based on the view that such preparation could be understood as an implicit 
acceptance of the coming war, an attack on the notion of staunch Arab nationalism 
that the Syrian government publically subscribes to. This notion included the view 
that “since 1948, the Arab nation has decided that it does not leave its land", which 
underscored how tightly, in this rhetoric, the issue of migration was connected with 
territory and sovereignty, emphasised by the continuously painful issue of Palestinian 
displacement since the creation of Israel.120 Whether the Syrian government had 
indeed prepared for a mass influx of Iraqis or not, the immediate aftermath of the war 
did not result in large-scale Iraqi immigration. Large numbers of Iraqis only began 
arriving in Syria in 2006, when the rapidly deteriorating living conditions in Iraq 
began to show the extent of the US’ failure to ensure political stability, let alone 
‘democracy’ in the country. The particular coincidence of political events and the 
importance of the Iraq situation for domestic politics in the US and other countries, 
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meant that Iraqi migration became an issue of political mobilisation particularly in the 
US and Europe, placing pressure on governments to assume responsibility for Iraqi 
refugees’ plight. This in turn led to an enormous influx of donor money into the 
region, primarily channelled through UNHCR and the EC, which allowed for the 
creation of a large, vocal and visible humanitarian programme aimed at Iraqis. In the 
Syrian context, and especially on Syrian territory, this humanitarian activity was 
without precedent, as Syria had remained largely closed to humanitarian NGOs and 
had not been the recipient of large-scale international funds. Post-2003 Iraqi 
migration, which might have remained a regional phenomenon, developed into a 
much broader social space, involving politics, locations, documents, employment 
opportunities, funds, and communication across the world and on the internet. 
Importantly for Syrian politics and production of sovereignty, Syrian governance 
strategies and treatment of the Iraqis received significant international attention, and 
had an impact both on Syrian government agents at home and abroad, and on the 
availability of international funds flowing into the country. The exposure of Syrian 
politics towards Iraqi migration also turned the issue into one of high importance for 
relations between the Syrian state and important powers in Europe, the US and the 
humanitarian sector.121  
The expansion of humanitarian governance of Iraqi migrants on Syrian territory, as 
well as the resettlement and immigration policies of other states towards Iraqis, had 
an effect on the conditions of possibility for the construction of Syrian sovereignty. 
Syrian society broadly, and Syrian government and public sector agents more 
specifically, were exposed to the discourse on refugees and migrants used by the 
humanitarian sector and other states, closely in line with the ideal of modern 
sovereignty and its particular forms of inclusion and exclusion.122 The high visibility 
of Syrian politics towards Iraqis and the interference in these politics by a variety of 
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powerful actors made Iraqi migration to the country such a rich opportunity for the 
study of the construction and transformation of sovereignty.  
Constructing domestic sovereignty: Syrian state agents and Iraqis  
One of the most interesting aspects of Iraqi migration to Syria concerned the 
interactions between Iraqis, Syrian-state officials and Syrian policy making. The 
consistencies and inconsistencies, congruence and incongruence between these 
different levels of rule gave insights into how population governance was created in 
Syria, and how the state and its sovereignty existed through these interactions. 
Comparing the daily-life experiences of Iraqi interlocutors with state rhetoric about 
Iraqi plight revealed significant inconsistencies and contradictions. Similarly, 
comparing the assumptions about Iraqis contained in humanitarian programmes with 
official state policies, proved key to understanding the different levels on which 
Syrian state sovereignty was constructed and upheld, most importantly concerning the 
blurred line between internal, ‘domestic’ sovereignty and external, ‘international’ 
sovereignty.  
The lived experience of Iraqis in Syria differed in important aspects from the way 
Iraqi immigration was constructed as an abstract, social ‘field’ in media stories, NGO 
reports and Syrian state presentations and policies. But at the same time, the effects of 
certain, powerful ideas about how Iraqi life must be going on in Syria, which shaped 
governmental and NGO interventions in Iraqis’ lives, filtered into Iraqi lived reality 
and affected how Iraqis viewed themselves, what hopes they had, what opportunities 
they confronted and how they positioned themselves vis-à-vis the Syrian and the Iraqi 
states. Ideas and physical realities of Iraqi migrants’ existence stood in constant 
interaction and formed a dynamic equilibrium, each influencing the other. The 
following paragraphs will focus on the Syrian state’s presence in Iraqi daily life, both 
in personal interactions with officers and clerks, as well as on the more abstract level 
of changes in immigration policies and their enforcement. The aim of these 
paragraphs is to tease out how Syrian state sovereignty was constructed in these 
strategies of population and migration management, and to compare these strategies 
with those stipulated by the sovereign ideal. A further aim is to show the enormous 
complexities of actions that sovereignty-creation requires, and the delicate beliefs, 
assumptions and ideas that it relies on.  
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Iraqis in Syria: visas and immigration rules 
The immigration regime governing movement of Iraqis into Syria underwent 
significant changes between 2006 and 2009, which coincided with the dramatic 
upswing of Iraqi immigration post-2006, and the increased international attention to 
the issue.123 Until early 2007 Iraqis entered Syria without a visa, simply receiving a 
stamp into their passport upon entry. This ease of access was a remnant of Syrian pan-
Arab politics, which officially awarded Arabs a status between foreigner and Syrian, 
with important benefits such as visa-free travel and much lighter residency and work-
permit regulations. In practice, political and other considerations led to considerable 
variations in how citizens from different Arab states were treated at Syrian borders; 
during Saddam’s times the Syrian-Iraqi border notably opened or closed to migrants 
depending on the political climate.124 The growing restrictions on Iraqi immigration 
since 2007 culminated in a situation in 2010, in which Iraqis had to obtain a visa from 
the Syrian embassy in Baghdad to transit the border; this visa was only awarded for 
certain reasons, such as medical treatment in Syria or the pursuit of higher education.  
The administrative changes to the immigration regime had a transformative effect on 
how Iraqis experienced the Syrian state and sovereignty. Those interlocutors who 
entered Syria before the growing restrictions reported on the ease with which they 
passed the borders, for example describing their entry as: 
“No, the entry was easy. Only the passport...No problem. The people were 
smiling when we came, the police, they smiled for us and said hello, their style 
was very nice at the beginning, in 2006, 2005.” 125 
Or 
“When you left Iraq, was it easy to get a visa at the border?” 
“For Syria? Yes, immediately. There was no visa at the beginning. When we 
came, there was no visa required for Syria. Immediately we entered. They 
                                                
123 Given the enormous implications and details related to these changes in immigration policy, only a 
small fraction will be highlighted here. Further details on the matter will be provided in the chapter on 
Daily Life of Iraqis (chapter XYZ). 
124 Geraldine Chatelard, "The Politics of Population Movements in Contemporary Iraq: A Research 
Agenda," in Writing the History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges, ed. Ricardo 
Bocco, J Tejet, and P Sluglett (London: World Scientific Publishers/Imperial College Press, 2011). 
125 Interview with Iraqi man, 14.02.2010 
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stamped the passport, but we didn't have to pay anything. Now a visa is 
required, since about two years. The operation at the border was easy then. Yes, 
very, directly we entered.”126 
In these descriptions, Iraqis encountered the most direct, physical manifestations of 
state sovereignty – border crossings – in a benevolent manner, with a very weak 
impact on their actions and behaviour. Bureaucratic and security routines were weak, 
hardly distinguishing Iraqis from Syrians and marking the transition from one 
sovereign territory to the next in a soft way. When discussing the question of entry to 
Syria from Iraq with Iraqis who entered Syria since the increased restrictions, a 
different image emerged. One mother of an Iraqi girl who had come to Syria in 2009 
to participate in an NGO education-programme described the new, elaborate routines 
necessary to obtain a visa: the obtaining of a fake doctor’s report, the dangerous and 
unpleasant visits to the Syrian embassy in Baghdad, the waiting times and expenses, 
amounting to around USD 50 per visa, a significant expense for most. Another 
interlocutor described her transit, which she had arranged through a company 
specialising in arranging packages covering travel, paperwork, visa and transit. Such a 
package cost USD 200. 
"....they take you in special buses, very clean ones, but it is expensive. And they 
will give you the visa..." 
"Without you having to go to all the different places to get the visa?" 
"Yes, they take you in a special bus. When you reach the border, they help you to 
register and go to the offices and the officials. And it's very, very easy, everyone 
can do it, but it takes so much time...they sign it quickly, but when they search 
the car and the bus, they asked us Why are you coming here? and I told them I 
have a treatment for my eyes for laser, but this is not true. (Laughs).”127 
These different experiences show very tangible transformations in how Syrian 
domestic state sovereignty was performed, upheld, created vis-à-vis Iraqi immigrants, 
through increasingly complicated bureaucratic requirements, changing personal 
interactions between border guards and migrants, and higher costs. Changing the 
                                                
126 Interview with Iraqi man, 17.01.2010 
127 Conversation with Iraqi woman, 11.02.2010 
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practices that constituted the immigration regime for Iraqis presented a direct change 
to how the Syrian ‘inside’ of sovereignty was constructed and to how it affected the 
daily lives of people living in on Syria territory. The examples of petty corruption as a 
solution to formal requirements again highlighted how legal codes did not hold 
abstract power per se in Syria, but rather enforced networks of patronage and 
discrimination against poor people, through which sovereignty was experienced and 
constructed. A much harder, because less easily documentable puzzle, was the 
question of how the changes to immigration regulations changed the construction of 
the ‘outside’ of Syrian sovereignty on the ‘international’ level – and what the reasons 
for the changes were, who decided upon them and with what goal in mind. While the 
latter question would remain elusive due to my lack of access to Syrian policymakers, 
some suggestions could be made about the first point. Overall, it was striking that in 
interviews neither international aid workers, no Iraqis, condemned the increasing 
restrictions placed on Iraqi immigration by the Syrian state. The restrictions were 
accepted as a perhaps unfortunate, but immovable event, as a sort of act of the powers 
that be, whose reasoning could only be guessed at, but given the immovability of the 
decision, guessing would be quite futile in any case.128 The reasons for this 
acceptance and lack of criticism, I argue, can be taken as evidence for how the 
construction of the international sphere of sovereignty took place through more 
standardised and globally accepted practices than the construction of domestic 
spheres of sovereignty. Such standardised and accepted practices included strong 
borders and restrictions on migration, which led to the unvoiced view that the Syrian 
state, in strengthening its borders, was only doing what was ‘natural’ for a state to do, 
that it had the right to do so and was therefore understandable. The previous openness 
of Syria’s borders became, in this way, again constructed as an exception, rather than, 
for example, a moral obligation or historically consistent event. From the perspective 
of the international, and interestingly also from the perspective of many Iraqis 
interviewed, Syria, by imposing tighter access restrictions, was becoming more like a 
sovereign state, less of an anomaly and therefore possibly also more acceptable as a 
member of the ‘international community’ than when its borders remained open. This 
example demonstrated the effect of the standards and practices governing behaviour 
                                                
128 A further reason for the lack of condemnation was that Syria’s entry restrictions, compared with all 
other neighbouring states of Iraq, were still relatively low. Jordan, for example, was criticized 
frequently for having closed its border to most Iraqis already since 2006. 
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of state agents in the international spheres, according to which state sovereignty was 
judged and measured. It further showed how these standards, working at a global 
level, interacted and influenced local conditions, and in this way contributed to the 
distribution and dominance of a particular way of politics.   
Iraqis in Syria: residency permits 
The issue of residency permits was a frequent topic of conversation and worry among 
the Iraqi acquaintances I made during fieldwork. Given this high profile, it can be 
argued that the issuing and obtaining of these permits was the chief relationship and 
encounter between Iraqis residing in Syria and the Syria state, and a key element in 
the construction of Syrian state sovereignty vis-à-vis Iraqi migration and the ‘inside’ 
of Syrian sovereignty. The interesting and puzzling aspect of this relationship was that 
I never encountered an Iraqi who experienced deportation due to the absence of a 
residency permit, although rumours of such deportations circulated. Deportations 
were rather expected, by both Iraqis and international aid workers, in the case of 
serious, illegal wrongdoing on behalf of an Iraqi, regardless whether s/he possessed a 
permit. Neither did it appear that Iraqis frequently experienced random checking of 
their passports for up to date residency permits. The importance allocated to the 
permit appeared to stem rather from the fact that it was the key, state-related, 
bureaucratic routine that allowed Iraqis to demonstrate and perform their allegiance to 
Syrian authority, to show that they were willing to make an effort to conform to the 
requirements set by this authority and to obtain some form of justification, legality 
and protection for their stay. The other, related bureaucratic routine of importance 
concerned the registration with local, municipal authorities and the obtaining of an 
official, rental contract for an apartment, which was frequently a requirement to 
receive the residency permit.  
Residency permits were mostly issued through the Office of Immigration and 
Passports, consisted either of a stamp in the passport or a separate ID card, and were 
mostly obtained and renewed through a personal visit to the office. Most foreigners 
living in Syria for longer than one month have experience of this office, whose main 
branch in the busy Damascus area of Baramka consisted of a four to five storied, run-
down, dirty, concrete office block in which clerks behind glass windows tended to 
queues of harangued people trying to figure out how to meet the needs of Syria’s 
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labyrinthine bureaucracy.129 During my fieldwork, Iraqis could obtain residency 
permits for a range of reasons, although this range was not easily understood and 
possibly not fixed. The most frequently encountered justification was having a child 
registered in school (which afforded a one-year permit for the whole family), also 
encountered were the seeking of medical services, membership in a professional 
union, membership of the Baʿth  party, the UNHCR protection paper, the payment of 
bribes and personal connections. Depending on the type of permit and also unclear 
variations, Iraqis had to renew their permits every year or every three months, 
however other variations also appeared to exist. Once a permit had expired, and an 
Iraqi had spent some time without a permit, it was still possible to regularise the 
situation, however there did not appear to be a standard procedure for this. The 
relative lack of clarity and varied information (recent experiences and news about 
how to obtain permits was eagerly exchanged among Iraqis) about residency permits 
matched the procedures for foreign language students in Syria, who engaged in a 
similar guessing game and word-of-mouth exchange about how to obtain visa 
extensions and permit.  Whether the result of deliberate opacity, or of bad rule-
making in the ministries, or of lack of training among state clerks, the effect of the 
inconsistency of rule was to insert Syria state sovereignty into daily-life 
considerations. Through the residency permit issue, the Syrian state became present in 
Iraqi consciousness as something to consider regularly, as something that required 
tending, and physical and financial effort. Whether Iraqis considered the obtaining of 
the permit as a matter of easy routine, or as significant worry (this strongly depended 
on an individual’s situation), all were aware of the matter and had gone through 
efforts to obtain the permit. As one interlocutor explained: 
“At the moment, what kind of residency permit do you have?” 
“For the studying issues. About my daughter and before that Sally the same 
thing, but I told you that Sally finished the secondary school last year and now 
we depend on Sarti [name of youngest daughter], so now (laughs) she threatens 
us, if you don't give me something I will (laughs)... 
                                                
129 Susanne Schmelter, "Erfahrungsbericht Studium an der Universität Damaskus 2009/10," ed. 
Universität Marburg (Marburg2010). See also the website of the Syrian Studies Association for student 
experiences on obtaining residency permits http://www.ou.edu/ssa/learn.htm 
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How often do you go to the immigration office? 
(wife adds: “every three months…”) “If you have to renew this residency, each 
year and they told us each time, you have to return back after one months, 
after...it depends on their rules.  
“So sometimes they give you one month, sometimes three months…?” 
“..it depends on the rules!  For the first year it was not like the last year. 
Something changes all the time, you know. It depends on something, it belongs 
to the government.”130 
This quote demonstrates how the residency issue transported Syrian state sovereignty 
into daily life routines and even family relations. The uncertainty of regulation is 
highlighted, as is the acceptance of these changes, which were explained with 
reference to the government, which served as a catch-all explanation for matters 
beyond control and explanation, for sovereignty.  
A further interesting example was provided by the story of an Iraqi friend, a single 
man, who, after exhausting all legal attempts to obtain a permit, eventually obtained it 
through a grey-market transaction: 
“So how did you find the solution in the end, the solution for the residency 
permit”? 
“The solution, after that, after some time, the union of expatriate photographers, 
they make a yearly permit. For example the association of poets, those who were 
in the party, the artists, those groups they make you a yearly permit. So I had a 
friend, he called me, and asked me whether I had gotten a permit and I told him 
no, I haven't gotten one. He told me, ok, do you want that I make you an annual 
permit and I told him ‘I wish’. So I gave him 200 dollars, good, I borrowed it 
from my sister, I told her that I needed money to make the permit. So I paid the 
200 and wrote down my name and all the details and it worked out, after a short 
while, I had the permit.”131 
                                                
130 Interview with Iraqi couple in Damascus, 20.02.2010 
131 Interview with Iraqi man in Damascus, 14.02.2010 
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Unlike the previous narrative, this story shows a different reaction and behaviour 
solicited by the necessities of upholding and constructing Syrian state sovereignty 
through human behaviour. The apparent contradictions, that sovereignty was here 
maintained through the breaking of state law, demonstrated yet again the limits of the 
‘sovereign ideal’ as an analytical concept, according to which this situation would be 
a paradox. Rather, understanding sovereignty as an unstable system of power 
relations, constructed through human behaviour and shot through with 
inconsistencies, personal enrichment, individual exceptions and blurring of 
supposedly clear boundaries, is a much more useful academic approach to the 
question.  
Iraqis in Syria: police, surveillance and security 
One of the characteristics of the Syrian government at the time was its reliance on an 
extensive, very visible and intrusive internal security/intelligence apparatus to 
monitor and intimidate the population. Key to the power of this apparatus was the 
lack of legal remedy against it, as actions by internal intelligence officers were 
beyond the law. No redress for transgressions against habeas corpus or other human 
rights were available, at least not along official paths. The focus of this apparatus on 
protecting the echelons of government, and the patronage networks between 
government and intelligence personnel, blurred the distinction between state and 
government to an extreme degree. Paradoxically, internal intelligence were linked to 
and made use of certain state institutions like the presidency or different ministries, 
yet the personalised character of its mission and its position outside the law rather 
made it a part of the current government, or even individual power, rather than a 
representative of the state. While the behaviour monitored by internal intelligence 
mainly concerned criticism of government figures rather than the state the 
punishments meted out often made use of elements of the state, such as deportations, 
travel restrictions, prisons, withdrawal of licenses or public sectors positions, or law 
courts. In this latter way, the internal security apparatus functioned as a means of 
creating Syrian state sovereignty, and this section addresses the role of this apparatus 
in relation to Iraqi immigration and the construction of Syrian sovereignty in this 
context. 
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Overall, most Iraqis in my research group had very little encounters with internal 
Syrian security forces and did not complain about surveillance or intimidation.132 This 
was partly related to the fact that all but two interlocutors did not engage in any 
activities that would be of interest to security agents, and led low-key existences. 
When queried about their concerns and fears regarding Syrian police or intelligence 
officers, most Iraqis interviewed and observed pointed out that all their papers were in 
order and that they had nothing to fear. A small number of acquaintances, notably 
those who had had difficulties obtaining a residency permit or were in an otherwise 
precarious state, expressed fear of random harassment or questioning by security 
agents. Most Iraqis characterised Syria as a place of safety and calm, comparing it to 
the disastrously dangerous situation in Iraq after the war, as well as the extreme 
government repression and surveillance experienced under Saddam’s government. 
Two interlocutors reported home visits by intelligence officers, however considered 
them ‘normal’ security measures related to the obtaining of a residency permit, and 
relatively unobtrusive. One Iraqi acquaintance, a feminist activist who regularly 
worked as a fixer for foreign journalists, maintained a network of international friends 
and had travelled abroad to international conferences on women’s issues, faced a very 
much tougher situation. As a consequence of a long, complicated and not quite clear 
course of events, she had been called in for an unpleasant questioning by intelligence 
officers, who, she discovered, had created an elaborate file on her life and activities. 
More seriously, she subsequently discovered that a she was subject to a travel ban and 
had to apply for permission every time she wanted to leave Syria.133 Such measures 
by Syrian intelligence were frequently used against Syrian intellectuals or political 
activists, including Syrians I had interviewed and was acquainted with. The reason for 
mentioning them here, is to highlight that Iraqis per se were not subject to increased 
controls from the security apparatus, but that the same red lines applied to them as to 
anyone living on Syrian territory, be they Syrian or not. The choice of penalty 
however, varied according to sovereignty, or perhaps sovereignties: citizens of 
powerful, well-organised states would face, at the worst, deportation when crossing 
red lines, as Syrian authorities were aware that anything stronger would create a 
diplomatic incident. People hailing from states with weak bureaucracies, which were 
                                                
132 This excludes the paying of bribes to local police or other security officers, which was frequently 
done for various reasons; while Iraqis (as Syrians) complained about the soliciting of bribes, this was 
not considered intimidating or threatening. 
133 Conversation with Iraqi woman, 3.11.2009 
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not concerned about the welfare of single citizens, were treated similarly or worse 
than Syrians. In the case of the Iraqi activist mentioned above, the choice of travel-
ban, rather than deportation, appeared as a particularly interesting construction of 
Syrian sovereignty. Firstly, because it was so similar to the treatment of Syrian 
activists and served as another pointer for the lack of exceptionalism awarded to Iraqi 
immigrants, and the absence of bureaucratic population management based on 
documents and imagined national identities. Secondly, because it emphasised again 
the  political character of Syrian sovereignty-construction, which focused on 
individualised relations between ‘citizens’ and state, rather than standardised, 
technical, bureaucratic programmes that streamline state-population constructions. 
The presence of Syria’s notorious internal security apparatus in Iraqi daily-life thus 
emphasised that Iraqis as a category were not singled out through increased 
surveillance or constructed as foreigners or exception through this measure. Latent 
fear, awareness of red lines and the potential randomness of government violence was 
as present in Iraqi life as elsewhere in Syria and functioned as a general device of 
control, not specifically aimed at migrants. Internal security concentrated on certain 
behaviours, regardless whether this behaviour was carried out by Syrian nationals or 
persons with foreign passports.  
Iraqis in Syria: labour and investment 
The last aspect of the Syrian state’s construction of sovereignty towards Iraqi 
migrants to be discussed is that of Iraqi employment and business. This element is 
important, as regulating legal access to paid work is a standard element of migration 
management across the world, and changes in labour regulations mark borders 
between sovereign territories. Further, as the official prohibition on Iraqi employment 
and investment played a big role in the humanitarian construction of the image of the 
penniless Iraqi refugee, as well as in Iraqi narratives about their plight in Syria, 
employment regulation by the Syrian state was an important part of the construction 
of sovereignty on different levels. The following paragraphs will present and analyse 
how the contradictory management of Iraqi employment by the Syrian state served to 
construct its sovereignty, both towards international and domestic actors.  
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Upon entry into Syria, Iraqis received a stamp into their passport, stating in English 
and Arabic that this person was not allowed to work in Syria.134 Given the frequency 
with which Iraqis had to furnish their passports (to obtain their residency permits or to 
obtain humanitarian services), this declaration was not just an instance of Syrian state 
sovereignty, but also a constant, visual reminder of the exceptional status of Iraqis 
living on Syrian territory. Humanitarian sector/UN employees would frequently 
mention the employment ban as an element of the Syrian state’s management of 
Iraqis, and many of my Iraqi interlocutors, notably those with a middle-
class/academic background would also point out the employment ban. However, the 
more observations and conversations I conducted, the more contradictions to this 
apparently clear prohibition began to emerge, showing a much more nuanced way 
through which employment/investment by Iraqis created Syrian state sovereignty. 
Despite the official employment ban, in certain areas of Damascus, signs of Iraqi 
employment and investment abounded. The majority of my male Iraqi acquaintances 
had engaged or were engaged in a form of (self)-employment. In these cases, Iraqis 
mentioned the ban on employment rather as an additional hurdle on the difficult 
Syrian labour market, for example prohibiting the entry into a skilled/higher-level job 
such as practicing as a doctor or lawyer or working for the public sector (which in 
Syria covered the education sector). The ban was, in this way, mentioned in the same 
moments as broader discrimination against Iraqis or the fact that unemployment of 
Syrians was already high, or that cooperation and bribery of Syrian local authorities 
complicated the setting up of businesses. Eventually, I also became aware that some 
Iraqis were indeed working in skilled jobs, as doctors or professors, and that certain, 
substantial new businesses had been created by Iraqis. From this perspective, it often 
seemed that Iraqis faced very similar conditions on the Syrian labour market as 
Syrians (apart from the important prohibition of entry into the public sector), and that 
in Syria, skills, money and connections were far more important than nationality for 
success.  
These observations showed that in local, closer personal interactions between Iraqis 
and state officials, the employment ban was not upheld. The directive (or possibly 
habit?) of border clerks to stamp Iraqi passports with a ‘no work’ visa did not 
                                                
134 It is unclear when this policy began. In 2007, conversations with Iraqis who had then lived in Syria 
for several years never brought up this topic and pre-existing Iraqi business in Damascus confirmed 
that during earlier times, Iraqis could access the Syrian employment market legally.  
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correspond with the activities of municipal or local officials in charge of registering or 
monitoring businesses, or even with local security agents controlling neighbourhoods. 
One Iraqi interlocutor, specifically asked about his experience of setting up a small 
billiard salon, explained his interactions with the local municipality, his landlord and 
local security. The fact that him and his business partner were Iraqis was not a 
problem, he stated. What eventually led to the abandonment of the project, despite its 
popularity with local young men, was that all profits were eaten up by bribes and 
quasi-bribes, which made the salon unviable. Once again, the Syrian state and its 
sovereignty were not experienced as a single power with a united purpose, but very 
much as a construction in multiple location, through multiple agencies and people and 
as being used for different ends. The “assemblage of technologies” used by Syrian 
state officials produced an order of sovereignty, but this order could only be defined 
and understood in moments of time and place as it could change in unpredictable 
ways. 135 State sovereignty here clearly appeared as an agreed upon belief, constantly 
reinforced through instances of violence, propaganda and so forth. The micro-
techniques and every-day activities through which individuals and institutions 
mobilised sovereignty to govern and to maintain their power, was not agreed upon 
and in constant flux.  
The effect of this ‘grassroots’ tolerance of Iraqi work was that Iraqis developed into a 
dynamic, sustained and visible population in Damascus, enhancing and changing 
consumption and business patterns in certain neighbourhoods. Far from the 
humanitarian trope of refugees as helpless human beings in camps, Syrian 
state/government policies and politics allowed those Iraqis who had the means to 
build sustainable and occasionally thriving existences on Syrian territory. When 
questioned about the ‘grassroots’ tolerance of Iraqi work, Iraqis and Syrians explained 
this phenomenon with reference to the Syrian government. The brother of my Syrian 
landlady, who ran a small shoe factory and had employed Iraqis, explained that the 
government ‘closed both eyes’ on the matter, as they knew that Iraqis had to make a 
living somehow. Iraqis referred to the fact that they were only allowed to do low-
skilled jobs anyhow (which in fact was not fully correct), which was considered to 
take the ‘threat’ out of their activity, some Iraqis also directly stated that they believed 
the Syrian government wanted to help them. Interestingly, even those Syrians critical 
                                                
135 Ong, Neoliberalism as exception : mutations in citizenship and sovereignty., page 99  
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of Iraqi immigration, who believed that Iraqis were taking over low-skilled jobs and 
pushing down wages, never referred to the possibility of enforcing the employment 
ban. Overall it appeared that in the imagination of my interlocutors, while preventing 
Iraqis from entering or remaining on Syrian territory was an option available to the 
authorities, the stringent enforcement of an employment ban did not figure. In the 
Syrian and Iraqi context, it appeared fully logical and ‘natural’ that an Iraqi restaurant 
owner would turn first to relatives, and then to nearer or further Iraqi acquaintances 
for staff. Such personal ties and power relations, often running across state borders, 
co-existed and criss-crossed state related power structures and their power was an 
accepted element of the sovereign order on Syrian territory.136 The interactions 
between Iraqis and various instances and representations of the Syrian state thus 
presented how, in the daily lives of Iraqis, the space around them was transformed 
into the domestic, sovereign sphere of the Syrian state, via this infinite and constantly 
changing collection of human relationships. The basic, physical and difficult to 
transform elements of the state - borders, ministerial offices and local municipalities – 
provided the constant reminder of the existence of a separate Syrian territory, making 
Syrian sovereignty visible and tangible, and representing it both domestically and 
internationally. But as an order of governance that implemented the abstract notions 
of state, government, internal and external, Syrian state sovereignty was always 
constructed on the spot, by human behaviour. This social construction of sovereignty 
allows for an understanding of sovereignty not as a fixed, timeless and natural order, 
but as a constantly transforming set of power relations based on a number of 
dominant beliefs and norms.  
Constructing international sovereignty: Syrian state agents and international 
actors  
The emergence of Iraqi immigration as an international humanitarian and political 
concern brought Syrian government actors into contact with various international and 
foreign institutions. In their interactions with foreign agencies, other states and media, 
Syrian state officials constructed the outside of Syrian sovereignty, or its international 
aspect; the most frequently mentioned example is perhaps how Syrian ministers often 
                                                
136 Gianluca Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World, IMISCOE Research (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2009); Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military 
Group and the Causes for its Dominance." 
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portrayed Syria as a generous host to Iraqi refugees, in the face of the severe 
economic burden they presented.137 In this rhetoric, presented for example in April 
2007 at a UNHCR-sponsored, international conference on Iraqi migration in Geneva, 
Syria was constructed as a distinct sovereign territory, with a government in control 
of population movements; Syrian sovereignty was also bolstered by the claims to 
goodness and generosity, which legitimise the existence of the state.138 Given Syria’s 
then status as a pariah and designated member of the axis-of-evil, the legitimising 
potential of Iraqi immigration was seized upon to confirm Syria’s acceptance by the 
international community as a sovereign state.139 This move was only possible due to 
the exceptional status that migration was awarded within the sovereign ideal, which 
stipulates national homogeneity, stability of populations and exclusion of migrants. It 
demonstrated the presence, in the international sphere of diplomacy and the UN, of a 
set of standards of the sovereign ideal, against which the existence of a state was 
judged against. Somewhat ironically, Syria’s weak application of this sovereign ideal 
(in the sense that Iraqi migrants were given easy access) allowed Syrian officials to 
point out Syrian generosity; in this way they portrayed the Syrian state’s management 
of migration not as ‘un-sovereign’, but as a generous exception to the rule that Iraqi 
migrants should, if sovereignty were properly applied, be systematically excluded 
(even if this rule had never existed or applied to Iraqis in Syria).140 To quote from the 
paper presented at the above mentioned conference by the Syrian ministry of foreign 
affairs: 
“In the spring of 2003 the region witnessed the biggest exodus from Iraq to its neighbouring 
countries. The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first countries targeted by this exodus. 
The Syrian government and people moved to offer a safe haven for the Iraqi brothers and 
sisters from different spectrums and social affiliations including children, women and 
elderly, who fled the destruction and dangers inflicted on them. Syria offered and is still 
                                                
137 al-Miqdad, "Iraqi refugees in Syria."; Syrian Arab Republic  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Paper 
presented by the Government of Syrian Arab Republic to the International Conference on Addressing 
the Humanitarian Needs of the Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons inside Iraq and in the 
neighbouring Countries.". 
138 Ibid. 
139 For some of these negative portrayals of Syria, see for example Barry Rubin, The Truth about Syria  
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); David Schenker, "Syria's Role in Regional Destabilization: 
An American View," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (October 2007). 
140 These events show the enormous dominance of the sovereign-ideal paradigm, which meant that the 
world could only understand Syria’s treatment of Iraqis (not in camps, not turned back at the border, 
not handed over to international humanitarian management) as a single, ad-hoc exception to Syrian 
sovereignty, rather than as a fundamentally different way of managing migration. 
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offering those refugees all possible help and assistance necessitated by the ties of 
brotherhood and neighborliness (sic), despite the scarcity of material and financial 
potentials.(... )It is noteworthy that regulations in Syria do not require an entry visa for 
Arabs.” 141 
The quote demonstrates some of the key contradictions in the construction of Syrian 
sovereignty. On the one hand Syria is presented as a separate sovereign terrain 
through reference to its borders, government and people, on the other hand emphasis 
is placed on the fact that ‘Arabs’ – a vague identity, incongruous with modern 
sovereignty – enjoyed visa-free access to Syrian territory. Given the lack of detail 
however, overall, the image of Syria that emerges from this quote is that of a good, 
generous and caring sovereign, in which government and people move in unison, 
happy to allow those living in the dangerous outside access to their secure and orderly 
inside territory – classic rhetorical, sovereignty-producing strategies.142 The Syrian 
government officials who wrote the speech were demonstrably aware of the values 
and idealised social relations that the global, sovereign ideal required from a good, 
liberal sovereign, even if the political reality within Syria did not correspond to these. 
The use of the term ‘refugees’, rather than ‘brothers’ or ‘guests’ is noteworthy, as it is 
a departure from standard Syrian government terminology and contains at least a 
degree of acceptance of the liberal, sovereign and humanitarian categorisations.143  
Syrian state relations with UNHCR 
As the main humanitarian actor focusing on Iraqi immigration located on Syrian 
territory, UNHCR was one of the most important agents with whom Syrian 
government officials and state institutions interacted in this context. Despite strong 
UNHCR lobbying, Syria had not joined the Geneva Refugee Convention, which 
regulates to a wide extent how subscribing states, required to integrate the convention 
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into their domestic refugee and asylum law, relate to UNHCR and refugees.144 Due to 
this absence of legal formality, UNHCR documents and interviewees regularly 
maintained that Syria did not have a functioning refugee or asylum policy in place.145 
Consequently, the Syrian state’s relationship with UNHCR was governed by 
astonishingly informal arrangements, given the extent of UNHCR’s interventions. 
Until summer 2010, when UNHCR signed a cooperation agreement with the Syrian 
ministry of foreign affairs, the agency operated on the basis of relatively informal 
partnership agreements with relevant ministries, such as the ministry of health or the 
ministry of education.146 Also in 2010, UNHCR signed an MOU with the Syrian 
ministry of social affairs, which regulated UNHCR’s cooperation with local 
associations, as well as a partnership agreement with the Syrian Woman’s Union (a 
quasi-government organisation).147 This relative absence of formal, legal 
arrangements even with such a powerfully intervening actor as UNHCR emphasised 
the extent to which unpredictability and instability served as an element of 
governance in the production of domestic Syrian state sovereignty, and how this 
instability blurred the boundaries between state, government and personal power. By 
denying UNHCR an independent legal standing, Syrian state agents asserted not just 
Syrian state sovereignty vis-à-vis the organisation, but also the influence of particular 
ministers and their staff. At the same time, these piece-meal arrangements weakened 
the notion of the Syrian state as a single, unified institution with a legal existence 
independent of the sum of its parts (the parts being the decisions of individual 
ministers). Rather than affirming the existence of an independent sovereign state, as 
an overall agreement with the Syrian Arab Republic would have done, these ad-hoc 
agreements with UNHCR confirmed the existence of a multitude of entities, each 
drawing power from an assumed attachment with the state, ultimately backed up by 
the implicit understanding/threat that support for UNHCR’s operations could be at 
any time withdrawn. In Syrian-UNHCR relations, Syrian state sovereignty appeared 
once again as a web of social relations and implicit understandings, which contained 
certain beliefs about the power of Syrian state institutions, which, while they were not 
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regularly tested openly, were signalled to UNHCR employees through the harassment 
of low-level UNHCR associates and NGOs by state security agents.148  
The flexible arrangements that Syrian state institutions struck with UNHCR also gave 
the agency room to manoeuvre on Syrian territory, supposedly exclusively ruled by 
the Syrian state. This manoeuvring created a puzzling situation for an analysis of state 
sovereignty, which could not be explained from the perspective of the sovereign ideal. 
From the perspective of this ideal, it appeared difficult to understand why the Syrian 
state allowed UNHCR to nullify its sovereignty in certain areas of law, public order 
and population control. As will be argued below, the explanation for this situation lies 
in the fact that Syrian state sovereignty was created via social relations and forms of 
power that did not correspond to the expectations raised by the sovereign ideal. This 
meant that UNHCR’s influence over certain spheres of life and indeed over certain 
decisions concerning the Syrian body politic was not particularly important or 
threatening to sovereignty in the Syrian context. One interesting example of how 
UNHCR’s activities ‘undermined’ Syrian state sovereignty concerned the treatment of 
gay people. Even though homosexual acts were prohibited by Syrian law and Syria 
state agents regularly cracked down on gay people, UNHCR could extend special 
protection to gay Iraqis experiencing persecution due to their sexual orientation and 
prioritise their resettlement to the US.149 Not only was Syrian state law concerning the 
public order reversed by UNHCR, but more importantly, the ‘conduct of conduct’ of 
persons on Syrian territory was determined on a very basic, and strongly normative 
level, given the religious and cultural controversy surrounding homosexuality, by 
UNHCR. Further, given that UNHCR only had a mandate for intervening in Iraqi 
lives, and could not extend protection to persecuted Syrian gays or other vulnerable 
Syrians, UNHCR’s activities had an impact on the ordering of the population living 
on Syrian territory and the shape of the body politic. UNHCR’s activities led to an 
imagined ‘disentangling’ of Syrian passport holders, considered the legitimate 
resident on Syrian territory, and the alien Iraqis, who needed to be managed through 
international intervention until their sovereignty-disturbing presence would be 
somehow neutralised. A similar argument could be made about UNHCR’s significant 
welfare provisions to Iraqis, which continued at a time when the Syrian state did not 
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provide such services to poor Syrians, even those in greater desperation; and to other 
areas.  
The question of why and how Syrian state agents allowed UNHCR such scope of 
intervention can be understood and explained by arguing that the UNHCR’s areas of 
intervention, important for sovereignty from the perspective of the ‘sovereign ideal’, 
were simply not relevant to and not part of the strategies of power through which the 
Syrian state constructed its sovereignty. As already referred to above, stringent 
application of the law was not standard practice in Syria; yet this is often regarded as 
an important element or even codification of the state.150 Constant exceptionalism and 
highly individualised relations with the state were widespread, depending on an 
individual’s particular situation. Therefore, the fact that a gay Iraqi’s particular 
situation, out of coincidental reasons, included access to UNHCR protection, which 
facilitated a positive resolution of his problem with the Syrian state, was not an 
affront to Syrian state sovereignty, even though UNHCR favoured this person in 
direct contradiction to Syrian state law. Other persons on Syrian territory committing 
illegal acts could perhaps escape the law because of their wealth, or their personal 
relationship to someone who could manipulate state institutions. Such an analysis of 
the maintenance of Syrian state sovereignty within Syrian territory makes it possible 
to understand how sovereignty is truly created in relationships and human activity, 
especially in Syria, where the legal codifications of the state were weak.  
Syrian relations with NGOs 
The increased presence of foreign, humanitarian NGOs in Syria was one of the most 
remarkable aspects of Iraqi immigration. Prior to 2008, foreign NGOs were largely 
absent from Syria, and the Iraqi issue acted as a door-opener or catalyst for their 
entry. Over the past few years, the Syrian government’s economic-policy statements 
had pointed towards increased participation of NGOs in the country’s economic 
development.151 The activities of the president’s wife Asma al-Asad in the 
humanitarian sector had also shown an increasing interest to build a development 
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sector in Syria, focussing strictly on economic and social welfare issues, rather than 
political empowerment or human rights. This approach, in which basic services are 
moved out of the state-sector to third parties, is a standard element of neo-liberal 
economic development and has been observed in other Middle Eastern countries, 
notably Egypt.152 The move towards economic deregulation led to open 
disagreements among Syrian government figures, pitching more traditional Baʾthists, 
concerned about the effect on poverty and Syrian industry, against the ‘modernisers’ 
favoured by the president.153 It is therefore possible that the Iraqi issue was a 
convenient opportunity for the ‘modernisers’ to allow the registrations of foreign 
NGOs. Initially foreign NGOs were to provide services only to Iraqis; towards the 
end of my field research, it was becoming clear that services were also increasingly 
provided to Syrians, if on a very small scale. With around a dozen, medium-sized 
NGOs active, overall NGO activity in Syria remained relatively low in 2009 and 
2010.154 The growing NGO presence and the political struggles and processes 
surrounding it, highlighted the practices through which Syrian state sovereignty was 
transformed. Secondly, as will be set out below, the contradictory interactions 
between Syrian state agents and NGO employees – sometimes repressive, sometimes 
lauding and applauding – also served to explain further how Syrian state sovereignty 
emerged from this relation.  
Unlike the relations between the Syrian state and UNHCR, NGO relations with the 
state were codified and formal. For an international NGO to become active in Syria, it 
needed to obtain formal approval from the  Syrian ministry of foreign affairs, before 
being able to sign an MOU with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, a quasi-governmental 
organisation associated with the ministry of Health (this MOU was the legal 
document authorising the NGOs activities). The registration process was notoriously 
difficult and lengthy. According to interviews and observations, NGOs had to wait for 
at least one year to obtain the required paperwork.155 Once operations had begun, 
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organisations were subjected to regular and intensive control by ministerial staff and 
security agents; rumours about the extent of state harassment circulated among 
humanitarian workers, often mentioned with hushed excitement, as the ‘dangers’ of 
working in Syria lent their work importance and a degree of adventure.156 Harassment 
by security forces (such harassment ranged from obvious surveillance to interviews 
with police or intelligence personnel) generally targeted low-ranking NGO or 
UNHCR staff with direct and regular contact with Syrians or Iraqis. Foreigners were 
more rarely harassed then Syrians or Iraqis, who were relied upon to relay the 
message to their foreign colleagues or managers.157 Senior UNHCR officers were 
never harassed and, gathering from the public meetings I witnessed and interviews, 
were treated with respect and even gratitude and/or praise for their work. This 
discrepancy demonstrated the different ways sovereignty was constructed in 
interaction with different actors: open harassment of senior UNHCR manager was 
eschewed, given the likelihood that this would have weakened Syrian sovereignty, in 
terms of Syria’s international image as a stable state that adhered to international rules 
of engagement with senior foreign public servants. Harassment of persons whose 
plight would not engage international interest and who possibly harboured grievances 
against the government that could mobilise them into public action strengthened 
Syrian state sovereignty, as the induced fear served to uphold internal acquiescence 
and the impression that the people living on Syrian territory were happy with the 
representation provided by the Syrian government; all necessary attributes of a truly 
sovereign state.158 In the case of NGOs, targeted harassment and control served to 
check the activity of a sector nominally independent of state-interference and with a 
reputation for democracy-promotion and human rights advocacy. Foreign NGOs 
could also be easily construed by opponents as foreign agents with hidden agendas 
inimical to Syria; their perception as political actors, rather than technical operators, 
was emphasised by the notable absence of British or large American NGOs, two 
countries with which Syria has had historically difficult relations, especially in the 
aftermath of the Iraq war. Instead, the NGOs allowed to operate represented a 
selection of relatively small French, German, Danish, Turkish, Spanish and Italian 
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and two small US NGOs (whose US identity was interestingly obscured in UNHCR 
documents).159 
The entry of NGOs to Syrian territory contained a transformative element for Syrian 
state sovereignty and presented a difficult political issue for the government. In terms 
of international sovereignty, the presence of a vibrant NGO-sector would signal to the 
‘international community’ the Syrian government’s tolerance of plurality and thus 
increase the impression of its representativeness and its sovereign credentials. Further, 
NGO activity would suggest that the Syrian territory had now also arrived among 
those governed by the Washington consensus of liberal economic rule, an additional 
signal that the Syrian government was rational and interested in increasing economic 
dynamism and thus the welfare of its people.160 In this way, NGO presence bolstered 
Syrian sovereignty vis-à-vis powerful states in Europe and in the US, which, at best, 
could lead to the lowering of the economic sanctions, mitigate the possibility of future 
military interventions and lead to financial pay-off in terms of donor money and other 
donations (as was already happening in 2009/10). For the construction of domestic 
sovereignty, NGO presence was much more tricky and possibly destructive. NGOs 
and its foreign employees could attract international attention to negative social, 
political and economic conditions in Syria and undermine the credibility and 
legitimacy of state institutions, as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
regularly did. This concern explained the intimidation by state officials of NGO 
employees, who were made to fear that their operations may be easily shut-down in 
case of official displeasure. As the crack-down and aftermath of the brief ‘Damascus 
Spring’ showed in 2001, the Syrian government was adamantly against the 
development of a politicised ‘civil society’ focused on transforming the relationship 
between the people living on Syrian territory and the Syrian government.161 The ‘civil 
society’ that the government’s moderniser’s were trying to foster, should rather serve 
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to bolster the regime’s legitimacy by providing welfare and promoting Syrian 
‘civilisation’.162  
Syrian relations with Resettlement/Donor States 
Around three years after the 2003 Iraq war, due to political pressure, the US and a 
number of European countries began offering permanent immigration to tens of 
thousands of Iraqis. Some immigration applications were processed through the 
countries’ own immigration or asylum procedures, but most went via UNHCR’s 
resettlement programmes in Jordan, Lebanon an Syria. In this programme, UNHCR 
selected Iraqis for resettlement and matched their file with a particular country that 
had offered resettlement slots for Iraqis. According to UNHCR’s guidelines, 
resettlement was considered an option for those Iraqis, for whom return or integration 
was permanently impossible.163 The resettlement states, all ‘Western’ states, were also 
the main contributors to UNHCR’s annual budget, the US’s contributions outstripping 
those of all other states by far.164  
Analysing the involvement of these states in the management, categorisation and 
territorial distribution of Iraqi migrants via the burgeoning humanitarian sector in 
Syria, is important for our understanding of the construction of sovereignty in this 
context. The activities of other states provided a crucial link between the rhetorical 
and relational constructions of sovereignty, and the material, political impact of these 
constructions. The resettlement programme implied that the Syrian state did not 
guarantee the survival and social fitness of Iraqi migrants, and judged that integration 
was not possible for most Iraqis in Syria. This judgement justified the intervention of 
the international community, which was considered necessary to rescue Iraqis from 
the Syrian context, where they presumably remained without the effective protection 
of a sovereign. Syrian state sovereignty was constructed as lacking and incomplete, as 
to achieve ‘protection’ Iraqi migrants had to be sent to better, proper states. In this 
sense, the resettlement programme (together with the other humanitarian 
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interventions) presented an “expansion of the Western sovereign frontier” through 
humanitarian interventionism.165  
In the resettlement programme UNHCR (and IOM) clerks pre-selected Iraqis for 
resettlement, matching them to a particular resettlement state and its criteria. As 
described by a UNHCR manager in charge of resettlement: 
“…because each country has their own criteria that are not necessarily 
matching what we are considering as resettlement criteria. And so we have to 
compare and see ok, this case is good for this country, this case is good for that 
country, we look into a variety of elements…(…)…these people come to us with 
their requirements so we see ok, this is what the Dutch want, this is what the 
Norwegians want, this is what the Americans want and then we balance it out. 
Of course, the most important thing is the best interest of the refugee.”166 
This quote shows the delicate negotiations and complex considerations that went into 
the decision of where an Iraqi person would finally be sent. Questions related to 
domestic space and politics of resettlement countries clearly formed part of the 
‘international’ question of accepting Iraqi migrants from Syria, showing how the 
construction of sovereign borders and exclusions went completely beyond the 
assumed separation of domestic and international. Further, it showed how the way 
that resettlement countries chose to welcome or reject Iraqi migrants, changed the 
composition of Syria’s population of migrants, which showed the direct, political 
impact that the resettlement programme, justified by Syria’s lacking sovereignty, had.  
Once the UNHCR selection was complete, the final stage for Iraqis in the process was 
an interview with resettlement-state officers, on Syrian territory, who passed the final 
judgement whether an Iraqi would be allowed to resettle or not. The US and EU 
countries sent immigration missions for this purpose, in the case of the US the 
interview was conducted by a member of the Department for Homeland Security on 
mission in Syria. This process demonstrated how the particular criteria of resettlement 
states, according to which a person would be allowed to transcend the limbo-state of 
refugeehood and become rehabilitated as a citizen, and, more concretely, be allowed 
to access their territory and population, translated into governance/sovereignty-
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creating practices carried out on Syrian territory. Such phenomena have been referred 
to as ‘overlapping’ sovereignty, however this spatial metaphor is only moderately 
helpful.167 Rather, observing the resettlement process should help us understand 
sovereignty as a construction, as an ideas-practice complex that resulted in Western 
state agents’ ‘conducting the conduct’ of Iraqis in Syria according to their states’ 
criteria of sovereignty and citizenship. The sovereign ideal emerged through this 
practice of categorising and territorially redistributing Iraqi bodies according to ideas 
about who would make a good sovereign citizen, and who could not be rehabilitated 
in this manner.168 Given the transformative political power of these interventions by 
resettlement states, it was interesting to note how little Syrian state officials or 
institutions were involved in this process. The lack of involvement of Syrian state 
practices was highlighted by a further quote from the above-mentioned interview with 
a UNHCR manager: 
“So, once the submission to the resettlement country is made our participation 
in the resettlement process stops…(…)…but we are still following up on that 
process because technically from the submissions point to the departure part 
they are still in Syria, they are still under UNHCR’s responsibility.” 
Even though physically (“technically”) present on Syrian territory, Iraqis were clearly 
imagined as located in a conceptual place that was not Syrian sovereignty; this 
became explainable from within the sovereign ideal’s perspective that the Syrian state 
was denying Iraqis citizenship and was thus denying responsibility for them. Syrian 
sovereignty over Iraqis on its territory became completely hidden in this construct, 
making the intervention of other states necessary and logical. According to the 
indirect information I was able to gather during fieldwork and from Syria-focused 
literature, Syrian state or government officials were not primarily concerned about the 
influence the international community was wielding via the humanitarian sector.169 
Instead, humanitarian/welfare services were expanding into the Syrian health and 
education sector, via actors nominally focused on refugees. Given the Syrian 
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government’s history of invoking foreign intervention as a source of the country’s 
troubles, this lack of concern required explanation. I argue that this explanation lay in 
the fact that some elements in the relationship between donors/ humanitarians and 
Syrian state officials allowed for a performance of Syrian state control and power. 
This performance overrode in certain key moments the construction of Syria as an 
ineffective state that needed outside help, which the humanitarian intervention 
implied, and allowed Syrian state official not just to ‘keep face’ but awarded them 
benefits. The high-level public meetings, training seminars for public servants, the 
UN conferences, donor coordination meetings and positive media attention related to 
the humanitarian and resettlement effort provided Syrian representatives with 
heightened importance and a place among the ‘international community’, which so 
often shunned Syria. Publically, Syrian state officials, humanitarian sector workers 
and donor state representatives applauded each other on the Iraqi refugee effort, and 
high praise was consistently given to the Syrian government for its efforts. The 
construction of the sovereignty-boosting narrative ‘Syria has generously opened its 
door to refugees created through the disastrous US-invasion of Iraq, which it even 
opposed, and requires some assistance to help these poor refugees’ obscured the way 
that the humanitarian sector presented Syrian sovereignty, at the same time, as 
incomplete and ineffective. The expansion of humanitarian activity in Syria and the 
powerful distinction it carried with it between developed and underdeveloped 
countries had the potential for a lasting construction of Syrian sovereignty as 
‘underdeveloped’.170 As a middle-income country with a state-dominated economy 
Syria remained somewhat of an anomaly in the developed-underdeveloped 
dichotomy.  The process of marking Syria as underdeveloped through the creation of 
a humanitarian sector, and the associated meanings for Syrian state sovereignty, was 
therefore particularly illuminating and interesting.  
Syrian-state relations with Iraq 
Iraqi migrants were widely considered as a political bargaining chip in Syrian-Iraqi 
state relations. Many Iraqis interviewed feared that a souring of Syrian-Iraqi ties could 
lead to their expulsion or at least create trouble for them. Several events and 
observations supported the idea that in Syrian-Iraqi diplomacy, Iraqi migration was an 
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openly politicised phenomena and not a technical problem that required management 
and bureaucratic/welfare intervention. This presented a significant difference to the 
approach of humanitarian agencies, and pointed to the depoliticising effect of 
humanitarian actions, in which open political bargaining and power-jockeying 
becomes replaced with neutral-sounding interventions through which the outcome of 
these interventions appear as inevitable and natural, rather than as the result of 
(political) choices.171 Despite the easy access for Iraqis to Syrian territory and the 
associated blurring of territorial exclusivity on this ‘human’ level, Iraq migration was 
also, on other levels, used by the Syrian government to enforce its sovereignty vis-à-
vis its old rival Iraq. This was evident from the entry-restrictions placed on Iraqi state 
agents and interests, and from the way the Syrian government made use of its right for 
exclusive control over territory and borders when it came to persons that the Iraqi 
government wanted extradited or arrested. Such persons, former members of the 
Saddam Husayn-regime and high-ranking Baʾthists, enjoyed the protection of the 
Syrian state and in this way became a location of Syrian state sovereignty vis-à-vis 
Iraq. Pointedly, when Iraq’s then Prime Minister Maliki requested the hand-over of 
certain persons sought by his government, the Syrian president reminded him that for 
ten years, Syria had provided asylum to Maliki, refusing to extradite him to Saddam 
Hussein. This rebuff signalled continued Syrian sovereignty over such matters, and a 
humiliating, indirect comparison between Maliki and Saddam Husayn.172 Highly 
insightful events concerning the construction of Syrian sovereignty in relation to Iraq 
occurred during the Iraqi parliamentary elections in March 2010, in which Iraqis 
living in Syria were allowed to vote. The process alone, which was not conducted via 
postal voting, but at voting stations set up in schools/other suitable buildings, was 
remarkable in terms of the construction of sovereign spaces (especially in the absence 
of meaningful and free parliamentary elections in Syria). To the surprise of many 
observers of Syrian politics, in the weeks preceding the elections, Iraqi election 
posters began to appear in Iraqi-dominated neighbourhoods, and eventually even in 
central areas of Damascus.173 Jaramana, the Iraqi neighbourhood I was most familiar 
with, was soon covered in a blizzard of posters and large banners strung across the 
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street, dwarfing the familiar pictures of Asad père et fils. The posters usually showed 
the face of the individual candidate, the district that s/he was standing for, the name of 
her/his party and possibly some national or religious slogan. A variety of candidates, 
from bare-headed women to religious sheikhs, and parties, were visibly contesting.  
Interviews with Iraqis living in Jaramana confirmed that in addition to the posters, 
Iraqi party-activists were conducting door-to-door canvassing of Iraqis living in the 
area. The Iraqi embassy had begun issuing information about how to vote several 
months previously and information about where to vote spread by word of mouth. 
Through a comparatively elaborate selection process, the electoral commission hired 
Iraqis as security guards and voting assistants, paying as much as  USD 100 per day; 
one of my interlocutors successfully applied and earned USD 300, over a months’ 
rent, in three days. A common assumption (later confirmed by voting results) was that 
Iraqis living in Syria favoured the opposition candidate Ayad Allawi and his coalition 
the Iraqi List, a secular man representing secular politics. A further widespread 
assumption was that Allawi was also the preferred candidate of the Syrian 
government; but notably, all parties were allowed to advertise. During voting, which 
took place on 5-7 March 2010 across Damascus, no intimidations or restrictions by 
Syrian government agents were reported. In this election process, Syrian and Iraqi 
state sovereignty appeared as intertwined and mutually dependent. The mainstays of 
the ‘sovereign ideal’, territory, borders and population, did not appear as defined, or 
fixed categories of analysis. ‘Iraqi’ or ‘Syrian’ locations emerged ‘on the spot’, where 
election officials decided to locate them. A Syrian school was turned into an Iraqi 
voting station, manned by Syrian and Iraqi state officials, without much ado. 
Sovereignty became real through the persons who went to vote to this school, who in 
that moment became identified as Iraqi – a sovereign category – and who, through 
their imagined link with a far-away, national and sovereign territory, were allowed to 
influence the politics on this territory. The sovereign ideal awarded these voters an 
imagined link of solidarity and nationality, and a tangible right to influence the 
government on this particular territory. Conversely, Iraqis who did not decide to vote, 
who wished to give up their nationality and would have been happy to adopt the 
Syrian or any other nationality, weakened, through their actions, the construction of 
the sovereign ideal. Syrian-Iraqi state relations, in the context of Iraqi migration, 
again showed how practices and activities could simultaneously contradict and 
 111 
confirm the sovereign ideal. Different levels of interaction played a role for these 
constructions. Syrian-state related activities aimed at Iraqis living on Syrian territory 
often contradicted the social/political relations assumed by the sovereign ideal. 
Syrian-state activities aimed at persons associated with the ‘international community’ 
or representatives of foreign states on the other hand performed and confirmed the 
values, ideas and politics stipulated by the sovereign ideal, even if the corresponding, 
lived reality in Syria, did not.  
Conclusion 
This chapter presented an analysis of how the practices of the Syrian state constructed 
and transformed Syrian state sovereignty the context of Iraqi migration to the country. 
The first section analysed how the Syrian state’s sovereignty over Syria’s domestic 
space emerged as an effect from different interactions between Syrian state 
institutions and Iraqi migrants. Firstly, the changing regulations controlling Iraqi entry 
to Syrian territory were discussed. Until 2007, Iraqis enjoyed easy, visa-free access to 
Syria, whereas since 2007, it has become increasingly complicated for Iraqis to obtain 
the now necessary visa. These regulatory changes had a significant impact on how 
Iraqis experienced the most basic, physical form of Syrian sovereignty, that of Syrian 
border posts and guards; earlier migrants spoke of the friendly, easy reception they 
received, while later migrants described the growing hurdles they had to overcome 
and a tougher, formalised crossing of the actual border. These examples showed how 
changing bureaucratic requirements transformed the appearance of Syrian state 
sovereignty in Iraqi daily life. Secondly, the question of residency permits, which was 
an important, often-discussed element in Iraqis’ interaction with the Syrian state, was 
analysed. The uncertainties and frequent changes to the rules surrounding residency 
permits meant that they became a vehicle through which Iraqis were constantly 
reminded of Syrian state sovereignty, and Iraqis’ status of toleration, rather than legal 
guarantee. This randomness of rule also confirmed how in Syria, the state did not 
appear through the law, but through the absence of regularity and as a source of 
continuous insecurity; in this, Syrian state sovereignty appeared as a very different 
form of rule than that stipulated by the sovereign ideal and many modern theories of 
sovereignty. Thirdly and fourthly, the issues of Iraqi access to the Syrian labour 
market and policing of Iraqis were discussed.  
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The chapter’s second section analysed how Syria’s international sovereignty was 
performed and constructed in the context of Iraqi migration. The political 
developments that turned Iraqi refugees into an international, humanitarian concern in 
the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion, brought Syrian state officers into contact with 
international humanitarian agencies and the wider ‘international community’. The 
development of a humanitarian sector in Syria was an unprecedented opening of the 
country to international NGOs and humanitarian presence. In these encounters, Syrian 
state officials constructed Syrian state sovereignty, via a narrative that presented Syria 
as a unity of territory, population and government that extended a generous and 
protective hand to the Iraqi aliens fleeing the chaos outside of Syria’s secure and 
defined borders. This section firstly focused on the interactions between Syrian state 
institutions and UNHCR, which had developed a large portfolio of programmes to 
manage Iraqi migration. Given the breadth of UNHCR’s interventions, it was 
astonishing that the agency maintained a relatively informal relationship with the 
state, via ad-hoc MOUs with several ministries, rather than an overall, detailed 
agreement with the government. This situation ensured that the Syrian state’s 
sovereignty towards an external power appeared invested in separate institutions and 
powerful individuals, who drew their power from an official link with the state 
apparatus, but also from their personal networks and relationship with the president. 
Sovereignty was here clearly an effect of an ‘assemblage’ of power relations, which 
maintained UNHCR in a position of insecurity and dependence, but also allowed the 
institution room to manoeuvre on Syrian territory. Once again, this governance over 
UNHCR showed that Syrian state sovereignty was not based on the social relations 
and legal regulations assumed by the sovereign ideal. Indeed, occasionally UNHCR’s 
programmes nullified Syrian sovereignty, for example when the agency extended 
special protection to gay Iraqis, who would have been considered criminal under 
Syrian state law. For the functioning of Syrian sovereignty, the concept of legality 
was simply not relevant, as a person’s relationship with the state depended on 
individual characteristics, not neutral, legal categories. Secondly, this section focused 
on international NGOs, of which around a dozen had been allowed to operate in Syria 
for the first time in 2007/8. The opening of Syria to NGOs on the one hand boosted 
the state’s international standing and sovereignty, as it presented Syria as a 
liberalising state that allowed independent organisations focused on human rights to 
operate, and that accepted Western ideas about development and care for the 
 113 
population. On the other hand NGOs were also a risk to Syria’s international 
sovereignty, as they signalled that the Syrian state was not able to care for its 
population and was an underdeveloped country. Syrian ministries thus kept NGOs 
under much stricter control than UNHCR and initially only allowed the organisation 
to work with Iraqis. Lastly, this section considered the Syrian state’s relationship with 
Iraq and with donor states. The latter had a significant impact on the management of 
Iraqi migrants in Syria via their funding and their participation in the resettlement 
programme for Iraqis.  
Overall, this chapter argued that the maintenance and enforcement of Syrian domestic 
sovereignty relied on different forms of power than those assumed by the sovereign 
ideal. Rather than being codified in law, bureaucratic routine and fixed institutions, 
the Syrian state became present in daily life through the creation of insecurity and 
randomness of rule. Yet when constructing Syria’s international sovereignty in 
interactions with international agencies and institutions, Syrian government officers 
displayed a definite awareness of how to perform the ideal of liberal sovereignty, by 
presenting Syria accordingly. The international attention and intervention focused on 
Syria’s handling of Iraqi migrants, created new occasions, interactions and spaces for 
Syrian state officers and institutions to construct and enforce Syrian sovereignty, and 
allowed for an observation of their practices, and their sovereignty-creating effect.  
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Chapter 4 
The humanitarian Regime of Sovereignty I: UNHCR in 
Syria 
 
 
One of the consequences of the sudden increase of Iraqi migration to Syria in 2006 
was a rapid expansion and intensification of UNHCR operations in the country since 
early 2007.This expansion led to a number of fascinating political developments in 
Syria, which previously had been largely isolated from post cold-war humanitarian 
discourse. Focusing on these political developments, this chapter develops the 
argument that UNHCR’s legal framework and practices were based on a particular 
understanding of sovereignty and a particular understanding of the social relations 
that should underpin it. UNHCR’s interventions in Iraqi life in Damascus reflected 
and produced these understandings, and shaped Iraqi life accordingly.  
The argument is complicated by the fact that UNHCR itself is not a static organisation 
and has undergone significant changes in the interpretation of its mandate in the past 
twenty years. UNHCR’s legal framework, in particular the 1951 Geneva Refugee 
Convention, is based on ideas of national sovereignty prevalent in the first half of the 
20th century, of a world of powerful, clearly demarcated nation states, in which the 
government-citizen relationship is envisaged as one of protection and 
responsibility.174 But since the 1990s UNHCR has been transforming into an 
organisation with broader humanitarian and interventionist operations, and has 
become part of the dominant discourse of today’s global elites, which merges 
economic deregulation, humanitarianism and international law into a set of beliefs 
about how the world should be governed.175 This discourse, confusingly referred to by 
authors as ‘post-liberal sovereignty’ or ‘global sovereignty’, contains a changed 
understanding of national sovereignty and the role of the international community, 
which is often cast as confronting sovereignty, for example in the case of 
                                                
174 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 
175 Gil Loescher, "The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy," 
International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001); Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism with a Sovereign 
Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow," International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001). 
 115 
humanitarian intervention undertaken by the ‘international community’ in a sovereign 
state. 176 In Damascus, UNHCR’s operations produced Iraqi identity in a complex 
manner that revealed on the one hand the organisation’s historical understanding of 
state sovereignty, of borders, of citizens, territory and government, and on the other 
also demonstrated how far UNHCR had moved away from the narrow framework 
provided in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Formal UNHCR rhetoric categorised 
Iraqis in Syria as refugees, in need of protection, which remained a vague term. This 
categorisation displayed UNHCR’s incorporation of the ideal of state sovereignty: 
Syria and Iraq were understood as two separate, sovereign territories, whose borders 
clearly demarcated distinct forms of rule, national identity and citizen-government 
relations. Once a citizen had lost the protection in her home-state and had been forced 
to flee due to this loss, UNHCR discourse assumed that its intervention became 
necessary to enable the refugee to slot back into the system of state sovereignty, in 
which she floundered and floated, as long as no state would protect her by awarding 
her a sovereignty-conform identity.177 Iraqis were cast in these terms by UNHCR 
Damascus.178 
In 2009/10 UNHCR programmes in Damascus clarified that in practice, protection 
translated into a concern for the physical welfare of Iraqis and a focus on those 
matters that would enable them to become self-sufficient, economically stable 
persons: education and access to jobs. This mobilizing of protection blended out any 
questions of political protection (in relation to which the Refugee Convention was 
designed) and raised two interesting points: firstly, that UNHCR was adapting to the 
Syrian government’s oppression of political freedom and secondly, that UNHCR’s 
humanitarian discourse and conceptualisation of refugees as non-political bodies with 
chiefly physical needs, made this adaptation astonishingly easy and blurred the 
common distinction between authoritarian and liberal. This problematique was linked 
to UNHCR’s post-1990s expanded humanitarian role and its adoption of humanitarian 
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governance techniques that depoliticised ‘beneficiaries’ of aid across the globe.179 
Both elements of UNHCR’s discourse (the classic, sovereign ideal and humanitarian 
governance) explained the techniques of management and rule that the organisation 
deployed in its operations in Syria, which are a further focus of this chapter. The 
relevance of these techniques lay not only in what they revealed about humanitarian 
values and ideas, a focus that has been developed relatively extensively in the 
literature.180 In the Syrian context, they also indicated that humanitarian actors were 
vehicles for the introduction of particular forms of governance that were previously 
absent from Syria. These governance techniques transported norms and ideas about 
national state sovereignty and thus alluded to one mechanism through which 
transformations of sovereignty occurred locally in reaction to globally dominating 
ideas and practices. On the other hand, UNHCR’s own reflections on its Middle East 
operations also showed how the organisation was adapting to the characteristics of the 
regional states, thus illustrating the intensely dynamic character of such 
transformations that do not, as is often assumed in critical literature, simply flow from 
the powerful metropolis into the post-colony, but through constant exchange. 181 
This chapter unfolds in four sections. The first section gives an overview of 
UNHCR’s operations in 2009/10. Section two analyses UNHCR’s largest programme, 
the resettlement operation, which allocated Iraqi refugees to a number of countries 
that had agreed to receive a certain number as permanent immigrants. The third 
section looks at UNHCR’s broader humanitarian programmes and the fourth, short 
section provides a special focus on the techniques UNHCR used to manage Iraqis, 
arguing that they blur common understandings of liberal and authoritarian.   
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An overview of UNHCR’s operations in Damascus 
In 2009/2010 UNHCR in Syria operated three main sites in Damascus, all of which 
had been newly developed since 2007. Their set-up, detailed below, reflected the 
contradictory and ironic relationship of UNHCR/UNHCR employees with their 
‘beneficiaries’, in this case mainly Iraqi refugees. The contradictions of this 
relationship will be familiar to most analysts of humanitarianism, in which the 
continued existence of desperate people ensures simultaneously the existence of well-
paid and prestigious jobs for expatriates, whose stated raison d’être is the amelioration 
of the desperate people’s poverty or fear. In Syria, as elsewhere, the most senior 
UNHCR employees were the furthest removed from contact with Iraqi refugees, a 
situation mirrored by the spatial organisation of the UNHCR sites. The more lowly 
and badly paid UNHCR staff were either Syrian or Iraqi, and were those with most 
contact to ‘beneficiaries’. During visits to UNHCR facilities I witnessed how difficult 
UNHCR employees often found ‘dealing’ with Iraqis, sometimes treating them rather 
as annoying petitioners rather than persons with a right to UNHCR’s services. High in 
their upper-floor offices in separated buildings, senior UNHCR staff were shielded 
from any such stressful encounters.  
In terms of this organisational hierarchy the most important site was a newly built, 
modern, four-story office block on a main road in Kafar Sūsa, a rapidly developing 
area around 1km from Damascus centre. The block was set around 50 meters back 
from the road in an unpaved building site of mud and rubble, and housed the central 
decision-making facilities of UNHCR in Syria, the offices of senior and middle-
ranging UNHCR managers, meeting rooms, a cafeteria in a small garden and, in the 
cellar, a small number of window-less and cell-like interview rooms. Entry occurred 
through a metal gate and a reception area, where friendly receptionists sat behind two 
desks, asked visitors for their IDs and handed out visitors’ badges. The building’s 
relatively elegant corridors and walls were richly decorated with UNHCR posters and 
adverts displaying emotional portraits of refugees and words such as ‘courage’, 
‘hope’ or ‘strength’. Offices were set up in the familiar manner of desks, computers 
and files and the typical hierarchy of increasing office size and comfort according to 
managerial rank was visible.  
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The other two UNHCR sites were completely different in architecture and 
atmosphere. Both concerned the processing of Iraqi refugees and were key locations 
in which encounters between UNHCR officials and Iraqis took place.  One was 
located close to the central office block, however in a more removed and rundown site 
directly on a moderately busy side road. In this one-story building, simply constructed 
from corrugated iron, plywood and tarps, UNHCR-registered Iraqis could seek 
different services each day of the week (Tuesdays – enquiries regarding resettlement 
status, Wednesday – legal aid etc). The centre had a small, roofed, outside waiting-
area and two separate entrances for men and women, through which one proceeded 
past a metal detector and into the waiting area, which had a warehouse feel (no 
pictures of hopeful refugees here) and rows of white plastic chairs. While there was 
no cafeteria or garden, informal vendors offered soft drinks and snacks and there was 
a water fountain. As demand for the services offered often outstripped the available 
space, there was regularly a large crowd of dozens or sometimes hundreds of Iraqis 
standing outside of the building, waiting until the number they had been allocated 
would be called up, allowing them to proceed inside.  This overcrowding and the long 
waiting times contributed to an atmosphere of disorganisation and lack of 
consideration for the attending ‘beneficiaries’. The third main site consisted of a large 
warehouse complex 25 km outside of central Damascus in the suburb of Dūma. This 
was where UNHCR conducted new registrations, (the process through which Iraqis 
became recognised as refugees and received their protection paper) and where various 
kinds of clerks conducted the interviews with Iraqi families and individuals that were 
required during the registration and resettlement process. This facility, which was 
UNHCR’s largest registration facility in the Middle East and possibly the world, was 
also used for the distribution of food aid and consisted of warehouse halls, several 
large waiting rooms and smaller interview rooms. 
In addition to these main sites, UNHCR also ran a network of around 80 so-called 
‘outreach volunteers’, all of whom were Iraqi women functioning as messengers 
between Iraqis and UNHCR. Each volunteer was responsible for a particular 
neighbourhood and was in charge of alerting UNHCR to Iraqi poverty, and of 
spreading information about UNHCR’s programmes, by leaving her telephone 
numbers with local shopkeepers or wardens, and word of mouth.182 UNHCR had 
                                                
182 Interview UNHCR volunteer, 01.11.09 
 119 
developed this group in response to the absence of humanitarian NGOs, through 
which the organisation usually conducts aid programmes in a refugee crisis, when in 
2007 it started responding to increased Iraqi migration. The lack of so-called 
implementing partners in Damascus had left UNHCR initially without means to 
contact and collect information about the Iraqi community, making it difficult to 
target available assistance. The volunteers, who received a small monthly 
compensation for their expenses, met every two weeks at the UNHCR office. While 
speaking very highly of the volunteers and of the usefulness of this system, a senior 
UNHCR official also described it as heavily time consuming, due to the need to 
closely monitor the volunteers to prevent any abuse or misconduct.183  UNHCR was 
also indirectly present in the field through its funding of NGO programmes, after the 
Syrian government began licensing such organisation in 2007 (in 2009/10 around a 
dozen NGOs were operating, most of them on a small scale). For example, UNHCR 
set up and funded six community centres in neighbourhoods with Iraqi 
concentrations, which were later handed over to the NGO Danish Refugee Council 
and ran in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. These centres offered 
various training and counselling courses and sessions. UNHCR was the central 
funding vehicle for NGOs in Damascus. Finally, UNHCR’s also engaged in high-
level and “quiet” diplomacy to lobby its position with regards to refugees, and 
organised regional conferences and training workshops attended by government and 
other public officials.184 By organising charity concerts and festivities focused on the 
theme of Iraqi refugees the organisation raised its profile among Damascene elites 
and the media. A biannual UNHCR Syria update, around 10 pages long, provided 
regular statistics on recent developments and various puff pieces on the organisation’s 
activities.185 
Numbers and Challenges 
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In 2009/10 UNHCR Syria employed around 200 staff, probably making it, according 
to one experienced UN consultant, the organisation’s second largest operation after 
Thailand.186 The resettlement programme, discussed in detail below, was the largest, 
employing around 60, followed by the three departments of registrations, community 
services and protection. These numbers were the result of a very rapid scaling up, as 
in March 2007 UNHCR still operated from a small office in central Damascus with 
no additional site and a dozen or so staff.187  
UNHCR’s latest biannual update of summer 2010 states that it was at that time 
managing 151, 907 Iraqis (54, 054 families), who had registered as refugees since 
2007. This presented a downward revision from UNHCR’s last update in Winter 
2009/10, which had reported 218, 363 registered individuals (71, 107 families). While 
resettlement accounted for some of this trend (since 2007 21,018 Iraqi individuals 
have departed for resettlement according to UNHCR figures), UNHCR also 
“inactivated” the files of 15,900 individuals who had not had any form of contact with 
UNHCR during 2010, assuming that these persons were no longer resident in Syria.188  
With regards to registrations of refugees, in late 2009 UNHCR Syria appeared to be 
critically examining the practice, adopted by UNHCR in February 2007, that all Iraqis 
outside of Iraq would be considered as refugees on a prima facie basis.189  This move 
had been explained by UNHCR with the pervasive insecurity in central and southern 
Iraq and the sudden arrival of large numbers of Iraqis in neighbouring countries, with 
no available staff to interview them. Given that in 2009/10 the security situation in 
Iraq was improving, UNHCR Syria was, according to a spokesperson, piloting status 
determination interviews with new arrivals from certain provinces.190 According to its 
own statistic, UNHCR was still registering over 1000 Iraqis as refugees each month 
between January and July 2010. 
In UNHCR circles the Iraqi refugee operation, which also involved UNHCR offices 
in Jordan and Lebanon, was regarded as exceptional, and indicative of the challenges 
that UNHCR had to grapple with to address the troublesome issue of urban refugees, 
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i.e. refugees who do not reside in camps, in the future. These challenges included the 
lack of formal refugee legislation and UNHCR endorsement in Syria, Lebanon and 
Jordan and the precarious standing of UNHCR activities, which were tolerated, rather 
than guaranteed. In this scenario, UNHCR could not roll out the “international 
standard” it liked to uphold, but had to negotiate with governments about how far 
they would adapt to such standards.191 A further challenge concerned the fact that the 
presence of Iraqis in Damascus was obscured due to their dispersion in the urban 
jungle, which made it much harder for UNHCR to intervene than if they had been in 
camps. Urban refugees were the subject of a divisive, special UNHCR policy, due to 
their ‘exceptional’ position.192 The absence of camps was repeatedly mentioned by 
UNHCR officials and publications as a key difficulty, given that camps made it so 
much easier for UNHCR officials to assess, inform, supply and control a refugee 
population. Lastly, the final challenge associated by UNHCR with Iraqi migration to 
be mentioned here, was that a large percentage of Iraqis in Syria hailed from the well 
educated, middle class and were therefore much harder to satisfy with regards to 
living conditions and more difficult to manage. In the words of one UNHCR manager 
working on the resettlement process:  
“This is very different compared to an illiterate refugee population. These 
people ask questions and ask for information, they voice concerns and have 
expectations, they understand the process to a certain level. Also, this is the 
largest refugee operation UNHCR has and it is very different than a camp… In a 
camp, I can go around, I know what is going on, but here it is not possible to 
know.” 193 
This quote demonstrates the connection between having knowledge about and having 
power over a population and crystallises the unequal power relationship between 
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UNHCR and the Iraqi population. UNHCR’s anxiety about feeling out of control was 
due to its lack of information about the Iraqi population in Damascus. Similarly, Iraqi 
demands for information about UNHCR processes were attempts to obtain knowledge 
and power, and the unease expressed about this restful refugee population and 
attempts to empowerment vis-à-vis the organisation, showed UNHCR staff’s limited 
desire to truly empower its ‘beneficiaries’. 
UNHCR and sovereignty 
UNHCR receives its mandate from the UN General Assembly, to ensure the 
protection of refugees worldwide through various measures, including the lobbying of 
governments and the instructing of private organisations to assist in the task. The 
relevant UN documents define a refugee as a person, who, due to fear of persecution 
on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is unwilling or unable to avail himself of the protection of his home 
country.194 This definition sits, as do the documents as a whole, fully within the 
discourse of the sovereign ideal, in which reified territories, borders and populations 
are represented through the similarly fixed UN technocrat, who executes the will of 
the nation embodied in a set of bureaucratic and legal rules. From this perspective on 
sovereignty, refugees are an anomaly, a living proof that the nation-government-
sovereignty link has broken down or possibly never existed, resulting in the illogical 
situation that a government or a nation is persecuting its own people.195 UNHCR and 
the 1951 Refugee Conventions sit like a band-aid on international legislation, a 
corrective tool within international law, as an after-thought following the realisation 
that the firming up of post-empire national sovereignty was creating exclusion and 
concentrated violence, rather than islands of peace.  
The inadequacy of the refugee convention, with its focus on the individual perception 
of fear of persecution, and its silence on situations of generalised violence has been 
recognised.196 The case of post-2003 Iraqi migration, in which many people fled a 
situation of general insecurity that resulted from a mix of targeted persecutions, 
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criminality and the actions of the US army, particularly highlighted the short-fallings 
of the convention. But the key reason behind the convention’s discrepancy with real-
life refugee situations is its understanding of sovereignty.  If the convention would 
recognise that forced migration is not a result of the breakdown of the sovereign ideal, 
but often a product resulting from attempts to create it, or occurs in political settings 
where this ideal does not apply, then it would call into question the entire, 
universalising system of international law and the UN, and its claim to peace, security 
and human rights.  
UNHCR in Syria did not apply international law by the letter, for example by 
accepting Iraqis as prima facie refugees. But the sovereign ideal was observable in 
full force in the organisation’s resettlement and humanitarian programmes. To 
become deserving of resettlement abroad, regarded both by UNHCR staff and most 
Iraqis as the ultimate prize, Iraqis had to prove in great detail the foundations of their 
fear of persecution, their lack of (pro-Saddam/anti-American) political activity, their 
poverty and suffering. The more vulnerable and lacking of governmental protection a 
person was considered to be according to UNHCR criteria, the more likely 
resettlement and aid would be forthcoming. In accordance with the understanding of 
the sovereign ideal (and its absence), the more Iraqis lacked any of the characteristics 
of a citizen, the more likely they would be regarded as true refugees and therefore in 
need of UNHCR’s help. The intellectual puzzle and political relevance of this 
treatment of Iraqis in Syria by UNHCR, lay in the fact that in Syria, the relationship 
between state, government and population was not as assumed by UNHCR’s concept 
of sovereignty. Sovereign citizens, governmental protection and nation were all ideas 
only weakly recognisable from the lived experience of people on Syria’s territory, be 
it that they carried Syrian or Iraqi passports. Through its programmes, UNHCR was 
transporting aspects of liberal sovereign identity into the lives of Iraqis living in Syria 
and into the Syrian political context.  
Local legal context 
An analysis of the local legal context in which UNHCR operated in Syria shows the 
relationship between UNHCR and the Syrian state and how the two actors influenced 
and limited each others practices. The Syrian government’s production of sovereignty 
limited UNHCR’s impact in such a way that the organisation’s effect was 
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transforming, rather than threatening to Syrian sovereignty. UNHCR’s mandate (and 
the included assumptions about sovereignty) adapted in the Syrian scenario, but its 
humanitarian discourse still created political contradictions and tensions, as it shaped 
Iraqi identity and life from a political rationality highly different from that of the 
Syrian state. The Syrian state was not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and, from UNHCR’s perspective, did not have a modern asylum or refugee law at the 
time of research.197 Therefore UNHCR’s mandate did not automatically extend onto 
Syria’s territory. Instead, since 2003, the organisation operated under a ‘temporary 
protection regime’ that was respected to a varying degree by the Syrian government. 
In practice this meant that the government allowed UNHCR’s operations, cooperated 
with certain UNHCR efforts and, for example, since 2010, was accepting UNHCR’s 
temporary protection document as a way of extending official residency permits for 
Iraqis. Despite this last point regarding permits, it was noteworthy that during the time 
of my research, only one of around 80 Iraqi informants had obtained a residency 
permit through her UNHCR protection paper. All others had obtained permits 
independently from their registration with UNHCR, meaning that permits were also 
open to those Iraqis not registered with the organisation. This point was important, as 
UNHCR’s stated primary protection target was protection from refoulement 
(deportation/no option of legal residency), which, however, in Syria was provided or 
withdrawn by the state regardless of someone’s status with UNHCR.  
None of the Iraqis who I asked directly (perhaps 20) attributed a strong protection 
element to the UNHCR protection document, in the sense that it would protect them 
from deportation. In fact, protection from deportation was not mentioned in 
conversations and interviews about Iraqis’ motivations to register with UNHCR. The 
reasons for UNHCR registration mostly concerned access to resettlement and aid, as 
well as a general hope that something positive might develop from this step.198 
UNHCR officials, Syrians and Iraqis all believed that deportation of an Iraqi could 
occur at any time at the discretion of the government. Given the government’s politics 
of toleration at the time, interlocutors acknowledged that deportation was generally 
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only likely if an Iraqi broke the law in some way.199 As long as their papers were in 
order, many (but not all) of my research contacts felt secure from deportation in the 
political climate, again indicating that their residency in Syria had little to do with 
UNHCR registration. Iraqis frequently mentioned fear of a political reversal that 
would end the politics of toleration and would force Iraqis out of Syria. Such a change 
would be related to a change in Iraqi-Syrian government relations and not as an 
element within the remit of UNHCR. The fact that UNHCR-registration did not play 
an important role in terms of whether an Iraqi was permitted to remain on Syrian 
territory or not pointed out UNHCR’s ambivalent legal status and influence in Syria. 
While it was possible that UNHCR’s quiet diplomatic efforts contributed to the 
overall toleration of Iraqis in Syria, it was notable that since the organisation’s 
increased involvement in the management of Iraqis from 2007 onwards, the Syrian 
government had increased residency and visa restrictions on Iraqis. As argued above, 
it was possible to link these growing restrictions to transformations to the way the 
Syrian state was producing its sovereignty in response to the framing of Iraqi 
migration as a humanitarian crisis, and the subsequent international involvement in 
this field.  
The Syrian government’s tolerance of UNHCR’s aid operations and its broad 
disregard for its supposed influence on residency and deportation issues also 
illustrated that UNHCR’s impact on Iraqi life occurred mostly in the biopolitical 
sphere and in regards to further migration. Before elaborating on both aspects in a 
more detailed analysis of UNHCR’s resettlement and humanitarian programmes, 
firstly it is necessary to provide a brief analysis of UNHCR’s main programmes and 
activities aimed at Iraqis in Damascus.   
UNHCR’s key programmes in Damascus 
As mentioned above, at the time of research, UNHCR ran four key operational units 
whose activities had a direct impact on Iraqi life: the registration unit, the community 
services unit, the protection unit and the resettlement unit. The registration unit was in 
charge of staffing the registration centre, interviewing Iraqis wishing to register, and 
renewing their registration annually. To initiate registration, Iraqis would visit the 
centre and receive an appointment by showing their Iraqi passport. In mid-2008, 
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waiting time for the registration interview was two months, due to the large numbers 
of Iraqis wishing to register (an average of around 8000 new registrations per month 
in 2008), however by late 2009 this had been reduced to less than two weeks.200 At 
the registration appointment, which all members of the family wishing to register 
were required to attend, Iraqis were asked to provide passports and Iraqi identity 
cards, and fill in an application form, which requested information about the family’s 
biodata, its previous situation in Iraq and the reasons for departure in form of a 
narrative. After filling the form and waiting (the waiting process was managed via 
numbers which were called out), a Syrian UN clerk would conduct the interview 
based on the information provided on the application form. In the official words of the 
UN, the registration interview served as the “first screening for special needs and 
identification of vulnerabilities”.201 Referral to and information about relevant 
UNHCR services could be administered through the clerk at this point. Photos were 
taken of each family member and each received a UNHCR protection document, valid 
for one year, and a file number for the whole family. The document, titled ‘refugee 
certificate’, showed the owner’s photo, name, nationality, date and place of birth and 
date and place of entry into Syria and included a paragraph stating that the person had 
been recognised as a refugee by UNHCR and should, “in particular, be protected from 
forcible return to a country where he/she would face threats to his or her life or 
freedom. Any assistance accorded to the above-named individual would be much 
appreciated.”202 This document had to be presented to receive all other sorts of aid 
from UNHCR and affiliated NGOs.  
The community services and protection unit cooperated to increase the broader 
‘protection space’ for Iraqi refugees in Damascus, through identifying ‘protection 
needs’ and developing programmes to address them. In practice this translated into 
the running of a variety of services, via the above mentioned community volunteer 
network, six support groups made up of Iraqis with a relevant background (for health, 
psycho-social issues, the elderly and people with disabilities, unaccompanied and 
separated minors and education), twelve community support centres and the UNHCR 
buildings at Kafar Sūsa, and Dūma. UNHCR’s 2010 ‘Regional Response Plan for 
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Iraqi Refugees’ reveals the extent of these community-based services and lists, inter 
alia, vocational training, extracurricular activities and remedial classes for children, 
psycho-social counselling, adolescent empowerment programmes, training of youth 
workers, child-friendly spaces, life skills training and support for victims of sexual 
violence.203 UNHCR clerks and volunteers would alert Iraqis to these programmes 
during any point of contact, or Iraqis could seek them out voluntarily. The protection 
unit, according to UNHCR reports, additionally focused on capacity building among 
Syria official involved in immigration through training and the provision of 
equipment, and raised awareness among the Syrian population on refugee issues.  
Finally the resettlement unit, at the time of research the largest unit in terms of staff, 
managed the complex process through which Iraqis were identified as qualifying for 
resettlement abroad and were matched with one of the participating resettlement 
countries.204 If selected for resettlement, Iraqis received a permanent residency in the 
resettlement country as well as varying levels of financial and educational support, 
and thus, according to UNHCR logic, ended their refugee status. Resettlement was 
considered by UNHCR as one of three durable solutions to end refugee status, 
generally for the most vulnerable refugees, with selection criteria based on 
humanitarian and legal criteria. Practically, the question whether a person was 
resettled or not strongly depended on whether a third country had agreed to give 
UNHCR a ‘resettlement quota’ for this particular group of refugees, and thus also on 
political questions. UNHCR documents and interviews talk about ‘filling’ quotas or 
refer to estimates or expectations about how many persons would be submitted for 
resettlement in a given year, which were based on quotas provided by resettlement 
states. The availability of resettlement ‘places’ therefore clearly influenced the 
selection process and given UNHCR’s urgent lobbying for more such places, it 
appeared unlikely that once a quota has been provided, it would not be filled.205 This 
presence of third countries in the resettlement process underscored that resettlement 
was a space of ‘overlapping’ sovereignties, a question that will be addressed in 
chapter five. 
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In the case of Syria, each resettlement country informed UNHCR about the amount of 
Iraqis it was willing to resettle in a given year and of any additional requirements, for 
example Norway had the aim to fulfil the 2009 quota to 55% with women.206 
UNHCR’s task was to pre-select and submit the required number of files to the 
authorities of a country, however the final decision whether a file would be accepted 
was only made after resettlement-country officials would conduct a final interview 
with a proposed Iraqis; such interviews took place in Syria. The participation of 
various, complicated bureaucracies and the sheer number of people and files involved 
meant that resettlement was a highly complex and work-intensive programme. In 
addition, resettlement was high-profile and controversial, subject to much speculation 
and accusations of discrimination. This was partially due to the fact that resettlement 
was so strongly desired by most UNHCR-registered Iraqis, due to the deliberately 
opaque decision-making about the grounds on which files were selected and due to 
the long waiting periods between decision-making steps, during which no information 
was provided to the Iraqi applicants. The high work-pressure on resettlement staff and 
the constant suspicion on all sides that Iraqis were trying to cheat their way into 
resettlement added to its contentiousness. The following two sections will provide a 
more detailed analysis of UNHCR’s resettlement programme and it humanitarian 
programmes, as it is here that the organisation’s framework of sovereignty became 
operationalised and observable.  
UNHCR’s Resettlement Programme 
UNHCR’s resettlement programme categorised Iraqis according to criteria of 
vulnerability, and the provided them with a sovereignty-conform identity supposedly 
conform with the sovereign ideal, and legal status. The programme showed what kind 
of Iraqis were considered by UNHCR as most completely non-conform with 
sovereignty and in need of resettlement, which was considered as the last resort 
solution to become rehabilitated into the sovereign system. Resettlement was one of 
UNHCR’s so-called three durable solutions to end someone’s situation as a refugee; it 
was considered an important ‘protection tool’ “when local integration is not an option, 
and voluntary repatriation does not seem viable or feasible in the near future”, which 
                                                
206 Interview with manager of the UNHCR resettlement unit, 21. 01. 2010, Website of the Norwegian 
foreign affairs ministry, accessed November 2010.  
 129 
was, with regards to the Iraqis, considered to be the case by UNHCR.207 Resettlement 
was also considered as a solution of choice when a refugee has ‘specific needs’ that 
would not be met in the country of refuge, and other reasons.208 
Based on UNHCR’s Resettlement Handbook, the organization had developed 11 
categories of Iraqis, who would be prioritized for resettlement. The profiles reflected 
a mix of heightened suffering (‘persons who have been the victims of severe trauma’), 
of physically weaker persons/less able to look after themselves (‘older persons-at-
risk’, ‘unaccompanied children’, ‘medical cases’), gender considerations (‘women-at-
risk’) and targeted persecution (due to a person’s ‘religious or ethnic’ background).209 
The categories also included the very situation-specific profile of persons who “fled 
due to their association with the Multi-National Force, Coalition Provisional 
Authority, UN, foreign countries, international and foreign institutions or companies 
and members of the press” and stateless persons.210 Narratives and data that Iraqis 
were requested to provide during registration and resettlement interviews focused on 
identifying information related to these categories. These profiles reflected UNHCR’s 
twin concerns firstly with vulnerability defined along humanitarian ideas focused on 
the body, and secondly with vulnerability defined as an ‘unclear’ (from UNHCR’s 
perspective) legal relationship vis-à-vis the state and government. The first concern 
could be traced to UNHCR’s subscription to humanitarian discourse, as set out above, 
that casts refugees as biopolitical subjects with no means of employment or self-
support. The second concern was linked to the organisation’s concept of sovereignty, 
according to which UNHCR’s corrective intervention in a person’s status became 
desirable if she did not enjoy, and could not in the future achieve, the kind of citizen-
state relationship of reciprocal rights and duties that is the bedrock of the modern 
ideal of sovereignty. Resettlement was regarded as a solution to both aspects of 
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vulnerability: the granting of long-term residency status with the eventual option of 
obtaining citizenship solved the absent relationship with a state. The provision of 
government-assistance in the resettling country, followed by integration into the 
labour market, completed the transformation into a self-governing human who 
contributed to the maintenance of a protective government through paying taxes and 
voting. Together, these steps were regarded as the successful provisioning of 
‘protection space’ to a refugee, who was resettled in a sovereign, stable and peaceful, 
realm. The resettlement programme was a mechanism to eliminate the vagueness of 
Iraqis’ status in Damascus. Iraqis’ sovereign status was vague from the perspective of 
UNHCR’s sovereign ideal because they were neither properly recognized refugees, 
nor citizens, nor fully stateless; this vagueness was regarded as a threat to Iraqi 
survival, however perhaps more importantly, threatened the stability of the sovereign 
ideal on which UNHCR’s foundations rested (particularly in light of the fact that 
Iraqis did indeed survive in this vague state, many not very badly). The following 
sections examine more closely the way that the resettlement programme produced 
Iraqi identity and status and what techniques UNHCR used in the process.  
Resettlement and the production of Iraqi identity 
As set out above, the resettlement programme functioned as a corrective tool, through 
which an attempt was made to produce Iraqi identity and legal status in a way that 
conformed with the sovereign ideal. From this sovereignty-conform status, human 
rights, citizenship, peace and stability (in short: protection) were supposed to flow, in 
accordance with the idea that a sovereign realm was an ordered realm of law and 
rights. However to qualify for the expensive and work-intensive resettlement process, 
resettlement candidates first had to become identified as having moved further away 
from the sovereign realm than any of their peers, through displaying poverty and 
suffering. Although UNHCR officials kept selection criteria secret, reportedly in 
order to avoid fraud, it was well known amongst my Iraqi interlocutors that signs of 
greater distress would increase chances of being resettled. One middle-aged Iraqi 
man, complaining about the perceived randomness of UNHCR decision-making and 
the general chaos and opacity of UNHCR operations in Damascus, stated this point 
when he asked rhetorically:  
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“Do I have to lie to receive resettlement, do I have to say that I was kidnapped 
and my wife was raped? They say that your story is not so bad, but they do not 
understand. People that lie receive resettlement.”211  
A further statement that demonstrated such awareness of UNHCR’s processes came 
from another Iraqi man, who was waiting to hear about his resettlement case and who 
stated:  
“When we go to ask them about what is going to happen, they told us we have to 
wait until we…every family, it is like a queue. It depends on your story or your 
situation; it makes them deal with you first. There are other families, maybe they 
came after us, but their circumstances makes the UN deal with them before us. It 
depends on their opinions and their ideas.”212  
Other interlocutors, whose relatives or who themselves had held positions in Iraq’s 
former army under the Saddam regime, were aware that this placed them in an 
awkward position vis-à-vis the resettlement requirements. Two middle-aged female 
interlocutors, whose husbands had both worked in the army (as doctor and pilot 
respectively), suspected that their respective delay and rejection from the resettlement 
process was linked to their spouses’ previous positions. The fact that one of the men 
had vanished on the Syrian-Iraqi border, in all likelihood murdered for his army 
association, showed the potential life-death impact of UNHCR’s judgment of people’s 
deservingness of resettlement.213  
The resettlement programme pushed Iraqi identity onto selected aspects of Iraqis’ 
experiences and self-understanding. While violence, fear, injury, poverty, 
dependency, weakness and support of the US-led invasion were all – among many 
others - recognizable elements of Iraqi experience and life in Damascus, participation 
in the resettlement programme nudged these elements towards becoming defining 
features of Iraqi identity, as they were prerequisites to being selected for the (often) 
highly desired move abroad. Even as UNHCR clerks recognized that this perception 
was often highly distorted, the structural requirements embedded in the stated 
‘priority profiles’ ensured that the resettlement remained focused on the identification 
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of these vulnerabilities. Through producing Iraqis as ‘huddled masses’ of beings that 
had been cast outside the protective realm of sovereignty, who, through resettlement, 
could access this realm again and achieve safety, UNHCR produced and performed 
successfully the narrative that state sovereignty in its modern, liberal manifestation 
was the right, just, stable and peaceful form of power and social-political 
organisation. This mise en scene of sovereignty could only be achieved by ignoring 
the many ambiguities that Iraqi existence in Syria introduced to the sovereign ideal, 
by the simple fact that many Iraqis existed quite well without a citizen-state 
relationship that would qualify as such in UNHCR’s perspective. This ignorance 
about other aspects of Iraqi existence in Syria on behalf of UNHCR, elaborated 
below, was astonishing and thorough. 
Resettlement and the body politic 
The resettlement programme also contained a judgment on Iraqis’ place in the Syrian 
body politic. As UNHCR only considered resettlement viable if local integration was 
“not an option”, Iraqis examined for resettlement were necessarily understood as un-
integrated in Syria and, in present circumstances, un-integratable. This notion was 
often repeated in UNHCR rhetoric, both in official statements and interviews, and 
always extended to Iraqis in general, not just those being examined for resettlement. 
Speakers and interlocutors pointed to two key facts when making this argument. 
Integration was not considered possible due to the fact that Iraqis only received 
temporary residency permits; and because Iraqis were prohibited from working (Iraqis 
received a stamp into their passport stating this prohibition). These statement’s again 
clearly reflected UNHCR’s two central concerns about refugees, namely their lack of 
a stable relationship with the state and their inability to care for themselves. Iraqis’ 
status, in UNHCR’s view, cast Iraqis ‘outside’ of the Syrian body politic, as they were 
assumed to stand in a fundamentally different relationship to the Syrian state than 
persons with Syrian papers. The following paragraphs will argue that this view of 
Iraqis was only possible by viewing the Syrian context through the lens of the 
sovereign ideal and by ignoring that Syrian state sovereignty was constructed through 
very different social relations, governance strategies and techniques. Government 
protection and a reciprocal citizen-state relationship did not form part of Syrian 
sovereignty in the way that the sovereign ideal stipulated. By basing its programmes 
on this ideal, UNHCR imported related ideas and techniques onto Syrian territory, 
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creating a conflicting narrative about where Iraqis stood in relation to the Syrian state 
than the situation that presented itself through daily observations.214  
The ban on employment 
When confronted with the observation that signs of Iraqi employment and investment 
were evident around Damascus, many interlocutors (both from UNHCR and not) 
would stress that Iraqis could only seek work in the informal sector, in unskilled jobs, 
and that Iraqis easily became victims of exploitation due to their lacking legal status. 
The clearly widespread Iraqi employment was thus portrayed as temporary and 
precarious, as an emergency survival measure, rather than as a sign of residency, 
stability and successful organisation. The most striking aspect of this assessment was 
its blatant and peculiar blindness towards the reality of labour, authority, citizenship 
and state – in short towards the reality of daily life – as it presented itself in the Syrian 
context. Lack of security and precariousness was a central governance strategy 
through which the Syrian government produced and performed the state’s sovereignty 
towards the people living on its territory. One key technique through which this 
precariousness was produced was to impose ‘official’ prohibitions, while at the same 
time tolerating systematic and widespread transgression of the ‘official’ rule. In this 
way the possibility of state intervention was always allowed for, however it was never 
clarified when such an intervention may occur.215 This technique, combined with a 
low supply of jobs and poor education facilities, meant that precariousness and at 
least latent feelings of insecurity were constant factors for many people living in 
Damascus, especially with regards to employment and income. The regional 
instability, recently highlighted during the 2006 Israeli attacks on Lebanon, followed 
by the 2008 attacks on the Gaza strip, strengthened this feeling even amongst Syrian 
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interlocutors who held attractive and relatively well-paying jobs.216 In the Syrian 
context, ‘protection’ in UNHCR’s sense of physical safety, enforcement of one’s 
rights and economic independence flowed much more from personal wealth and from 
useful personal connections to state employees/otherwise powerful persons, than from 
the judiciary or from the government. This applied to all people living on Syria’s 
territory, be they Iraqi or Syrian. Dozens of observations and interviews confirmed 
that successful Iraqi employment, business activity and investment depended much 
more on such matters, than on their secure or insecure relationship with the Syrian 
state.    
The two neighbourhoods with the most visible Iraqi community, Saīda Zaīnab and 
Jaramana, hosted dozens of Iraqi-run business, mostly restaurants but also bakeries, 
shops and travel agencies. One interlocutor told me how, shortly after his arrival in 
Syria, he had set up a small billiard bar, together with a friend who had provided the 
necessary capital. The bar had been a moderate success until increased rent and bribe 
payments made business unviable.217  Another Iraqi acquaintance worked in a 
restaurant owned by his family, which provided a moderate income for the family 
after rent and bribe payments. The bribe payments in both cases were necessary to 
local state agents due to absent permits and to prevent any form of harassment.218 
While these and other observations pointed out that Iraqis could face additional 
hurdles in Syria due to their status as foreigners, they also showed that Iraqis with 
capital and skills had better chances of finding employment/business than poor, 
unskilled Syrians. This, as argued throughout this thesis, was due to the way that the 
Syrian government created and produced Syrian state sovereignty through techniques 
of population management that notably differed than those captured in the sovereign 
ideal. Due to these differing techniques, in Syria a person’s legal status vis-à-vis the 
state only had a relatively modest effect on desperation, unlike what the UNHCR 
assumed in its criteria for resettlement. 
A similar analysis may be made in reference to the often-repeated statement that 
Iraqis were only allowed to work in the ‘informal’ economy and were prone to 
exploitation. While it was true that Iraqis could not access public sector jobs, which in 
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Syria included wide swathes of the economy, including large parts of the health and 
education sector, there was no further indication that other parts of the job market 
remained systematically closed to Iraqis. In addition, the ‘formal’ sector (i.e. jobs 
where a closer government inspection was likely, such as education or health), was 
not fully closed to Iraqis, as was indicated by the private Iraqi-run university on the 
outskirts of Damascus, which had been open since 2005, staffed and headed by Iraqi 
faculty. One of my interlocutors, a natural scientist, was visiting Damascus for several 
months for the specific purpose to seek a job at this university; his worries focused on 
the competition and made no mention about possible troubles about work permits.219 
Further, the vague term ‘informal’ did not carry clear meaning in the Syrian context, 
where ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ spheres were blurred to a high degree. The fact that 
many Iraqis were working in jobs beneath their level of education or in worse jobs 
than they had held in the past was disappointing and sad, but not highly different than 
the situation experienced by many Syrians I encountered. While Iraqis occasionally 
seemed to be paid substantially less than Syrian employees for the same tasks, this 
was not the case across the board, as many observations and conversations indicated. 
All in all, there was no strong evidence that, in terms of employment, Iraqis faced a 
radically different situation than Syrians due to the ‘official’ employment ban on 
Iraqis. This point was astutely summarised in a highly insightful research study on 
Iraqi employment conducted, somewhat ironically, on behalf of UNHCR, for which 
21 working Iraqis were interviewed. The study states that: 
“All the participants had a stamp on their residency card saying they were not allowed to 
work. They knew what the stamp meant, but this did not stop some from being puzzled at 
the idea of needing a permit to work. Many assumed that their working would be tolerated 
as they had seen other Iraqis doing so, and assumed that they also had the stamp forbidding 
them to work. 'N' thought that permits were only needed for setting up businesses. 'E' and 'O' 
did not understand what a work permit was. 'Z' left Iraq specifically to work and send 
remittances to his family in Iraq. He was not aware of any permit requirements and is 
working in a hotel without one. 
'G' was aware that she was not supposed to work. Her husband, a Chinese chef in Iraq, had 
applied to work in a Chinese restaurant in Dūmar. They said they would hire him if he went 
to get a work permit from the 'National Leadership'. Experience had taught 'G' that work 
permits were not an issue in the Saīda Zaīnab neighbourhood. She believed that the Syrian 
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government tolerated Iraqis working there, and setting up businesses too. She mentioned 
that there were Iraqis working as professionals in the medical clinics associated with the 
Haūzas (the Shia religious seminaries).”220 
This report, interviews and observations with Iraqis cast doubt on the claim that Iraqis 
were systematically exposed to increased exploitation, simply due to the fact that they 
were Iraqi.221 One of my interlocutors, an Iraqi woman in her late teens, reported 
about her search for work and how she had learned about a basic juice-making 
factory, where Kurdish girls squeezed pomegranate with bare hands while sitting next 
to large, burning-hot cauldrons, earning around USD five per day. Through this 
encounter the Iraqi woman had learned that Kurds in Syria were in a ‘bad situation’, 
as they were not given nationality and opportunities. The job in the juice factory 
presented such bad conditions that my Iraqi friend decided against it.222 A further 
research informant, an Iraqi man in his early 20s, was actively searching for work in a 
number of fashionable restaurants in the old city, where some of his Iraqi friends were 
employed. The wage he expected to earn, around USD 160 per month to begin with, 
would be the same as Syrian employees; however it was noteworthy that this 
informant was not hired in the end as his residency permit had expired, the restaurant 
owner told him that once he obtained a residency, he would hire him (a work permit 
was not mentioned).223  
The relationship with the state 
Also with regards to others areas of ‘protection’ and the key issues of residency and 
freedom of movement did daily life in Syria challenge UNHCR’s assumptions about 
the way sovereignty worked. The lack of a formal relationship with the state, which in 
UNHCR’s logic translated into a lack of protection, did not distinguish Iraqis in the 
Syrian context in this regard. Protection was not a key element of the state-citizen 
relationship in Syria, where the state’s sovereignty was built on different strategies of 
coercion and social relationships. As the sovereignty-producing strategies of the 
Syrian government are analysed in greater details in chapter three; this section will 
only present a few aspects that demonstrated the contrast with UNHCR’s vision 
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especially starkly. The Syrian government had ruled under emergency laws since 
1963, which suspended the constitution and any protection it awarded to individuals 
from state violence.224 In practice and according to observations and interviews this 
meant that the government regularly resorted to personal harassment, arrest, 
conviction and physical violence against persons who had fallen foul of state or 
government agents. It also meant that it was very hard to seek redress for any 
arbitrary rights-violations by state or governments agents; if attempted, it would be 
sought through personal connections and bribe payments, rather than legal process.  
One of the most pertinent issues when considering the alleged absence of freedom of 
movement/residency of Iraqis, assumed by UNHCR to be an issue of official state 
matters, was the fact that persons who had drawn the negative attention of state agents 
were regularly prohibited from, or harassed when leaving the country by the Syrian 
government. As mentioned in chapter two, this situation applied to various of my 
interlocutors: a Syrian, middle-aged, male government critic; an Iraqi woman who 
had been questioned by intelligence agents over her links with foreigners; and a 
young Syrian man who was dodging the military service. A further Syrian 
acquaintance, a man in his late 20s who had been living abroad for many years, 
repeatedly faced trouble when trying to exit Syria after visiting his relatives. After 
repeatedly having to pay bribes and mobilize contacts to leave, he decided not to visit 
again despite important family occasions, as he was too worried about the 
consequences: in effect, the Syrian government had banned him from returning to 
Syrian state territory. These observations show that, when on Syrian territory, state-
affiliation was not a crucial determinant for ‘protection’. Freedom of movement from 
and to the territory was not a sovereign-citizen right for persons with Syrian 
documents that could be systematically upheld under certain conditions. Syrian state 
agents, due to arbitrary circumstance, could easily treat two persons in a similar 
situation differently in terms of protection and freedom of movement.225 Certain 
                                                
224 In 2011, the emergency law was officially ended as a reaction to the wide-spread anti-government 
protests, however this did not change the situation on the ground where security officials still 
conducted arrests and convictions based on ‘national security’ question. This development highlighted 
that the concept of ‘legality’ was broadly meaningless in Syria. 
225 An important caveat to this statement : state affiliation does impact on protection in the sense that if 
a person holds citizenship in a country that is likely to intervene on her behalf in case of rights 
violations or arrest, Syrian state agents will be much more cautious. So while Iraqis (for example) 
could not turn to their embassy to seek protection, EU citizens could, and were therefore much less 
exposed to harassments or arrest.  
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observations of the resettlement programme also scuttled notions that a legal 
residency permit in a sovereign state would result in ‘protection’. Hardship, and other 
issues, led a small (and unknown) number of Iraqis to return to the Middle East, after 
having received the long awaited resettlement.226 Once resettled to the US, Iraqis 
received financial support from the US government for the first months, after this 
period food stamps were provided, however rent and other expenses had to be 
covered by Iraqis themselves. This process clashed with UNHCR’s focus on resettling 
the most ‘vulnerable’ refugees, who were often persons who would find it most 
difficult to obtain employment and economic independence abroad. Here, UNHCR’s 
narrative that legal residency in a sovereign country would result in protection for 
‘huddled masses’ was most clearly revealed to be problematic. The returning Iraqis 
were also a living evidence that the particular definition of ‘protection’ enshrined in 
ideas and laws about modern sovereignty, in practice had important limits. While 
sovereign protection covered violence stemming from certain persecutions, it did not 
extend to physical harm resulting from poverty, and thus revealed its historical and 
ideological ties to capitalism and liberal values about self-governance. The issue also 
highlighted sovereignty’s continuing basis on imagined nationhood and the exclusions 
and barriers faced by migrants, and pointed out that in Syria, the state had not 
assumed control over the broader and more inclusive identity of ‘Arab’, even though 
this meant a slacker control of borders and territory.   Further complicating any 
assumed link between citizenship and protection, UNHCR’s financial and food aid for 
Iraqis in Syria was perceived as unlimited, unlike the temporary state support received 
after resettlement. 
As UNHCR sought to create the ‘protection space’ that Iraqis were apparently lacking 
due to their foreignness in Syria, the organisation created benefits and services that 
were not available to Syrians via the Syrian government. In this somewhat ironic 
situation, UNHCR produced ‘Iraqi’ and ‘Syrian’ as distinct categories of persons, 
based on the sovereign-ideal of citizenship as a person’s defining characteristic, in a 
way that the Syrian government did not. This absence of ‘protection space’ for 
Syrians again called UNHCR’s assumptions about sovereignty and citizenship into 
                                                
226 During research I met one woman who had returned after being resettled from Amman to the US, 
after not being able to find means of survival after her six-months support ran out. Other informants 
told me directly about a handful of other cases, as did UNHCR interviewees. A number of press reports 
appeared in US papers on the issue, however there do not appear to exist statistics on this issue.  
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question, as ‘vulnerable’ Syrians, be they ‘women-at-risk’, ‘elder-persons-at risk’ or 
be they persons facing persecution on political grounds, had no recourse to enforce 
their assumed right of protection as citizens. A conversation with a Syrian 
acquaintance, who was an astute observer of Syrian politics, stressed this point. When 
asked about what she considered as a key difference between the situation of Syrians 
and Iraqis, she answered that “the state did not care about the human rights of either 
its citizens nor of the IR, whether they lived or died, the state did not care. But the IR 
(note: Iraqi Refugees) had various organisations that were representing them to 
Europe, to the US, to the UN, such as UNHCR and the aid organisations. So in that 
sense they had someone speaking for them and there was a spotlight on them.”227  
Together with other humanitarian actors, UNHCR contributed to a transformation of 
the space in which the Syrian government could produce the state’s sovereignty, both 
towards the people living on its territory and towards the international community. As 
already alluded to, UNHCR’s humanitarian programmes played a crucial role in these 
transformations; they are the focus of the next section.  
UNHCR’s Humanitarian Programmes 
UNHCR’s humanitarian programmes demonstrated the organisation’s institutional 
belief in liberal values of self-government and the liberal subject, and hinted at these 
ideas’ connection with the sovereign ideal. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to 
establish an easy dichotomy between UNHCR as a ‘liberal’ actor and the Syrian state 
as a ‘despotic’ actor. As the last section of this chapter will argue, UNHCR’s 
governance techniques showed that in terms of violence, there was no neat divide 
between liberal and authoritarian forms of power. Considering UNHCR’s 
humanitarian programmes it was important to note that at no point did Iraqi migration 
result in the widespread misery associated with tent camps and forced marches of 
people carrying their belongings. No camps for Iraqis had been established in Syria, 
neither had homelessness visibly increased in Damascus in association with Iraqis. In 
early 2007, during a meeting with UNHCR Damascus at a time when no significant 
programmes existed, the then community-services officer recounted how she gave a 
(then unusual) cash hand-out to the most desperate Iraqi man who had approached 
UNHCR, who had told her that he had no accommodation and was considering 
                                                
227 Field note 091009a 
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sleeping in a park. In middle-income Syria, where visible signs of extreme poverty 
were scarce, this man was considered a crisis. The explanation for the rapid expansion 
of humanitarian programmes should be rather sought in the particular politicisation of 
Iraqi migration through US and European advocacy groups, and the consequent 
expansion of funding for such aid programmes.228 In 2008, donor countries provided 
around USD 250 million to UNHCR, followed by a minimum of 130 million in 2009 
and around 160 million in 2010.229 This money, coupled with the intrinsic 
expansionism of UNHCR and NGOs always on the lookout for new ‘markets’, was 
fundamental to the setting up of the various new interventions analysed below.  
Given their breadth, the humanitarian programmes provided a rich ground of analysis; 
this section concentrates on two aspects. Firstly, it addresses the question of the 
targeting of the programmes, the meaning of their focus on certain areas of life, and 
not others. Secondly, it analyses the political transformation these programmes hinted 
at and the changes to the Syrian state and its sovereignty that they entailed.  
Iraqis as receivers of humanitarian care 
As already referred to, a crucial aspect of UNHCR’s raison d’être was its portrayal of 
Iraqis as weak, dependent and unable to produce themselves, through their own effort, 
into persons who could pass as citizens (and therefore as sovereign, adult humans). 
Without the existence of vulnerable Iraqis, there would have been no justification or 
reason for UNHCR’s press releases, funding appeals, job announcements, programme 
designs, cooperation with NGOs, with the Syrian state etc.230 The figure of the 
vulnerable Iraqi was the bedrock of UNHCR in Syria at the time. It was therefore no 
surprise that this figure was ever present in nearly all UNHCR Syria publications and 
programmes.231 Between 2007 and 2010, UNHCR Syria leaflets, plans and funding 
                                                
228 Chatelard, "What Visibility conceals. Re-embedding Refugee Migration from Iraq." 
229 UNHCR financial figures were published inconsistently across several different publications and 
present estimates. OCHA, "Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees."; UNHCR, "UNHCR Global 
Appeal 2011 (update) Syrian Arab Republic," ed. UNHCR (New York, USA: UNHCR, 2010); 
"UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011 Syrian Arab Republic," ed. UNHCR (New York, USA: UNHCR, 
2009). 
230 UNHCR also managed and helped non-Iraqi refugees in Damascus, and has done so for years 
(mainly Somalis and Afghanis), however non-Iraqis had been completely swamped and made invisible 
by the focus on Iraqis.   
231 An interesting exception is a report about UNHCR’s Syria programmes by UNHCR’s internal audit 
committee. Technical and neutral in tone it queries procedures and the management of UNHCR’s 
relationship with local partners, with no mention of vulnerabilities and the usually encountered tone of 
compassion and kindness.  
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appeals, always referred to several key areas of humanitarian intervention, which 
portrayed the Iraqi refugee population as lacking in the related areas of life. The 
referred-to areas were: delivery of basic food items, financial help, health care 
(including psycho-social counselling), training and remedial education, special help 
for single women and special help for victims of sexual attacks and torture.232 The 
image of Iraqis that emerged from these catalogues, aided by photographs, was of 
persons who were, due to unspecified developments, so poor to not have enough food, 
not able to earn a living, sick and in psychological distress, unprepared for the future, 
in social distress (single-women households) and victims of cruel and sexual violence. 
Part of this portrayal was a strange silence about the causes of the Iraqi plight. Apart 
from occasional and vague references to persecution by unnamed perpetrators, Iraqis 
could have easily been the victims of a natural catastrophe that had led to a wider 
state collapse, an event of ‘higher force’ for which no human agency was to blame. 
The responsibility of the US-led coalition forces for Iraqi flight was thus veiled, as 
was the complete failure of the stated goals of the war such as ‘bringing democracy to 
Iraq’. By eliminating the historical and political context of Iraqi suffering, UNHCR 
achieved a depoliticising of its ‘beneficiaries’. Being non- or a-political is, in 
humanitarian discourse, a necessary prerequisite for a person to be deserving of aid. 
In the case of UNHCR, presenting its beneficiaries as non-political also allowed for 
UNHCR’s image of neutrality to be upheld. The use of technical and medical 
language in this categorisation of Iraqis (‘trauma’, ‘at risk’, ‘gender-based violence’) 
also contributed to a strong distraction from the political processes and political 
violence that were contained in Iraqi experience.233  While it was thus relatively clear 
that UNHCR’s humanitarian programmes were biopolitical in effect and produced 
Iraqis as vulnerable, politically neutral and passive agents, it was much harder to pin 
down the political transformations of sovereignty and citizenship contained in 
them.234 The humanitarian programmes in Syria were linked to the powerful, 
globalising discourse of humanitarianism in general, and embedded Iraqis into forms 
of governance that not only transcended Syrian territory but which were de-territorial, 
in the sense that they drew legitimacy from ideas presented as universal and neutral: 
                                                
232 UNHCR, "Country Operations Plan 2007 Syrian Arab Republic."; "UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-
2011 Syrian Arab Republic."; UNHCR Syria, "UNHCR Syria Update Autumn 2009."; IRIN News, 
"Starving to survive: Iraqi refugees resort to desperate measures." 
233 Omar Dewachi, ""Between Iraq and a Hard Place": Urban Governance and Transnational 
Laboratories of Intervention of displaced Iraqis in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon," (2010).  
234 Ibid. 
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human rights, compassion and solidarity. However the social relations created by 
humanitarian programmes – between Iraqis, between Iraqis and Syrians, between 
Iraqis and UNHCR officers and between Syrians and UNHCR officers – were power 
relations, and relations of governance and influence, and were decidedly not neutral. 
These relations, through which money, ideas and identities flowed, created new 
understandings about what it meant to be Iraqi, what it meant to be Syrian and what 
the meaning and power of Syrian state, or Iraqi state sovereignty was. The creation of 
‘Iraqi refugee vulnerability’ as an arena of intervention produced a new space of 
encounters in which Syrian state sovereignty, Iraqi identity and the influence of 
humanitarian actors were renegotiated and transformed.  As Iraqi ‘vulnerability’ was 
a factor in determining a person’s access to welfare services and resettlement, it very 
concretely influenced a person’s (physical and imagined) location in a sphere of one 
or another state’s territory and population, and thus her position towards the state’s 
power. In this way, the characteristic ‘vulnerability’, produced through humanitarian 
programmes, had a transformative power, because persons understood as such were 
slotted into particular programmes that changed their location in the sovereign 
system. Further, it affected Iraqis’ modes’ of behaviour and self-governance as certain 
Iraqi practices were rewarded and others not. Like the resettlement programme, the 
humanitarian agenda cast Iraqis as external to the Syrian body politic and as outside 
of the Syrian state’s responsibility.235 In combination with Iraqi ‘vulnerability’, this 
justified and explained the intervention of UNHCR on Syrian territory and in the lives 
of part of the population living on it, i.e. the intervention of UNHCR into areas of life 
normally strongly understood as a space of state sovereignty, or a space in which state 
sovereignty was performed. This intervention would have been much harder to 
implement, if Iraqis were presented as agents with (political) potential for activism or 
indeed action of any significance on Syrian territory, as this would have merited 
stricter government control to maintain state sovereignty. By producing Iraqis as 
passive, neutral and as not possessing any means of intervening in Syrian affairs it 
was possible that UNHCR’s interventions became understood as similarly neutral and 
based on universal human values.  
                                                
235 In fact, as will be discussed further below, UNHCR rhetoric constantly stressed the Syrian 
governments’ generosity in hosting the Iraqis (despite the supposed strain these were placing on Syria’s 
public finances, and rather then for example pressing the government to do more, such as allowing 
Iraqis to work).  
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As an interesting and though provoking mental exercise it is worth considering the 
effects of UNHCR’s humanitarian interventions if they focused on other areas of Iraqi 
life, or applied different criteria. If UNHCR’s aid programmes, for example, focused 
on identifying successful, male Iraqis who had managed to set up a business in 
Damascus, and supporting such persons to give advice-sessions to other men, the 
political and social effect would be markedly different. Or if the organisation applied 
overtly political criteria, such as selecting persons who could demonstrate a 
commitment to democratic values, or small entrepreneurs, or simply privileging 
healthy persons rather than sick, such changes would have a significant impact on the 
organisation’s ability to operate, the availability of donor money, the acceptance by 
the Syrian government and so forth. It would also have had a profoundly different 
effect on Iraqi self-governance and identity formation. In the interviews and 
observations collected during fieldwork, UNHCR’s humanitarian interventions 
appeared as a visible, however not defining element of Iraqi life in Damascus. The 
importance of the agency’s aid varied according to a person’s situation. While a small 
number of interlocutors described it (especially the financial aid) as crucial to their 
existence in Syria, others were happy to take food aid and educational courses as a 
bonus and still others dismissed it completely, stressing the bad quality of the food, 
which they sold. Some interlocutors, who were single men and did not qualify for aid, 
spoke about times when they had needed support and did not understand why 
UNHCR would not provide it, and still others refused to register for aid out of pride.  
Humanitarian transformation of sovereignty 
While it would be tempting to argue that UNHCR was taking over areas of 
governance usually associated with the state and transforming Syrian sovereignty in 
this way, UNHCR’s interventions rather pointed out that the organisation was 
creating spheres of governance that had not been part of the Syrian repertoire of 
sovereignty-creating techniques before. Given the lax, institutional separation 
between Syrians and Iraqis in the Syrian context, arguably UNHCR’s humanitarian 
discourse about Iraqis was crucial for producing ‘Iraqi refugees’ as a particular field 
of governance, which had a transformative effect on how the Syrian state entered this 
field. This was most clearly visible in the way that the international focus on Iraqi 
migrants as a humanitarian crisis and in need of global attention opened the space for 
Syrian government officials to perform Syrian state sovereignty to external audiences. 
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International conferences, UN committees, journal and press articles focused on Iraqi 
refugees developed as a platform on which Syrian public figures acted out Syrian 
state sovereignty in terms of power (Syrian control over refugees), stability (Syria as 
safe haven for refugees), morality (Syria as a generous host) and in terms of 
membership of the ‘international community’ (Syria participating in the international 
effort to help the refugees).  
As already mentioned, the Syrian government gradually increased restrictions on Iraqi 
immigration simultaneously with the humanitarian focus on the matter. Until late 
2006 Iraqis entered Syria without visas and obtained residency relatively easily; since 
then visa requirements and residency procedures gradually tightened. Clearly, many 
issues contributed to this complex development, including government anxieties 
about border security and popular discontent about Iraqi immigration. But the 
growing restrictions were also a sign that the Syrian government was transforming its 
management of Iraqis according to ideas and practices about how borders and states 
should divide populations according to citizenship, in line with the sovereign ideal. 
The humanitarian discourse about Iraqis, which contained this ideal, and which was 
practiced mainly by European/US media, NGOs and the UN, at least appeared to have 
had an influence on the way the Syrian government transformed its sovereignty-
producing techniques towards Iraqis. The continuing entry restrictions in 2009/10, 
when public attention in Syria and globally to the Iraqi issue was waning, as well as 
the acceptance in 2010 by Syrian state agencies of the UNHCR protection paper as a 
means to obtain residency, pointed to this. The increased cooperation between 
UNHCR and Syrian state/government agencies, which was particularly pronounced in 
UNHCR’s humanitarian programmes, also indicated an increased convergence of 
interest and discourse between persons representing the two institutions. For example, 
in 2009, UNHCR signed a cooperation agreement with Syria’s Women’s Union, a 
government organisation, to jointly operate centres and programmes for women-at-
risk. The opening-celebration of the first jointly-operated centre in Kafar Sūsa, 
(Damascus), saw speeches of senior members of both UNHCR and the Syrian 
government. While their rhetoric remained quite different, their agreement that the 
existence of Iraqi refugee women merited a cooperation on the aid effort and on the 
type of interventions and aid offered to women showed a merging of interests on the 
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matter.236  Similarly, in 2010, UNHCR announced an MOU with the Syrian Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Labour  “to strengthen the services provided to vulnerable 
refugees, particularly women at risk, unaccompanied and separated children, minors 
in juvenile centres, refugees with disabilities, and the elderly”.237 In the field of 
health, UNHCR cooperated closely with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (‘SARC’), a 
quasi-government institution. SARC operated several clinics, delivering primary 
health care services to registered Iraqis and transferred them to public hospitals if 
necessary. Treatments for Iraqis were subsidized by UNHCR and in 2007 and 2008 
the organization funded SARC with over USD six million, which also highlights the 
financial incentives provided to Syrian actors to comply with UNHCR’s processes.238 
Given that SARC created a particular, computerised database to record UNHCR 
patients’ information, its personnel would have been necessarily exposed to the 
selection criteria and categories of vulnerability of UNHCR and, further, would have 
participated in the production of Iraqis as vulnerable refugees, in line with the 
sovereign ideal. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, it would be incorrect to 
characterise the transformative effect of Iraqi migration as only flowing from 
UNHCR to the Syrian government. Visibly, UNHCR’s implementation of its 
humanitarian agenda was affected by Syrian government demands and by the 
government’s management and discourse of Iraqis. At the most basic and important 
level, the unofficial and open attitude of Syrian authorities to Iraqi presence, 
settlement and economic activity strongly limited UNHCR’s scope and depth, than if 
Iraqis would have been forced to live in camps, deprived of all means to make a 
living.239 Further, the fact that the Syrian government was not a member of the 
refugee convention and UNHCR only operated under a temporary agreement, placed 
the organisation into a situation, in which its operations were dependent on 
governmental tolerance. This dependency must count as an explanatory factor for 
UNHCR’s consistent and lavish praise for the Syrian government, which was not 
                                                
236 UNHCR, "Press Release: Syrian Women's Union and UNHCR inaugurate centre to empower 
refugee women," ed. UNHCR (Damascus25 November 2009). ; Observations and recordings on the 
day of the opening of the centre.  
237  UNHCR Syria, "UNHCR Syria Update Summer 2010." 
238UNHCR, "Audit Report UNHCR Iraq Situation in Syria." This report mentions several poorly set-up 
financial processes, which would have easily allowed persons to siphon off money for personal gain, 
which highlights a further twist to the UNHCR-Syria relationship.   
239 In this sense, it is instructive to observe what an important role the Palestinians from Iraq, some of 
which were forced to reside in desperate conditions in tents in the desert between the Iraqi and Syrian 
borders for several years, played in UNHCR programmes. Fully dependent on UNHCR aid, these 
several thousand families always featured prominently in UNHCR publications and rethoric.  
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otherwise often mentioned in the same breath as terms such as  ‘principles of human 
rights’, ‘protection’ or ‘humanitarianism’.240 Despite UNHCR’s constant emphasis on 
human rights rhetoric, in no instance did the organisation appear interested in crossing 
Syrian government ‘red lines’ on matters of political freedoms, freedom of speech and 
so forth. While UNHCR did offer a free legal aid clinic to Iraqis and worked on a 
very small number of detention cases, the UNHCR employees I encountered 
displayed the same deference to the governments’ repression of certain political topics 
as most other persons in Syria.   
Violent and non-violent techniques in UNHCR programmes 
The aim of this last, short section is to make explicit an argument that is running 
throughout this thesis, which concerns a broader analysis of the dichotomy of ‘liberal’ 
and ‘authoritarian’. These two terms and the associated political systems are usually 
separated according to the degree and type of violence visited by governments on the 
people living on the state territory in question. The argument presented here is that 
this dichotomy of violence is not as stark as often understood and that the 
management of Iraqi migration in Syria by ‘authoritarian’ and ‘liberal’ actors 
demonstrated its limits. Ultimately, distinct regimes of violence appear to be instead 
differentiated by whom that violence is visited on, and how visible this violence is 
made by political discourses, rather than what kind of violent is used. To a smaller 
degree, the type of violence used is also a differentiating factor. This argument 
appears through an analysis of the techniques used by UNHCR in its management of 
Iraqis and by comparing them with those used by the Syrian state. By looking at the 
two actors’ techniques it becomes clear that, despite the perhaps initially apparent 
association of UNHCR with ‘liberal’ and the Syrian government with ‘authoritarian’, 
both used violent and liberal strategies in their management of Iraqis (and thus their 
production of sovereignty). The violence just appeared (or disappeared) in different 
circumstances and in different patterns.  
Global and local techniques 
Through making use of global communication and travel technologies UNHCR has 
over the decades developed a central repository of knowledge about refugees and 
                                                
240 These were just some of the accolades heaped on the Syrian government by UNHCR representatives 
speaking at the launch of the agency’s regional response plan 2010 in January 2010.  
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migration. The conclusions and programmes drawn from this knowledge are 
distributed by UNHCR to wherever its activities reach. In this way the organisation is 
creating de-territorial and potentially global techniques of intervention into situations 
of migration, which produce the experience of migrants, and their position in 
sovereign spaces, in a similar way. These techniques are, with regards to sovereignty, 
teleological, as they contain very strong assumptions about what the correct 
relationship between persons and their government should be and about the rights that 
a citizen of a sovereign state should enjoy. In this sense these techniques also have 
hegemonic potential, as no other institution comes close to rivalling UNHCR in terms 
of knowledge, mandate, funds or reach. UNHCR’s written and spoken texts repeat the 
organisation’s commitment to human rights, and its goal and mandate to protect 
refugees from violence throughout. An analysis of these texts could thus conclude that 
UNHCR is a fundamentally liberal organisation whose interventions focus on shaping 
refugee lives in accordance with the Enlightenment ideals of citizenship and 
productivity. UNHCR’s programmes, as described in these texts, amount to 
essentially biopolitical techniques that elevate the poor, deviant and sick to legal 
membership of society and prepare them to be handed over to the disciplinary 
apparatus of a sovereign state, where, if they adapt their behaviour accordingly, they 
will flourish. My observations during fieldwork however found that in Syria, 
UNHCR’s treatment of Iraqis showed a mix of the liberal biopolitics presented in 
UNHCR texts, and of much more direct, violent power that produced Iraqis not as 
‘beneficiaries’ but as unruly, deviant and potentially dangerous persons that had to be 
disciplined and punished. Occasionally also, UNHCR’s superficially liberal 
techniques of categorising and humanitarianism had effects that decided over life and 
death, for example if a person associated with the former regime was refused 
protection from persecution or if the non-provision of aid to a person would lead to 
their return to Iraq.  
UNHCR’s more violent or disciplinarian treatment of Iraqis was visible during direct 
encounters between UNHCR staff and Iraqis at the processing centre in Kafar Sūsa, 
where often dozens or hundreds of Iraqis were waiting outside. One day I 
accompanied an Iraqi acquaintance to this centre, where she was hoping to obtain 
information about her resettlement file. We arrived at around 7am in the morning to 
obtain a paper slip with a number that would ensure entry on that day; although the 
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centre only opened at 9am, it was known that there were not enough numbers for 
everyone, for this reason it was necessary to queue early. No proper waiting area 
adorned the entrance and soon around 200-300 people were crowding around it, 
leaning where possible against concrete blocks or fences which dotted the 
undeveloped site. From 9am onwards, ten people at a time were allowed entry 
through a narrow doorway, which was monitored by a male, Syrian UNHCR 
employee. As the day wore on and the heat increased, with no shade to stand in and 
no opportunity to buy food or water, the crowd, which was separated into men and 
women, became restless and people pushing towards the entrance were angrily 
shouted at by the UNHCR staff. After around five hours wait, my friend and I were 
standing on the dusty sidewalk, trying to lean against a fence to relieve our weary legs 
and feet. We had now been shouted at several times by the harassed-looking UNHCR 
employee, who had shouted several times that people without a number should go 
home, that there were no further number that day and that persons from outside 
Damascus would not be served at this site. I noticed that the men were being 
processed much faster than the women and assumed that this was because the male 
crowd would become more aggressive and demanding. Several women harangued the 
UNHCR guard about the long wait and their exhaustion about standing in the sun and 
I observed how a Syrian army officer intervened several times, in one instance raising 
his voice with an older woman who could not stand in the sun any longer and had 
questioned their bad treatment, adding that ‘they were not Jews’, which made my 
friend laugh. The presence of the officer made the waiting women nervous, in one 
instance I overheard his discussion with one of them in which he queried whether she 
had a residency permit. Eventually we were allowed inside; after a small discussion 
about my presence I was exceptionally allowed to accompany my friend, however 
requested to sit at the back of the waiting room with additional attention from the 
various guards. At the end of an incredibly exhausting and demoralising wait of about 
six hours, my friend held a five minute audience with a UNHCR employee in front of 
a computer, who looked something up in an electronic database and told her that there 
was no news on her resettlement file. The experience of the day sat very uneasily with 
UNHCR’s rhetoric of refugee rights and protection that I encountered during 
interviews and in UNHCR brochures. It showed that when in practice the presumably 
passive and unprotected ‘huddled masses’ of refugees were demanding and proactive, 
UNHCR’s approach could turn disciplinarian and threatening. Caught in their 
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organisation’s discourse of the sovereign ideal and humanitarianism, UNHCR staff 
seemingly had no ‘rights-based’ solutions once the refugees’ behaviour upset and 
undermined it. 
UNHCR had no means of punishing Iraqis who cheated the organisation or broke any 
other rules other than withdrawing support, and the organisations’ lack of any form of 
detention or police apparatus showed the important limits on its use of violence. To 
identify transgressors, UNHCR had developed instead a system of unannounced visits 
to beneficiaries’ homes to check their identities, and tried to cross-reference 
information through interviewing family members separately or checking different 
databases. Iraqi interlocutors complained about the intrusive nature of the interviews, 
and reported on very personal questions asked separately of spouses (presumably 
designed to spot false information, however this was not always recognised or 
believed by Iraqis, who experienced such processes as harassing). UNHCR staff was 
deliberately opaque about the organisations’ procedures and about why certain 
questions were asked, documents requested or further interviews requested. This 
strategy, reportedly intended to prevent fraud, left Iraqis in the dark about the reasons 
for UNHCR’s requests and therefore also without significant room to react to these 
requests other than as passively compliant, in the hope that something positive might 
come from them. The lack of information about significant events such as 
resettlement, dates of final interviews and departure, produced a situation of limbo 
and increased dependence on UNHCR. Through the access that UNHCR provided to 
other sovereign territories and citizenships, the organisation itself wielded a degree of 
sovereign power, even if the final decision rested with the resettlement states. In its 
management of Iraqis, UNHCR therefore used a mix of biopolitical, disciplinarian 
and violent techniques. To outside observers however, the disciplinarian and violent 
aspect was practically completely hidden and could only be witnessed through 
overcoming significant hurdles. UNHCR rhetoric overwhelmingly stressed its 
biopolitical strategies, and the design and set-up of its Damascus sites separated 
visitors from the messy, direct service-provisions. Only through accessing sites 
normally reserved for Iraqis (and to achieve such access without a UNHCR chaperone 
was tricky) was it possible to witness the full range of UNHCR techniques.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter presented an analysis of UNHCR’s concept of sovereignty and how the 
organisation implemented this concept into a lived reality in its management of Iraqis 
in Damascus. The analysis pointed to the contradictions that UNHCR’s programmes 
created in Syria, where the Syrian government implemented Syrian state sovereignty 
through different social relations and population management than those assumed and 
practiced by UNHCR. UNHCR’s institutional commitment to the sovereign ideal of 
the territorially stable nation state can be found in its statutes and in the Geneva 
Refugee Convention on which it is based. These documents, written shortly after the 
second world war, imagine the world as a community of distinct states, each with a 
government representative of its citizens. The assumed, normal government-citizen 
relationship is one of protection and mutual obligations. In the exceptional 
circumstance that this order breaks down, a citizen might become a refugee, now 
floating protection-less between sovereigns in need of a new sovereign identity. 
UNHCR is the organisation created with the mandate to help refugees re-access the 
sovereign space.  
Far from static, UNHCR programmes and policies have continuously changed the 
interpretation of this mandate. In the past twenty years, UNHCR has evolved into an 
organisation with a broad and more interventionist humanitarian agenda, extending 
into the provision of food, health and psychosocial care, financial aid and education 
services, far beyond the making available of passports and resettlement. Its discourse 
casts refugees as ‘vulnerable’, due to two key absences : the absence of a legal, 
documented relationship with a sovereign state and the absence of liberal self-
governance (in the sense of an inability to produce oneself independently into a 
financially stable, healthy and orderly person). UNHCR’s programmes are keyed to 
rectifying these two absences in the lives of refugees. These notions of sovereignty 
and citizenship, upon which UNHCR’s programmes in Damascus were based, did  
not correspond to the way the Syrian government managed Iraqis and integrated them 
into the Syrian body politic. The Syrian government’s regime of toleration of Iraqi 
migrants meant that their presence was based on a precarious stability, which 
depended more on individual wealth, skill, connections and luck than an official 
relationship with the state. Governmental protection and a citizenship of mutual 
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obligation were not a defining feature of the way the Syrian government produced 
Syrian state sovereignty. 
Through its programmes, UNHCR produced Iraqis as vulnerable and passive 
refugees, outside the realm of sovereignty, ignoring many aspects of Iraqi life in 
Damascus that pointed towards integration, self-help and stability. These programmes 
disregarded several key elements of the Syrian government’s sovereignty-producing 
strategies, such as the creation of official prohibitions, which were continuously 
ignored, unless an inopportune person needed to be punished. This strategy applied, 
for example, to Iraqi employment, which was officially prohibited, but in practice 
widely tolerated. In line with its assumptions about refugees, UNHCR however 
constantly portrayed Iraqi employment as illegal, precarious and temporary. 
UNHCR’s programmes opened up a political and social space for humanitarian 
intervention and for the Syrian government to produce Syrian sovereignty in this 
space. UNHCR’s interventions in Iraqi migrant life in this way did not weaken Syrian 
sovereignty, however had a transformative effect on how Syrian sovereignty appeared 
in relation to Iraqi migrants and the field of Iraqi migration as a humanitarian crisis. 
On the international stage, Syria’s portrayal as generous host of Iraqis confirmed 
Syria’s sovereignty according to the sovereign ideal. On Syrian territory, cooperation 
between government agents and UNHCR, as well as increasing residency and visa 
restrictions on Iraqis pointed out that the Syrian government was adapting its 
governance techniques to this ideal. Finally, the analysis of UNHCR’s resettlement 
and humanitarian programme presented in this chapter, showed that although 
UNHCR’s techniques for managing Iraqi migrants were mainly biopolitical, they also 
contained a degree of disciplinary and violent power. This observation calls into 
question the frequently made distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ actors 
or regimes, presumably distinguished by the presence/absence of violence and 
freedom; closer inspection found that this distinction blurred in the case of UNHCR in 
Syria. 
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 Chapter 5 
The humanitarian Regime of Sovereignty II: INGOs and 
Iraqi Migration to Syria 
Despite their variety, all humanitarian INGOs need to position themselves towards 
state sovereignty, in their management of the limits and opportunities that sovereign 
exclusions and boundaries pose for their operations. This chapter will demonstrate 
how a small number of very different INGOs, all involved in the management of Iraqi 
migration in Damascus, embedded themselves in the particular relationships of 
bureaucracy, money, emotion and violence that, partly, constituted state sovereignty 
in this context. The chapter argues that INGOs played a small, but key role in 
constructing state sovereignty vis-à-vis the potentially sovereignty-disturbing event of 
Iraqi migration. Field research found only small instances of ‘anti-sovereign’ 
practices among NGO workers, which transcended the framework of social relations 
imposed by sovereignty. A further aim of this chapter is to contribute to the academic 
debate about NGOs and the type of power they exercise. International relations 
scholars in particular have engaged in confusing discussions about the type of power 
that NGOs wield, debating whether they exercise public power, or productive power, 
are agents of imperialism, neo-liberalism or democracy.241 The empirical evidence 
presented in this chapter shows that the observed INGO activities indeed contained a 
will and power to transform the way state institutions govern. But INGOs in 
Damascus were also forced to stray from their accepted beliefs and practices, adapting 
to those of Syrian state agents. Power thus worked very subtly through personal and 
institutional contacts, imbued with conviction, money and fear.  
Most INGOs encountered during field research regarded their projects as remedies for 
problematic aspects of Iraqi lives.242 This problem-solving attitude, in which 
knowledge was understood as a legitimation and responsibility to intervene, was 
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contradicted by the fact that despite their efforts, INGOs did not possess significant 
information about the Iraqi population, and were prevented by the Syrian government 
from collecting such knowledge. INGOs in Damascus therefore based their projects 
largely on assumptions about the Iraqi population that flowed from established ideas 
and tropes about refugees, intimately connected to the sovereign ideal and sovereign 
exclusions.243 In this way INGO practices revealed some of the meta-ideas behind the 
techniques of migration management that flowed from, and at the same time enforced, 
the hegemony of the sovereign ideal. The first group of NGOs to be considered in this 
chapter consisted of around a dozen professional, established INGOs operating in 
Damascus during 2009/10. These organisations, officially registered with the Syrian 
state, transported new bureaucratic and regulatory practices into the Syrian political 
context; the struggle between humanitarians and Syrian ministries over ‘the way to do 
things’ highlighted that INGO activities posed a potential threat, and a potential 
building block for the construction of Syrian state sovereignty. The presence of 
INGOs promised financial reward, the upgrading of public infrastructure and a 
legitimacy-boost for the state domestically and internationally. But on the other hand, 
INGO presence could also signal internationally and domestically that the Syrian state 
was a ‘developing country’, in need of foreign intervention to sustain basic elements 
of the state.244 The second group of INGOs analysed in this chapter were a selection 
of unofficial operations run by volunteers and amateurs, displaying a variety of 
approaches and ideas. These organisations ran the gamut of small one-man-bands to 
semi-professional outfits with a degree of annual planning and foresight. While all 
stood in a relationship with professional humanitarianism, these organisations had 
different positions towards the ideal of state sovereignty, sometimes highlighting and 
enforcing aspects of this ideal and sometimes overcoming sovereignty’s boundaries 
through inclusive solidarity. Apart from INGOs position towards the imagined ideal 
of sovereignty, this chapter also analyses how both groups of INGOs managed the 
lived reality of Syrian state sovereignty, which, as presented in chapters above, was 
based on very different assumptions, categories and routines than those assumed by 
the sovereignty ideal. Indeed, it was from the contradictions arising from the 
implementation of INGO programmes based on the sovereign  ideal in the Syrian 
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context, that the most insightful perspectives on the construction and transformation 
of sovereignty emerged.  
Field research observations found that most INGOs did not weaken or undermine the 
exclusions and the violence implicit to the sovereign ideal, as their programmes and 
political assumptions were in accordance with it. In fact this chapter argues that 
INGO activity transformed such social developments in Syria that were non-conform 
with the sovereignty ideal into sovereignty-conform situations. INGOs operated 
within the territorial and population divisions of the assumed unity of territory, 
population and government, and maintained them. There appeared to be no indication 
that, especially in the humanitarian field, INGOs weakened the ideal of sovereignty 
and the forms of power related to it.245 Yet in terms of Syrian state sovereignty, it was 
precisely INGO’s adherence to the sovereign ideal that placed them into tension with 
the Syrian government and Syrian state institutions. INGOs initially approached the 
Syrian state according to notions of legality and representation that did not exist in the 
Syrian context, were sovereignty was exercised through different techniques. INGO’s 
had to adapt to the much more personal, direct and unpredictable forms of rule 
through which the Syrian state enforced its sovereignty over Syrian territory; while 
Syrian state institutions also had to accept certain changes to their practices when 
dealing with NGOs. These contradictions again demonstrated the relationship 
between the sovereign ideal and the lived reality of sovereignty, and how 
transformation to the micro-techniques through which sovereignty is constructed in 
local contexts, develop from the dynamic equilibrium between the two.  
This chapter is based on direct observations of NGO activities in Damascus, as well 
as indirect observations obtained through conversations with Iraqi migrants, foreign 
and Syrian INGO staff and foreign UN staff. INGO documents focused on Iraqis in 
Syria, such as websites, funding proposals, annual reports, were widely consulted and 
analysed, to understand how the ideas and attitudes expressed in these documents 
related to INGO practices. The first section of the chapter gives a broad overview of 
INGO activity focused on Iraqi refugees in Damascus. The second section analyses in 
greater detail the practices of professional INGOs that were officially registered with 
the Syrian state, characterised by the ideas and language of professional 
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humanitarianism. The third section concentrates on unofficial, semi-professional or 
amateur INGOs that ran projects for Iraqis at the time of field research. Displaying a 
greater variety of approaches, these organisations’ positions towards sovereignty was 
eclectic; sometimes confirming, sometimes undermining sovereignty. The fourth 
section concludes the chapter.  
Another consequence of the invasion of Iraq: INGOs in Damascus 
The link between post-2003 Iraqi migration to Syria and the sudden and unexpected 
expansion of INGO presence in Damascus has been noted repeatedly. This expansion, 
made possible chiefly through the construction of Iraqi migration as a humanitarian 
catastrophe and the lobbying efforts of American NGOs, was also linked to political 
developments in Syria, such as a growing openness among prominent government 
figures towards foreign NGOs and their role in economic development. But clearly, 
the rapid and large-scale funding provided by North Atlantic states to UNHCR Syria 
for its Iraqi programme, and UNHCR’s need to find implementing partners to run 
projects, increased the pressure on the Syrian government to allow the registration of 
INGOs.246 Consequently, by 2009/10, 13 INGOs were established as partners to 
UNHCR in Damascus; around half a dozen church organisations (with international 
links) and a small number of private or less official, international organisations 
operated independently.247 No public register for organisations working with Iraqi 
migrants existed, and despite increasingly stream-lined, bureaucratic registration 
processes, INGOs still maintained various channels with the state to authorise their 
activities.248 My research collected information on ten very different INGOs, to 
varying extent. On two occasions, I was able to conduct repeated and intensive 
participant observations, on four occasions in-depth interviews plus limited 
observations, at other times information was collected through informal conversations 
and/or interviews with INGO staff, beneficiaries or third parties. INGO projects 
ranged from professionalised services delivered by experienced, large organisations to 
semi-private projects run by amateurs. INGOs diverged in their programmes, staff and 
set-up, but a common thread was that their operations established Iraqis as recipients 
of either goods or services. The stated reasons for the delivery of such goods and 
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services were that Iraqis needed assistance and help to survive and lead meaningful 
and healthy lives, as reported by the numerous INGO reports on the needs and 
sufferings of the Iraqi community in Syria.249 This ‘needs-based’ view of Iraqi life 
was also the standard argument with which INGOs justified funding requests, and was 
the general perspective used by the professional INGOs in their aid-projects world-
wide. In Damascus, professional INGOs generally maintained a centrally located head 
office, however conducted their operations in Iraqi-populated suburbs, such as Saīda 
Zaīnab, Jaramana or Yarmuk, more rarely also in cities outside Damascus such as 
Homs and Aleppo. Smaller, less formal INGOs were run from private flats, church 
facilities or with no central location. The range of programmes broadly covered 
medical help, education, leisure activities and the building of infrastructure (new 
schools or hospital facilities). Accessing INGOs in Damascus proved difficult during 
field research. Other than I had expected, the sudden enlargement of the INGO sector 
had not led to increased ease of communication and transparency. Instead, many 
INGO employees, especially those of large organisations with little experience in 
Syria, were too worried about state surveillance to meet me, despite the very general 
and non-controversial focus of my research. While initially frustrating, these 
experiences became valuable information in their own right, as they expressed ways 
of control and self-preservation exercised by INGO employees, and related to 
questions about Syrian state sovereignty.  
An unusual feature of INGO activities in Damascus was their inconspicuousness. 
Unlike in other humanitarian ‘crises’, where INGO names are often displayed 
prominently on cars, buildings and signs, INGO logos were absent in Damascus. All 
INGO locations visited were unremarkable and found in low-key buildings and 
apartments. But the novel presence of INGOs in Damascus was nevertheless 
noticeable, most prominently in the expensive cafes and restaurants in uptown Mālkī 
or the old city: INGOs had brought a new type of foreigner to the city, the 
humanitarian expert. Whereas on previous stays, conducted annually since 2005,  the 
foreigners I had met in Damascus consisted mainly of language students, diplomats 
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and non-humanitarian professionals, I now encountered people in their 20s and 30s 
trying to establish their international NGO-careers, and older, experienced 
humanitarian workers. Their attitude towards knowledge about Syria and the Syrian 
political context frequently involved a mix of keen interest in the subject, a lack of 
access to local information and surprisingly confident opinions on particular 
questions. The element of confidence in the demeanour of these experts was important 
to note, as it appeared as a foundational element in the translation of ideas into 
practice in general. Humanitarian employees needed to at least appear confident 
about the truth of their assessments in order to justify their presence, activities and 
interventions. Syria was beginning to offer job and career opportunities in the 
humanitarian field, which placed it among a particular group of ‘developing’ or ‘post-
conflict’ countries, conceptually a huge departure from the idea of Syria as an isolated 
member of the axis of evil, inimical to Westerners. For Syrian state sovereignty, this 
subtle shift in perception among ‘internationals’ was important, and indicated a 
connection between a state accepting and receiving humanitarian aid, and being 
accepted as a member of the international community. In turn, this highlighted that if 
a state was prepared to allow the international humanitarian sector to operate on its 
territory, which implied the introduction of certain ideas about sovereignty, 
citizenship and government, backed up by the money of Western donors, this could 
bolster its formal, international sovereignty. This connection between the 
humanitarian sector and global forms of political organisation are summarised by the 
medical anthropologist Omar Dewachi, who argues that  
“humanitarian interventionism, as part of a transnational mobile network of deployment of 
people, ideologies and markets has become the link between transnational forms of 
domination and local political practices.”250 
Related to this point, it is important to mention that the post-2008 INGO expansion in 
Syria also included a small number of organisations working on general development 
issues, not just Iraqi migration, despite reports of an initial ban by Syrian authorities 
on INGOs to work with Syrian nationals. In 2009/10, the Spanish INGO Acción 
contra el Hambre provided basic health and sanitation services and improvements in 
al-Hasaka, Syria’s north-eastern governorate. A further Spanish INGO, AIDA, 
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provided specialised training on how to deal with infectious waste in hospitals.251 The 
existence of these INGOs point to the above-mentioned broader shift among Syrian 
policy-makers towards integrating INGOs into economic development and education 
programmes, which goes beyond the field of Iraqi migration. The political upheaval 
in Syria since spring 2011 makes it very hard to predict, whether this ‘opening’ trend 
towards the humanitarian sector will continue, and how a future Syrian government 
will position itself towards it. 
Professional humanitarian INGOs 
Humanitarian organisations in Syria were not easily classifiable along standard 
divisions of ‘home-grown’, ‘grass-roots’, ‘international’ and so forth. Several NGOs 
focused on humanitarian questions had existed in Damascus before the latest peak in 
Iraqi migration. Organisations such as Thara, focused on women’s rights, or the 
Syrian Human Rights Observatory, are clearly Syrian, but maintain international 
contacts with activists around the world.252 Regarding the group of international 
NGOs researched for the purpose of this thesis, it could be broadly separated into: (1) 
professional institutions with global ambitions run by foreigners and (2) semi-
professional and amateur organisations run by Iraqis and foreigners. The following 
section focuses on the former. Professional INGOs were those organisations that 
already had a large portfolio of aid projects in Asia and Africa and for which Syria 
simply represented the entry into a new ‘market’, where previous experiences could 
be adapted and rolled out. Such organisations included Danish Refugee Council, 
Terres des Hommes, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Première 
Urgence; established bureaucratic apparatuses and players in the global humanitarian 
sector.253 Their modus operandi included standardized, regulatory requirements, 
including a degree of transparency, financial accountability and bureaucratic 
continuity, which significantly influenced their interactions with the Syrian state.254 
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One of the few professional INGOs that responded to my requests for an interview 
was the IRC, one of two US-based INGO operating in Damascus.255 The interview 
took place at IRC’s inconspicuous office behind a main road in central Damascus, 
located in a typical, French-style Damascus flat on the first floor, with wide stone 
floors and high windows. Three employees, two Syrian, one European, provided me 
with an overview of the organisation’s activities with Iraqi refugees, which at that 
time consisted of projects in the education sectors. IRC was renovating and improving 
a number of schools in deprived suburbs and offering remedial classes to Iraqi 
pupils.256 Three main ideas emerged from the interview. Firstly, that Iraqi pupils faced 
problems when trying to attend school in Syria; secondly, that Syria was a new and 
difficult context for IRC to operate in due to the control from state institutions; and 
thirdly, that funding constraints and opportunities were a central concern for IRC. The 
expatriate director conveyed a business-like attitude, focused on the managerial 
challenges faced by IRC such as the obtaining of funds, the hiring of staff and 
compliance with government regulations.  
A problematic Population 
One of the Syrian staff explained that there were around 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in 
Syria and that 60% of Iraqi children did not attend school, adding that: 
As you might have read, Syrian schools suffered from overcrowding. First, the 
Iraqis face many challenges when it comes to schooling. For example, with the 
English language, in Syria we start in year one, whereas in Iraq they only start 
in year seven, so there is a very big gap there. Then there are the financial 
problems, this is probably the biggest problem. Often children have to work and 
families live off their wages.257 
This rhetoric closely reflected the language and information about Iraqis on IRC’s 
website and in press releases and reports.258 Iraqis in Syria were presented as 
hopelessly troubled and in desperate need of the world’s attention and aid. IRC’s 
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language was, even compared to that of other NGOs, extreme in this regard, however 
nevertheless represented broadly the tone of most INGO publications on Iraqi 
refugees, as further illustrated by the following texts: 
The February 2010 report “A Tough Road Home” by the IRC contains the following 
description of Iraqis, in its chapter titled ‘Refugees in Jordan, Syria and the Region’: 
Neglected Populations 
Host governments and the Government of Iraq have done little to ensure that these young 
men and women have any access to meaningful job training or economic opportunities. The 
longer they remain refugees, the greater the possibility they could become a “lost 
generation”—and a potential threat to regional stability. Young, unemployed men grow 
frustrated by their inability to provide for themselves or their families. Returning refugees 
are leaving young people behind in host countries because in Iraq they would be at risk of 
being arrested or forcibly recruited by militia groups. (…) 
Victims of sexual violence and those with psycho-social needs resulting from war-related 
trauma require targeted and timely interventions if they are to become fully functioning and 
contributing members of a society, be it in Iraq, a country of first asylum or a resettlement 
destination. The UNHCR and other bodies have noted the near universal experience of 
serious and debilitating trauma among the Iraqi displaced. The Commission urges the 
development and adequate funding of psycho-social services for Iraqi displaced wherever 
they may be.259 
The Danish Refugee Council’s website depicted Iraqi life as follows (similar wording 
in the organisation’s quarterly reports): 
Humanitarian Needs 
Due to their illegal status, the Iraqi refugee population in Syria is facing a difficult situation 
being both illegal and out of funds, and their possibilities of living a decent life are limited. 
The influx of refugees has created additional inflation and pressure on the job market in the 
country. Criminality has increased, and prostitution of young Iraqi women in need of cash 
support has become a reason for resentment by the host community. The Syrian education 
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system is also struggling to cope with the increased numbers of children and The access to 
secondary or tertiary health care systems for Iraqis with chronic diseases is very limited.260 
Finally, the website of Terres Des Hommes Switzerland, which supported a number 
of health-projects in Syria, carried the following description: 
Regional assistance to Iraqi refugees 
The Iraqi groups who have taken up temporary refuge in Syria and Jordan are in great 
distress. They have very few rights and no access to adequate services, in particular in the 
field of psychology. However, this is where their needs are greatest because of the trauma 
experienced during the war, while fleeing and also during their stay in the country which has 
taken them in. Tdh is providing psychological and social help to these children and their 
families in Jordan, where it has opened a centre. Two partner relief organizations are 
working in Syria.261 
These images of Iraqi migrants, which focused exclusively on the negative elements 
of their life and migration experience, cast the population as problematic, potentially 
dangerous and in need of correction. The notable focus on psychological trauma and 
sexual deviance (an often repeated trope in INGO publications on Iraqi refugees) 
located Iraqis’ problems firmly inside their own minds and bodies, implying and 
highlighting the need for interventions targeting Iraqi lives and individuals, rather 
than the external, political circumstances that were contributing to Iraqi poverty.262 
Unsurprisingly, this was indeed the form that many professional-INGO projects took. 
Further, the texts constantly connect Iraqis’ problems to the fact that they were 
migrants/refugees. Emphasis is placed on the assumed illegality of Iraqis in Syria, and 
their lack of rights. The act of migration to another state, and the existence as a 
refugee was portrayed as an existence of last resort.263 This portrayal of migration 
contained an implicit and explicit confirmation of state sovereignty (in terms of the 
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sovereign ideal unity of territory, population and government) as the accepted, correct 
and existing form of political organisation. This confirmation emerged from the stated 
assumptions about national and territorial belonging, and from the implicit 
impossibility of a good life outside Iraqis’ home state.  The act of crossing state 
borders was understood as outside the norm and only to be taken in extreme 
circumstance, with severe consequences such as illegality and the need for outside 
help. Iraqi existence outside of Iraq’s territory was not regarded as an indication that 
the stipulated unity of government, territory and population was a fiction, but as a 
wrong, bad and dangerous state of affairs that needed to be corrected so that the 
(fictional) correct, good and safe situation of sovereignty could be regained. In 
addition to their heavy biased towards negative elements in Iraqi lives, these texts 
thus conveyed to the reader that the drama of Iraqi lives was due to the breaking down 
of the imagined sovereign order. This position could only flow from INGO’s belief in 
the sovereign ideal, firstly, because even a cursory analysis of politics in Syria and 
Iraq showed that the sovereign ideal was not applicable to the lived reality of 
sovereignty in both countries; and secondly, because Iraqi existence in Syria in 
particular showed that they were integrated remarkably well into the Syrian body 
politic. INGO rhetoric and practice was thus firmly within the discourse of the 
modern ideal of sovereignty and neither weakened nor deconstructed it. Descriptions 
of Iraqi activities in exile that contradicted the sovereign ideal, and that placed into 
questions the notions of legality, citizenship and nationality, were absent from INGO 
rhetoric and, broadly, from their programmes, even though such activities were highly 
visible in Damascene suburbs at the time. Despite the troubled situation in their 
society of origin and their often horrible recent past, Iraqis in Damascus were also 
thriving: through their own strength and due to a political, social and cultural context 
that did not produce them as hopeless, non-sovereign outsiders. But in INGO texts, 
the natural and ideally best location for Iraqis was the territory of Iraq and the 
sovereign space of the Iraqi state, and it was only highly exceptional circumstances 
that had undone this natural and baseline situation. Through their highly selective 
portrayal of Iraqi existence in Syria, INGOs strengthened the construction of the 
sovereign ideal in a context where lived reality placed it in question.   
State-NGO relations  
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Returning to the IRC interview, the second important point relating to sovereignty 
that was discussed concerned the organisation’s interactions with Syrian state 
institutions. These interactions were relevant for the potential transformations they 
could produce to the sovereignty-constructing techniques of the Syrian government. 
When I asked whether I could visit one of their projects, IRC’s expatriate director 
warned me that: 
“This is not a regular environment for NGOs, I will request approval and I'm 
sure that there will not be a problem but we will have to see. In a different 
context we would take you along and show you everything, but here...”264 
From the perspective of the IRC, Syria’s working environment for NGOs deviated 
from the norm, due the relatively heavy monitoring conducted by state institutions. 
This once again pointed out, that NGO assumptions about what state’s role in society 
should be and normally was, were influenced by abstract notions that did not 
correspond to the Syrian context. The IRC interlocutors explained that their actions 
were closely monitored by officials from the ministry of education, with whom they 
met every week to discuss progress and to request approvals. After broad approval 
had been received, further requests had to be made regularly even for small activities, 
such as distributing leaflets to inform Iraqi students about projects. The schools that 
IRC was rebuilding and renovating, located in the suburbs Harastā, Qudsīa and Bīla, 
had been selected by the Ministry of Education, rather than by an independent needs-
assessment. Concerning the information and statistics about Iraqi pupils, according to 
which the schools had been identified (Syrian government statistics were notoriously 
poor and/or non-existent), the IRC staff explained that it was not easy to get 
information, as the statistics of the ministry were old, and that IRC used a mixture of 
government and UNHCR statistics for their purposes. The knowledge and figures 
about Iraqis, which IRC staff so confidently provided, thus appeared largely as 
assumptions, rather than empirically researched. In this particular case, IRC’s choices 
and projects were so closely related to those of the ministry that the boundary 
between governmental and non-governmental had become blurred. This situation 
highlighted the discrepancies between the sovereign ideal, and related notions of 
liberal government, and the manner in which state sovereignty was created and 
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enforced in Syrian politics. The IRC’s experience emphasised the particularities of 
Syrian politics through which the public sphere, or space, was lived in the Syrian 
context. According to liberal theory, NGOs form a part of an international civil 
society, located in the public space, a realm of activity protected from state influence 
by law and an active citizenship. Such ideas are closely related to the sovereign ideal, 
which assumes an intimate relationship of representation and unity between a 
population and its government; this relationship can only be ensured through a vibrant 
civil society active in public space.265 As the IRC’s experience showed, these notions 
were not applicable in the Syrian context, as the Syrian government clearly treated 
INGOs as political actors that needed to be controlled. Indeed, as will be highlighted 
below, state institutions used the new public sites developed by INGOs (community 
centres, training courses) as new sites in which to perform the state’s sovereignty.266  
The close monitoring and control exercised by Syrian ministries over INGO activities 
and knowledge was further described in an insightful report by the Middle East 
Institute:  
The registration procedure reflects the weight of the Syrian bureaucracy and the 
government's desire to keep the activities of foreign entities under control. The procedure is 
as follows: INGOs are first to seek accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One 
condition to be accredited is to present proof that the organization is fully funded. The 
second step is to submit a project proposal to SARC without being able to a conduct 
preliminary needs assessment. After SARC approves the proposal, it signs a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with the INGO. The MoU was particularly challenging for the first 
INGOs that signed agreements with SARC: these agreements included the obligation for 
INGOs to share a common bank account with SARC, and the need for SARC’s approval for 
any disbursement or the payment of 2% of the NGOs’ budget to SARC in compensation for 
expenses related to the partnership. A few months later, these financial arrangements were 
lifted after SARC realized that they were time consuming, impractical, and unacceptable by 
donors and INGOs. However, other restrictive terms of the MoU have remained in place: 
SARC enjoys oversight of the NGOs’ recruitment process, meetings between INGOs and 
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266 This is not to say that no public sphere existed in Syria. As argued in other chapters, the laissez-faire 
element in Syrian rule, which was focused on certain red lines of political behaviour, frequently 
resulted in less state intrusion into areas of live heavily controlled in liberal societies. The experience 
of Iraqi migrants is one such example. The key point here is that the construction of the public sphere 
was created through different forms of governance than those assumed in liberal theorizing.  
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any other organizations is subject to SARC’s approval, and so is communication with 
journalists or researchers.267 
These restrictions partly explained the reluctance of INGO representatives to meet 
with me. But more importantly, they showed that professional INGOs transported 
norms, ideas and behaviours onto Syrian territory that were different to those accepted 
by state officials. Further, they provide an insight into how such clashes and 
squabbles over the ‘way to do things’ could lead to changes in practices and beliefs on 
both sides – resulting in new micro-practices that could gradually produce social and 
political transformations to the way state sovereignty was exercised in Syria. 
It is of interest to consider the motivations of both INGO and Syrian state officials to 
engage in these struggles. Why would international NGO workers compromise on 
important values and their independence to set up in Syria, if there were so many 
crises in the world to work on? Why would Syrian clerks change their demands to 
allow INGOs to operate? These questions were not part of my research focus, 
however certain observations allowed for some deductions as to the motives to accept 
change. For INGOs, there appeared to be a publicity value in having been one of the 
first INGOs to set up operations in Syria. The Danish Refugee Council repeatedly 
mentioned on its website and in PR material that  it was one of the first NGOs to start 
operating in Syria; similar statements were found in publications of the IRC and the 
International Medical Corps, emphasizing that their operations were among only a 
few others in Syria.268 Entry into Syria allowed INGOs to portray their work as 
exceptional and pioneering, which presumably enhanced their profile towards the 
public and donors. The availability of funds and UNHCR’s call to INGOs were basic 
factors that pushed through INGO operations. Regarding the motivations for Syrian 
officials to engage with INGO procedures, apart from the fact that many would have 
been ministry officials carrying out decisions made by their superiors, access to 
resources such as jobs and money could have acted as incentive. The involvement of 
Syrian officials in the hiring of INGO staff, including, according to informal 
conversations with expatriate INGO employees, deciding upon individual 
appointments and their salaries, meant that such jobs could become part of patronage 
                                                
267 Di Iorio and Zeuthen, "The Benefits of Engaging and Building Trust with a Reluctant Government: 
The Experience of Community Center for Iraqis in Syria." 
268 http://www.internationalmedicalcorps.org/Page.aspx?pid=378; www.drc.dk; IRC, "IRC Press 
Release: International Rescue Committee set to begin aid programmes for Iraqi refugees in Syria ". 
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networks. Expat INGO staff, for example, speculated whether some employees were 
giving up parts of their salaries to the persons who had arranged their jobs. Further, 
the investment of INGOs and UNHCR in the Syrian health and education sector, 
occasionally without proper financial oversight, created substantial flows of money 
and jobs for Syrian companies.269 The importance of the tense relationship between 
professional INGOs and Syrian state institutions for sovereignty concerned both the 
domestic and international sovereignty of the Syrian state. As referred to above, 
INGO projects developed new public spaces, which remained heavily state controlled, 
through the operation of community centres or women’s shelters, and ran 
unprecedented programmes focused on the inner life of individuals, such as psycho-
social counselling or parenting skills. These new forms of social organisation and 
interventions included new governance techniques, in which the Syrian state appeared 
in various forms. For example, the existence of foreign and Syrian INGO staff, and 
spaces associated with INGOs, created new sites in which state officials demonstrated 
the state’s presence in these newly created domestic spheres. INGO activities thus did 
not weaken the sovereignty of the Syrian state over its territory, however changed the 
way this sovereignty could be performed and experienced.  
Professional INGO programmes also introduced a strict conceptual distinction 
between Iraqi and Syrian ‘beneficiaries’, as their project proposals and reports 
stipulated percentages for both. This practice made the national division, a key 
organising principle of modern sovereignty, visible and fixed to all involved in the 
programmes and elevated it to new importance.270 Establishing percentages of Iraqi 
and Syrian ‘beneficiaries’ that were to profit from certain projects were linked to 
ideas about ‘do-no harm’ development principles, according to which aid projects 
focused exclusively on Iraqis could have fuelled resentment from the host population. 
Particularly in the field of education projects, the continued distinction made between 
Syrian and Iraqi children, the latter described as the reason for the overcrowding of 
schools, even though of course they had arrived in Syria often as toddlers, was 
striking. To use the example of Première Urgence’s description of its school 
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attendance of Iraqi visitors (i.e. these were pre-existing projects aimed at all poor people).  While the 
project attendants were certainly aware of who was an Iraqi, they emphasised their openness to anyone 
in need and did not keep tabs on Syrian and Iraqi visitors, due to a firm conceptual distinction of their 
social roles.  
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rehabilitation programme, in an announcement concerning the completion of two new 
school buildings: 
These two schools, with a capacity to host 1.050 pupils, will allow the development of a 
response to the overcrowding of Syrian public schools and will promote the enrolment of 
Iraqi refugee children. Over 33.500 Iraqi children are enrolled in Syrian schools and over 
75% of these are attending schools in the greater Damascus region. (…)  
We are proud of this result and are now eagerly looking forward to the creation of 
educational programmes with the support of the Syrian ministry for education, with the goal 
to ensure the future of Syrian and Iraqi children” explained Sandra Bachrach, Première 
Urgence’s chief of mission in Syria.  
In this text, Première Urgence is not simply concerned with easing the lives of 
disadvantaged children, but is also focused on promoting a continuing distinction 
between Iraqi and Syrian children. The reference to overcrowding and the figures, 
percentages and locations of Iraqi children imply that Iraqi children are somehow 
alien to the Syrian education sector. Given that the raison d’être of INGO’s presence 
in Syria was the existence of ‘alien’, Iraqi refugees, promoting their distinction was in 
fact existential to these organisations. This observation again points out that INGOs 
working on refugee issues were closely bound to the exclusions linked to the 
sovereign ideal, rather than standing outside or even opposed to such exclusions.  
Funding 
Turning now to the final key point arising from the IRC interview, the following and 
last section on professional INGOs considers the relevance of INGO’s seeking of and 
dependence on third party funding. The IRC interlocutors made several, key 
references to the relationship between funding and their programmes. IRC’s focus on 
education was explained by stating that most INGO’s were focused on education as 
“this is where the funding is and the need”. Healthcare on the other hand was “90% 
taken care of by SARC 271 and funding for healthcare goes to them”. At the time of 
the interview, IRC was looking to add 14 staff to the existing 10 employees to cover 
an increased number of project in 2010. In reference to the expansion, the IRC 
director stated: 
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“Last year, the number of Iraqi children registering in schools was so much 
lower, so it was very difficult to justify any increased funding for this and the 
donors were very reluctant to fund any more projects. The latest information 
from the MoE is that there are expecting more children to register, so this 
should mean that there should be more funding forthcoming.” 
Apart from the curious fact that the potentially wonky statistics of the Syrian ministry 
of education were used as the decision-making basis for millions of dollars of 
funding, the interplay and positioning of foreign donors, INGOs and Syrian state 
institutions was relevant for our analysis. The relevance of donor-ideas and money-
flows also became apparent in an interview with a programme manager at Terre des 
Hommes: 
Are TdH projects limited? 
Yes of course. It all depends on the funding. After the end of the project we 
provide a report and we discuss the possibility of renewing the project or not. 
According to the report and the result, the target achievement of the project. 
Are most Iraqis that come to you registered with UNHCR? 
No, no. That depends…some. Last year we had a regulation that we cannot help 
any Iraqi if he is not registered in UNHCR. But this year, when we start a new 
project, one of the project funding from the EU, they set a regulation that the 
project has to target Iraqis not registered in UNHCR.272 
Funding was perhaps the most fundamental aspect to the operations of professional 
INGOs in Syria: no funding, no projects. Unlike some of the smaller, informal INGOs 
to be discussed below, professional INGOs had to pay staff salaries, office rents and 
administrative overheads and expensive projects required large amounts of money. 
UNHCR and INGOs did not provide detailed breakdowns of their budgets, however 
some documents allowed for a rough idea of the figures involved. The Danish 
Refugee Council in the year ending 30 September 2009 spent around USD 4.6 million 
on its projects in Iraq, Syria and Jordan; the IRC had a budget of around USD 6.4 
million for the Middle East in 2009, in 2010 this figure grew to around USD 9.8 
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million.273 These figures were dwarfed by UNHCR’s budgets for Syria of around 
USD 167 million in 2010 and around USD 130 million in 2009 (some of which would 
have gone to DRC and IRC). 274 The EU donated around EUR 37 million in 2009 for 
the Iraqi refugee issue (extraordinary, as standard annual funding to Syria amounted 
to around EUR 30 million).275 Even if the highest estimates for Iraqi refugee numbers 
of 1.5 million would have applied (UNHCR never registered more than around 
250,000 Iraqis as refugees in Syria), these budgets were large: amounting for UNHCR 
alone to around USD 1.5 per day for each registered Iraqi refugee in 2009. These 
flows of money dedicated to ‘non-governmental’ efforts to manage Iraqi migration 
according to the exclusions and categorisations of the sovereign ideal show perhaps 
most clearly that INGO practices were indeed part and parcel of the global, social and 
material relations that constructed the sovereign ideal. In the case of Iraqi migration, 
INGOs filled an “institutional gap”, created through sovereignty’s principle of 
territorial exclusivity, and allowed a multitude of states to intervene on Syria’s 
territory to focus on a mutual interest: that Iraqi migration would not destabilize 
sovereignty and its related divisions of territory and population.276 The refugee-aid 
provided through INGOs, although in Syria not highly visible and not well-known 
among either Syrians or Iraqis, contributed, and was connected to, global practices 
that promoted the sovereign ideal as hegemonic form of political organisation.  
The global money-flows also linked actors of foreign states to those of the UN, of 
Syrian (domestic) state institutions and of professional INGOs. The funds’ trajectory 
and acceptance through and across boundaries of territory, bureaucracy, culture and, 
indeed, sovereignty, and their link to the implementation of certain ideas (education 
for ‘Iraqi’ children in Syria, for example) highlighted that money was a crucial 
transporter of norms, but also showed how governance techniques, including those 
linked to sovereignty, were transmitted through humanitarian aid. 
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Semi-official and unofficial INGOs 
In addition to the large, professional INGOs described above, in 2009/10 a number of 
smaller organisations operated aid-projects for Iraqis in Damascus, which were 
neither officially registered with the Syrian government nor relied on professional 
staff. These organisations did not maintain regular, close contact with Syrian 
ministries; their staff possessed a deeper, more intuitive knowledge of Syrian-
government red lines, were open to meeting me as a researcher and allowing me to 
participate in and observe their programmes.  All organisations maintained a low 
profile. 
Iraqi Student Project 
The ‘semi-official’ INGO that I had closest access to, and which was the most 
intriguing of all, was an organisation called ‘Iraqi Student Project’ (ISP). This 
organisation had been set up by a retired couple from the US, to help gifted Iraqi 
high-school graduates receive scholarships to liberal-arts colleges in the USA. Apart 
from a single paid employee in the US, where ISP was registered as a non-profit 
organisation, this INGO was funded entirely through the couple’s income from social 
security, and donations of time and money from a small group of supporters in the US  
and Syria.277 ISP was run out of the couple’s rented, two-bedroom flat in central 
Damascus, which functioned as a live/work space, where volunteer teachers – often 
American or British TOEFL teachers working at the American Language Institute 
close by - gave classes to prepare the selected students for their study and life in the 
US. ISP’s origins stemmed from its founders’ engagement in the US peace 
movement, protesting against the invasion of Iraq in 2003. After spending two years 
in Damascus studying Arabic and learning that many young Iraqis in Syria could not 
attend university because of expensive fees, they decided to create ISP.278  
The key fascination that developed from the participant-observation at ISP concerned 
the intense and complicated power dynamics between the elderly directors, the 
volunteers, and the young Iraqi students. After several severe conflicts at the 
organisation, in which students were expelled from the programme for unclear 
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reasons, I became aware of how the power-imbalance between directors and students 
worked underneath the egalitarian and peaceful veneer. Given this chapter’s focus on 
the construction of sovereignty through INGO programmes, the following paragraphs 
aim to tease out how ideas and practices of sovereignty were present in the 
relationships at ISP.  
The selection process for students was based on several standard items, such as being 
Iraqi, not having been accepted for UNHCR resettlement, having a good school 
record and expressing an interest to return to Iraq after finishing college to contribute 
to the country’s future. In addition, selection depended on assessments of the 
candidate’s family environment, his/her psychological stability and potential for 
coping alone in a foreign country. These assessments were carried out in a relatively 
informal manner by the two directors, through home-visits and interviews. If selected, 
candidates joined a programme of classes and were subjected to continuing, broadly 
informal monitoring by the directors and volunteer teachers. Should a student become 
considered as ‘not ready’, s/he could be required to complete a further year of 
programme, or could be expelled at any time.  
The personal nature of these assessments is illustrated by the field-note excerpt below, 
reporting a conversation with one of the directors about several of the students: 
He talked about Firas and how he was such a great kid. “This guy’s essays, they are just so 
good, his use of English….if I could speak directly to any of the people in admission at the 
colleges, I would really tell him to take this guy, he’s just going to take off and flourish over 
there.” It’s clear that Firas is one of the director’s favourites and I just can’t get it out of my 
head that it has to do with his pretty tough story of 1.5 years in poverty in Jordan, during 
which he was alone with his father and had to take care of the household etc. (…) 
He named Radi as one of the students that he had some doubts about having the maturity to 
success ‘once he is alone over there’. While he acknowledged that Radi was very passionate 
about his subject and very good in class in getting the others to participate, he somehow 
doubted that Radi had the toughness to ‘hack it’ once out there in the states by himself. I was 
quite surprised by this assessment, as Radi lives on his own in Syria and is managing his 
affairs by himself, and while there is indeed something quite ‘young’ about him, I personally 
definitely found him quite tough and grounded.279  
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The two directors’ personal view of students held enormous sway over the students’ 
future, as most students considered their success in the programme as monumentally 
important. One Iraqi young woman described how, at the time that she was being 
considered for ISP, her alternative option would have been a job as a waitress in one 
of the new malls of Damascus, highlighting how the chance to complete a university 
degree in the US was an extremely desirable exit from a dead-end existence in Syria. 
This desire to succeed, coupled with the arbitrary and personal control exercised by 
the programme directors, created pressure on the students to conform to the directors’ 
expectations. The following extract from a conversation with one of the Iraqi 
students, which occurred in the immediate aftermath of the sudden and unexpected 
dismissal of another student, highlighted this situation.  
The thing with Hussein was such a shock. With Huda, ok, it was kind of 
predictable that they wanted to kick her out, but with Hussein it was a complete 
shock. Everyone likes him, he is such a friendly and smart guy. And they did not 
give him a warning. After this, everyone feels insecure, no one knows what is 
going to happen. (…) 
I feel so afraid now. Do we have to depend on her moods? Everything can 
change, I don’t know how to behave so that she likes me. Today when she said 
something about my trousers, I thought oh no, I’m not going to wear these 
trousers again. Does she not like my hair the was it is? Does she not like my 
nose today? Or if I write an essay that she does not like…First we were under 
pressure in Iraq, then we were under the pressure of the Syrian government, 
when we don’t know whether they will kick the Iraqis out and now we are under 
the pressure of ISP.280  
This statement crystallized how personal relationships at the programme were fused 
with wider, political relationships of sovereignty that strongly influenced the power 
dynamics at work. The influence wielded by the ISP directors was perceived by the 
Iraqi student in line with former pressures experienced in Iraq and Syria, which had 
had similar life-changing impact on the student’s life. In terms of the blurring of 
supposedly liberal and authoritarian forms of power this comparison was insightful.  
Yet for our analysis it was of greatest relevance how these power relations at ISP 
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could be explained with reference to the way that sovereignty organised populations 
on a global scale, linking people to certain territories and governments, whether they 
liked it, or not. Materially, the power exercised by the ISP directors was directly 
linked to their US citizenship which, in accordance with sovereignty, bonded them to 
the US government, which provided them with the money required to run their 
organisation. Their security and power was inversely reflected by the insecurity and 
weakness of the Iraqi students, whose Iraqi citizenship bonded them to the Iraqi 
government, which neither provided them with opportunities nor money. The ISP 
directors’ opportunity to intervene in Iraqi students’ lives, and to decide on their 
future, was afforded them by the political and social organisation of sovereignty. 
Interestingly, this fact, which linked the directors’ influence indirectly to the same 
source of power that had led to the invasion of Iraq, appeared to be much clearer to 
the Iraqi students than to the directors or American volunteer teachers, and indeed, 
initially to me.281  
The constructions of sovereignty on the level of imagination and ideas that emerged at 
ISP were much harder to pin down, and full of contradictions. Students were 
frequently encouraged to express their national pride as Iraqis and numerous books 
about Iraq’s rich history, and maps were displayed in the ISP flat. But representations 
of Iraq as a place of destruction and hopelessness also abounded, in which the US 
appeared as a safe haven, the only chance for these students to lead meaningful lives. 
The ISP directors were frequently cynical and critical about US politics in the Middle 
East, but strongly celebrated other instances of US culture, such as the peace 
movement (which they remembered fondly) and the civil rights campaigns, and 
encouraged the students to celebrate these too. Students were also encouraged to 
abandon certain cultural traits, and there was a narrow framework of behaviour that 
made someone a ‘good ISP kid’. The following extracts from conversations with the 
ISP directors develop some of the complex understandings of the US and Iraq as 
separate spaces that were present throughout the ISP programmes: 
The students get taught for one year by voluntary teachers to improve their 
English and to prepare them for the way teaching is done in the US. In Iraq, 
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students generally learn information off by heart and reproduce it in the text. In 
the US, they have to learn critical thinking and analysis and to write good 
essays. There are classes every day. Once a week my wife [one of the directors] 
does a writer’s workshop which focuses on essay writing skills. (…) 
For many Americans it is an experience to meet an Iraqi. It becomes a real 
place for them. One of our students was at immigration, when the officer stopped 
short at the passport and did a double take, then expressed surprise that this 
girl, who does not wear the hijab and wears modern clothes, could be from Iraq. 
“You can walk around like that in Iraq?” Yes you can. “Is that a tattoo?” Yes. 
“You can have a tattoo in Iraq?” Yes you can.282  
Iraq and the US emerged as two distinct educational spaces, in which knowledge and 
knowledge-production functioned, were understood and valued differently. In order to 
succeed in the US, the students had to abandon aspects of their previous, ‘Iraqi’ 
learning and acquire new modes of knowledge and thinking. Modern state 
sovereignty closely links knowledge-production to questions of legitimacy and 
government. Distinct epistemologies connect citizens to the imagined sovereign in a 
particular way and establish the citizen’s home-state as different (and better) than all 
other states; the fundamental boundaries of security and global hierarchy are 
established through discourses about what constitutes valuable, useful, dynamic and 
creative learning and knowledge, as much as through other media.283 In this sense, 
knowledge and education had replaced, or have been added to, oaths of allegiance 
and/or religion as ways of connecting populations with their rulers. Such distinct 
forms of knowledge became visible at ISP seminars, during discussions about 
representations of Iraq and the schooling the students had experienced in the past. The 
recordings of a number of classes showed that, of course, Iraqis did indeed learn a 
form of ‘critical thinking’ in Iraqi schools, however its form and content would 
probably be dismissed as uncritical and simplistic anti-Western propaganda by most 
‘Western’ observers. Most of the students reflected critically themselves on the image 
of a rapacious and imperialist US waiting to steal Iraq’s oil they had been taught.284 
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Crucially, these observations demonstrated that knowledge and its content were 
linked to territory and government, and was a form of power controlled by state 
institutions, through which the state’s sovereignty and the unity of its government, 
population and territory were created and demonstrated. To ‘fit in’ and succeed at US 
colleges, Iraqi students had to acquire the modes of knowledge production intimately 
tied to US sovereignty,  that indicated US territory as a separate physical and 
conceptual space. It was remarkable that the ISP directors considered it necessary that 
the students at ISP (who had already been preselected according to criteria of 
education and personality that made them more conform with US college life) 
received months of training to achieve an appropriate standard; their experience of 
several students failing in the US had taught them that students needed much more 
than English-language training to ‘make it’. 
Native without a Nation 
In a different way, education also played a central role for the activities of the small, 
informal INGO ‘Native without a Nation’ (NWN), created and run principally by an 
Iraqi man called Firas. NWN’s activities, which consisted of IT-skills and creative 
workshops for children and teenagers, home visits to depressed and/or hard-up 
families, and skype-exchanges between Iraqi and US youngsters, had developed out 
of Firas’ personal social activism since his arrival in Syria in 2006. Further, NWN ran 
a website, on which Iraqi teenagers could publish their stories and art work.285 A 
small group of US-based supporters helped organise the internet-exchanges with a 
school in upstate New York, USA; funding was restricted to occasional donations of 
equipment from friends and small cash donations.286 Although NWN’s projects 
helped Iraqis, thus making a distinction based on national identity, the organisation’s 
close focus on personal narratives, friendship and non-judgemental compassion made 
it an example of international solidarity that did not depend on reconstructions of the 
sovereign ideal, or the categorisation of people into sovereign types. In this sense 
NWN stood outside the sovereign edifice, and its activities were not relevant to the 
constructions of sovereignty and in the best case, created spheres of action not 
dominated by sovereign exclusions and red lines. 
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Although (or because) Firas, who had in-depth personal experience of UNHCR’s 
application of sovereignty, and that of the Syrian state, was heavily affected by all 
manners of sovereign regulations, NWN’s ‘humanitarian’ activities emphasised the 
personal disposition of the persons involved in the projects. There was little or no 
indication that broad assumption were drawn about people’s ‘needs’ or deviations due 
to the categories, values and exclusions of sovereignty. NWN’s website presented the 
stories of some participants without judgement-laden introductions or texts about the 
situation of Iraqis as such, their illegality and so forth.287 Many narratives concerned 
memories of violence experienced in Baghdad, but many also articulated instances of 
empowerment and independence.  One of Firas’ stated aims was to develop a 
platform for young Iraqi people to express themselves in their own words and 
thoughts. The following quotes from the website illustrate their diversity and the aim 
of self-expression: 
Othman Abd Al-Rahman Mohammad: 
My name is Othman Abd Al-Rahman Mohammad. I am an Iraq pupil and I am proud of 
being an Iraqi. Despite the fact that I live in my second country Syria, I love this country so 
much as well as its generous people. 
I love to study in a perfect way. I love my school, my family and my relatives who are away 
from me due to the cruel circumstances. I also love helping my father with the housework. 
From Noor, Muna and Anfal: 
Since the first art show we had in Damascus, we felt admiration and encouragement from 
the audience to continue painting, and talk about the mixtures of colors. We were often 
asked if we ever went to art schools. The answer always is “ We never studied art, it’s just 
what we do and like to do. We do express what we feel and we convert it on our paintings.” 
(…) At the end of the meeting we agreed that we have to be strong and keep getting better. 
We noticed the difference between the first and last art show, our paintings became stronger 
and more expressive through the subjects and the colors. Every painting had story. Now we 
are preparing for another art show, with new paintings, new stories, and new style. We will 
never stop looking forward. We will never be silent. 
Mustafa, 17: 
                                                
287 And interestingly, the few tropes about Iraqis in Syria exhibited by the website, in the familiar, 
humanitarian language, were evidently written by the overseas supporters.  
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(…) 
I will never forget that accident. I no more want to be in Iraq so that I don't have to face any 
of this again. That doesn't make my situation any easier as I have heart failure and the 
medical care is basically non-existent. All I hope for is to know my future after registering 
with the UNHCR as a refugee.288 
Sovereignty’s divisions are not absent from these self-representations, and sovereign 
boundaries, both physical and imagined, structure the thoughts and practices of these 
young people. However the key point concerning NWN’s activities was that they did 
not reproduce or use sovereignty as a reference point in the same way as other 
INGOs; they did not contain regulations or classifications according to people’s 
position vis-à-vis an assumed, protective sovereign. NWN did not run programmes 
that were pre-designed according to ideas about refugees based on the sovereign 
ideas. The INGO’s semi-spontaneous interventions relied on in-depth personal 
knowledge of persons who were interested in receiving support. Rather than aiming to 
guide or change these lives in any particular direction, this support created small 
instances of success or positive feelings, which empowered people to continue 
struggling against the often overwhelming way in which sovereignty’s exclusions 
were affecting them. By ignoring sovereignty’s framework in these small ways, 
NWN’s practices used an alternative lens through which Iraqis in Syria were not 
consistently recast as outside sovereignty, but simply as fellow-humans who had 
fallen on hard times. A similar dynamic could be observed during the web-
conferences that NWN organised between Iraqi youth in Damascus and a school class 
in upstate New York, USA. These conferences, held around every six months, were 
conducted via the internet-telephony programme Skype, and included video-calling, 
so that the partaking individuals could see each other. During the calls, the children 
and teenagers would introduce themselves and show each other art work they had 
made, or narrate items they had recently studied. The focus on shared, enjoyable 
activities among individuals (rather than divisive, negative experiences of imagined 
collectives) created a basis of understanding of one another’s humanness, regardless 
of sovereignty’s territorial, governmental and population divisions. The empowering 
aspect of the internet’s territory-undermining technology, which can create non-
territorial communities and nations, was a crucial aspect for this project.  
                                                
288 All texts taken from http://nativewithoutanation.blogspot.com/ 
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Capoeirarab – Bidna Capoeira 
The third and final informal NGO to be discussed was the INGO Bidna Capoeira, 
which developed out of the Syrian capoeira school Capoeirarab. An acquaintance 
alerted me that this school, set up by the Syrian-German capoeira fan and sport 
professional Tariq Salih, ran classes for Iraqi children, supported by Caritas. Over 
several months I participated in this project, and attended the regular capoeira lessons, 
‘hanging out’ with the other capoeiristas, a fun group of Syrians and foreigners. 
During this time, the directors of Capoeirarab (the sport club) came to realise that 
capoeira could be developed into a humanitarian development tool that could attract 
international funding. The resulting INGO, registered in the UK, was Bidna Capoeira. 
Fascinatingly, the changes in language and practice that resulted out of the shift from 
running semi-formal projects for Iraqis to creating a professional INGO, clearly 
reflected a move towards structures of the sovereign ideal. Perhaps most clearly of all 
points made in this thesis, this development demonstrated how the material and 
mental constructions of humanitarianism enforced and produced the values, 
categorisations and exclusions of the sovereign ideal.   
The classes for Iraqi children held in 2009/2010 took place in the community hall of a 
church in Damascus’ old city, reflecting the project’s link with the Christian INGO 
Caritas providing the funding. Twice a week, a mini-bus delivered a boisterous and 
jolly group of children from Jaramana, who received a two-hour training in music and 
sports. The classes were mostly led by two young Syrian men in their early 20s, 
sometimes accompanied by other members of Capoeirarab, foreign or Syrian. During 
training, no references were made to the fact that the participating children (between 9 
and 13 years) were of Iraqi origin. While the children, during casual conversations 
before or after the class would sometimes talk about their memories of Baghdad or 
other items relating to their Iraqi identity, the trainers did not appear to consider these 
children in any way different than the Syrian children they taught on other occasions. 
During conversations the trainers confirmed that the Iraqi identity of the children was 
of no concern to them; only when an older child perhaps used a word from Iraqi 
dialect did this serve as a reminder of the children’s background. A similar attitude 
was displayed at Capoeira’s flagship project at the time, a regular training and Roda 
(capoeira game) in the tent-tamp Al-Tanf, where several thousand Palestinians from 
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Iraq lived in very bad conditions just outside the Syrian border.289 The capoeira 
training was part of several activities developed by UNICEF “psycho-social 
consultants” to “heal the psycho-social wounds” of the camp residents.290 Around 
once a month, Capoeirarab’s trainer visited the camp with a small group of 
capoeiristas to teach capoeira music and movements to camp residents, who hugely 
enjoyed the entertainment, exercise and social atmosphere. The participating 
Capoeiristas repeatedly mentioned the positive and exhilarating experience of playing 
capoeira in the camp, commenting on the immense enthusiasm and quick learning 
ability of the camp residents, and how members of all ages participated in the Roda. 
This attitude was demonstrated by the following interview extract with a capoeirista 
from Costa Rica, who was visiting Syria as part of university exchange: 
So we go there every Monday and Wednesday for two hours, we do capoeira and 
it’s an organisation…most of the Iraqi refugees there are Christian, and some of 
them are Muslim, but only a very small percentage, maybe five out of 30. So I 
guess we are working with a minority in a minority, so that’s kind of interesting. 
We teach capoeira, music and movements and we play games with them – it’s 
not a very rigid schedule, it’s more like a hobby than wanting to change the 
world, it’s more like let’s have fun with kids, let’s do it. (…) 
I feel like with capoeira, it’s complicated, because I would love to be helping 
them with bigger issues, like immigration problems or rights here in Syria…but I 
guess when you do capoeira, I don’t think you are thinking to change the world, 
you are just thinking of one person, or one individual and making their lives 
better. I know a lot of them really enjoy singing and dancing and I guess it’s just 
another outlet for them. (…) 
I feel like the Middle East is an area, a lot of people here know so much about 
the Middle East, but they don’t know that much about the rest of the world, same 
thing that happens in the rest of the world, you always know about yourself but 
not about others, so just like teaching them that there is a dance that is not like 
                                                
289 Palestinians attempting to enter Syria from Iraq were initially refused entry by the Syrian 
government on the grounds that they should be allowed to return to Israel. As a result, several thousand 
persons were stranded between the Iraqi and Syrian border in the desert and two tent-camps, operated 
by UNHCR, were set up. Both camps are now closed, their previous inhabitants either resettled abroad 
or allowed entry to Syria.  
290 UNICEF press release, available online http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/syria_51283.html  
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belly dancing and teaching them that there is slavery and that things are 
happening in Brazil that aren’t happening here, I feel that this is also a global 
movement and that Damascus is becoming more global, little by little and I feel 
that capoeira helps and adds to that. (…) 
It’s because capoeira rocks! It’s a great sport, and because the people that are 
teaching it are really energetic and fun and they are always excited about 
teaching it and promoting it and music is always fun, I mean how can you go 
wrong – music and movement and young people teaching capoeira, it’s not like 
a 70 year-old teaching them mathematics, it’s something they can identify with I 
think.291  
This quote highlights how Capoeirarab’s activities, whether for Iraqi children or other 
people, were uniting, and elevated all participants to an awareness of their shared 
characteristics as human beings. Although it may appear somewhat esoteric or 
outlandish to persons unfamiliar with the game, I argue that the structure and history 
of Capoeira, its rules and the way it is taught, lie outside several key ideas related to 
modern sovereignty and liberal modernity. Indeed it is likely that the sports 
fascination and joy is related to the way that it taps into a different social imaginary 
and organisation.  During a Roda, a person’s identity constantly changes between 
being an isolated individual to being a member of a tightly fused group, and by 
standing in a circle (in which the game takes place) and playing/singing loud music, a 
separate, constantly shifting mini-territory is created. Restrictive, hegemonic notions 
of fixed space, of the separations object-subject, individual-community and enemy-
friend evaporate in a liberating feeling of concentration and excitement. It is in 
particular the forming of the circle and thus defining of a limited territory through the 
participants’ bodies that is of relevance to this process. It has been argued that 
sovereignty begins with the delimiting and definition of a territory; yet during a 
capoeira game, players experience the constant creation and undoing of a protected 
space through their own, shifting physical presence. Capoeira is defined by 
ambiguity, and its players are ambiguous, sometimes fighters, sometimes dancers, 
sometimes partners and sometimes enemies. It is undoubtedly this ambiguity that 
makes capoeira such an attractive game, as participants can shift and experiment 
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between different roles, or even pick a particular role that suits or contradicts their 
social position or personality. In the Roda, the divisions and hierarchies of society are 
gone, which creates extraordinary sentiments and energies of freedom and power.292 
Further, the game’s African origins, and its  (mythologised) travel and subsequent 
development in Brazil through slavery, belie nationalism and territorial boundaries, 
and in fact remind of the violence and tragedy associated with the development of 
modern statehood. In a feel-good and, I would argue, largely non-political space, 
capoeira thus allowed for moments in which sovereignty’s restrictions – both those of 
the sovereign ideal and those of local, Syrian manifestations of sovereignty – could be 
forgotten. 
The transformations that occurred as part of the professionalization of Capoeirarab 
into the INGO Bidna Capoeira were therefore all the more astonishing. In the 
aftermath of the successful project in Al-Tanf camp, several foreign Capoeirarab 
members began work to turn the experience into a permanent NGO, realising that 
interest from big, international donors created opportunities for paid jobs with an 
activity that they highly enjoyed. Stating that the organisation worked with 
“communities that need a lift”, in “difficult situations from post-conflict to natural 
disasters”, Bidna Capoeira’s website established capoeira as an intervention tool to 
improve “social integration & networking, child & women’s protection, gender-based 
violence, preserving cultural heritage”. Undoubtedly in an attempt to attract the 
attention of international donors, Bidna Capoeira’s founders applied typical 
humanitarian language, along with its ideas about distressed, impoverished 
populations and their ‘needs’. Completing the transformation of capoeira into a 
technical solution for deviant populations in need of sovereign protection, Bidna 
Capoeira’s website offers a ‘one-price-fits-all’ solution to its services: USD 3.5 per 
person per day for a one-month “emergency response”, USD 1.36 per person per day 
for a six-month “humanitarian relief” and a seductively low USD 0.77 per person per 
day for a 2 year “sustainable development”.293 As laid out above, these humanitarian 
tropes created ideas and practices of the modern sovereign ideal; people living in 
political conditions not matching this ideal were treated as deviant and in need of 
correction. Further, the focus on biopolitical technologies, i.e. changes to be made to 
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particularly on young peoples’ lives.   
293 All quotes taken from Bidna Capoeira’s website www.bidnacapoeira.org  
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the bodies, minds and behaviours or individuals, rather than to structural, political 
circumstances, created the firm belief that people in non-sovereign conditions were 
unhealthy, unproductive and dangerous. Bidna Capoeira’s website described a project 
in Palestine with the following paragraph: 
Our team will bring some immediate fun and inclusive activity to the camp. The capoeira 
will allow the children to express anger and frustration in a safe and healthy way. Our 
experience shows that children develop their self-confidence, discipline, and respect for new 
cultures while playing and testing themselves.294 
Particularly in the context of Palestine, the reference to expressing anger in a ‘safe 
and healthy’ way demonstrated the corrective element of the stated project aim (and 
reminded readers of how, without intervention, these Palestinian children might be 
un-safe and un-healthy). Depressingly, capoeira was robbed of all its ambiguity and 
sovereignty-undoing potential, even robbed of the myth that slaves used the game to 
practice their strength for an eventual show-down with their masters. The normative 
shift undergone from Capoeirarab and its non-corrective, empowering and 
exchanging classes to Bidna Capoeira’s quest for using the game as a tool to 
discipline and pacify violent and poor populations, demonstrated that this 
transformation was linked to the search for funds from international, humanitarian 
donors. The connection between material power – the provision of finances – and the 
promotion of the values of modern sovereignty were particularly clear in this 
example, emphasising that the maintenance of the status quo of sovereignty was 
closely linked to the maintenance of existing forms of dominance and power.  
Conclusion 
Post-2003 Iraqi migration, which, by 2007, had developed into an international, 
political and humanitarian concern, led to an unprecedented opening of Syria to 
international NGOs, which previously had been largely prohibited from operating in 
the country. The presence of this new type of humanitarian actor resulted in new 
spaces and practices of sovereignty construction, both through INGOs themselves, 
and through Syrian state institutions, who had to develop strategies to manage them. 
Research found that INGOs conducting aid projects for Iraqis broadly fell into two 
groups. The first group consisted of around a dozen professional and officially 
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registered organisations, such as Danish Refugee Council or International Rescue 
Committee. These INGOs were established members of the global, professional 
humanitarian sector and used standard procedures and regulations to set up projects, 
raise and organise funds, publish annual reports, recruit staff and so on. The second 
group of INGOs consisted of much less formal organisations that lacked official 
registration with state authorities and relied on volunteers rather than paid 
professionals. This group of diverse organisations included, for example, a semi-
professional INGO with several dozens of volunteers as well as a one-man outfit with 
little external support. 
This chapter argued that the activities of the first group, professional INGOs, were 
based on and promoted the modern ideal of state sovereignty as the normal, safe and 
correct form of political organisation. In their publications and in interviews, 
professional INGO employees continuously presented Iraqis in Syria as alien, illegal 
and helpless, due to their location outside of the territory that their nationality 
allocated to them, according to the sovereign ideal. Rather than considering Iraqi life 
in Syria as an indication that the assumed unity of population, territory and 
government of the sovereign ideal was a fiction, INGO activities consistently 
portrayed Iraqi migration as an instance in which this previously existing unity had 
been tragically broken. According to this logic, Iraqi migration was considered as an 
option of last resort and as the reason for Iraqis’ troubles. By portraying migration as 
outside of the norm, by continuously emphasising Iraqis’ illegality in Syria and by 
ignoring how Iraqis were indeed integrating in Damascus, INGO rhetoric and 
programmes reproduced and constructed the hegemony of the sovereign ideal.  
Interestingly, when it came to the type of interventions that Iraqis were considered to 
require, professional INGOs concentrated problems that were internal to Iraqis’ 
bodies and minds, such as physical and mental trauma or crime, such as prostitution 
and violence. Rather than focusing on the external, political developments that were 
leading to continued Iraqi displacement, INGOs orientated themselves to corrective 
interventions of Iraqis themselves. Unsurprisingly, this biopolitical focus was 
reflected in INGO programmes that largely comprised health and education projects, 
psychosocial counselling and help for victims of domestic violence. From this 
perspective, Iraqis in Syria could never be regarded as normal instances of human life, 
but were cast as deviant and in need of protection and correction through INGO 
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interventions. In this way, INGO discourse also served as an explanation and as 
legitimisation of foreign intervention into the Syrian body politic, on Syrian territory. 
Professional INGOs filled an institutional gap, created by sovereignty’s principle of 
territorial exclusivity, and created a channel for acceptable foreign intervention to 
govern Iraqi migration in a way that did not destabilize the fiction of the sovereign 
ideal (as the direct interventions of another state would have done). In this way, the 
activities of professional INGO activities in Damascus contributed to the 
regularisation of Iraqi migration into systems of sovereignty, carried out in light of the 
highly visible contradiction to sovereignty’s imagined unity of territory, population 
and government that Iraqi life in Damascus presented.  
Apart from INGOs’ portrayal of Iraqi migrants’ lives as alien and deviant, this chapter 
also considered the interactions between professional INGOs with Syrian state 
institutions. As argued in other chapters, domestically, Syrian sovereignty was not 
based on the social relations stipulated by the sovereign ideal, and notions of legality 
or the independence of the state from individuals hardly applied in the Syrian context. 
This situation resulted in occasionally tense interactions between INGO staff, who 
were unprepared for the heavy intrusion and control by state officials in their 
operations, and ministries, who treated INGOs as potentially threatening, political 
actors, rather than trusted partners. Consequently, INGO activities, such as the 
opening of community centres or the offering of vocational training, rather resulted in 
new spaces for the state to construct its sovereignty, than in the broadening of a civil 
society outside of state influence.  
The second group of amateur INGOs engaged in a range of activities that reflected 
both constructions of the sovereign ideal and the lived reality of sovereignty in Syria 
in a variety of ways. One organisation, focused on helping young Iraqis access US 
colleges, demonstrated how education and knowledge-production were areas through 
which sovereign boundaries were constructed and became apparent. The Iraqi 
participants to the programme were encouraged to move away from the type of 
learning they had experienced in Iraq, which was characterised by an absence of 
critical thinking and analysis. Iraq and the US were understood as being separated by 
different epistemologies and forms of learning. In order to succeed at a US college, 
students were not just required to master English, but to be able to grasp US-style 
beliefs about what constituted useful knowledge and education. Here, educational 
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practice was revealed as linking citizens to territory and government, according to 
rules set by the state, and national curricula acted as divisions between different 
sovereign spaces. Very differently, a second informal INGO ran projects emphasising 
the commonalities among Iraqi and US youth, without reifying Iraqi life in exile 
according to familiar humanitarian tropes. In this way, sovereign exclusions were 
overcome by simple expressions of human solidarity and by a form of organisation in 
which the roles of provider and beneficiary, of leader and led, were blurred and 
unclear.  
The highly varied activities of international NGOs in Damascus showed that INGO 
projects neither stood outside state sovereignty nor weakened it as a hegemonic form 
of political organisation. Instead, due to sovereignty’s impact on nearly all areas of 
human life, INGO activity was necessarily positioned in relation to it, both in the 
sense of the sovereign ideal and of particular Syrian manifestations of sovereignty. 
Tensions and transformations between INGOs and state institutions emerged over the 
techniques of power through which sovereignty was to be respected and enforced. 
Professional US/European INGOs approached sovereignty through practices of 
laissez-faire and liberalism, in which the state limits its own powers to intervene in 
certain areas of life, so-called public space or civil society. Such a structured and 
stable regulation of state power did not exist in Syria, where state intervention was 
unpredictable and uncertain, and could be minimized by building strong, personal 
relationships with ministers or other tactics. As new actors on the scene, INGOs were 
kept under surveillance by suspicious ministries; unfamiliar with this form of state 
power, INGO staff felt intimidated and attempted to play strictly by the rules, not 
realising that rules were rarely fixed by Syrian state actors. 
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Chapter 6 
The States on Syrian Territory II: the ‘international 
Community’ and Iraqi Migration to Syria 
 
 
This chapter addresses a puzzle arising out of the involvement of foreign states in the 
management of Iraqi migration to Syria. As the previous and following chapters 
argue, the programmes of UNHCR and international NGOs produced Iraqi identity 
and life in Syria in a manner conform with the modern sovereign ideal and its 
assumed unity of territory, nation and government. Iraqi migration was an opportunity 
for a variety of actors to perform and enforce both the domestic and international 
space of the sovereign ideal; sovereignty-contradicting Iraqi migrants were governed 
to become sovereignty-conform and to become linked to a nation, a territory, a 
government. Paradoxically however, the processes that created this international 
governance of Iraqis included a host of extra-territorial activity, or, put differently, 
cross-territorial intervention, by foreign state-institutions on Syrian territory to 
manage Iraqi migration. It appeared that to control sovereignty-undoing activity on 
the level of Iraqi migrants, extra-territorial state power was channelled into 
institutionalised paths that made it acceptable within the order of the sovereign ideal. 
Ironically, the construction of territorial and national sovereignty relied on trans-
border practices of control that were exercised through networks of sovereign-state 
power and interstate organisations. As shown in chapter five, international NGOs 
were one such institutional channel through which the interests and influence of 
foreign states became acceptable on Syrian territory; as will be demonstrated here, the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR played a similar role.   
The presence and influence of foreign states in Syria highlighted that sovereignty did 
not rule out unequal power relations between sovereign states. Some states or 
territories could apparently be more sovereign than others, along material or moral 
yardsticks and criteria. The field of Iraqi migration served to create and emphasise 
existing hierarchies among sovereign states, in which citizenship of ‘superior’ 
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sovereigns appeared as a prized gift that could be granted or withheld.295 These 
divergent strengths of different sovereigns did not, however, display themselves as 
clashes between states, but appeared via the different approaches that different states 
deployed in their governance of Iraqis, and via the material and organisational power 
brought to bear by intervening states. Far from creating ‘anarchy’, sovereignty 
produced a layered process of governance, in which human beings influenced each 
other through their association with differently powerful sovereigns.  
To understand this layered process of governance it was necessary to turn again to the 
question of how the inside and outside of sovereignty was constructed. The puzzle 
presented by the involvement of foreign states in the management of Iraqis on Syrian 
territory highlighted more than anything that inside and outside were conceptual, 
rather than tangible or geographical spaces, and were therefore also not fixed. The 
hierarchies in international/outside space existed according to material, technical, 
knowledge and moral standards, which empowered those actors affiliated to states 
with superior qualities according to these standards. This was visible from the 
confident interventions by foreign states described in this chapter. These confident 
interventions in turn showed that more powerful states’ actors, without visibly 
upturning the façade of the sovereign ideal, were able to influence the shape of the 
weaker state’s inside space. Inside and outside are thus dynamic concepts, in the sense 
that certain practices construct them as separate, and for the maintenance of 
sovereignty they need to remain separate, yet paradoxically, other practices cross the 
divide with impunity. The acceptance or rejection of practices crossing the inside and 
outside were related to hierarchies of power: while the sovereignty-undoing migration 
by Iraqis activated an international, corrective response to this contradiction against 
the sovereign ideal, the sovereignty-undoing interventions by foreign states related to 
the same phenomenon were accepted and/or not perceived as a problem.  
Together with those of the humanitarian sector, the complex international 
interventions by state institutions constructed Iraqis as located outside sovereignty, 
and highlighted that such persons were considered legitimate ‘targets’ of whichever 
sovereign power decided to intervene in their lives. This construction strengthened the 
abstract ideal of sovereignty that each person needs a sovereign to become a citizen 
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the International Organization for Migration." 
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with a productive and good life, which was threatened by the existence of Iraqi 
communities in Syria whose sovereign identity was vague, and who did not maintain 
a clear link with any particular sovereign (see chapter three). The construction of 
Iraqis as sovereignty-less non-citizens that appeared in the rhetoric and practices of 
foreign institutions, did not mirror the broad way of Iraqi life in Damascus, where 
Iraqi communities were thriving and suffering, waxing and waning, regardless of their 
vague, sovereign status. 
The practices of foreign states participating in the governance of Iraqi migration 
showed that efficient, bureaucratic systems run on high-powered technology were key 
to creating the dominance of sovereign-state power over a disparate population of 
Iraqis.  Unlike the Syrian state’s form of bureaucratic power, in which personal 
relationships could trump and money could buy outcomes, the bureaucratic 
procedures operated by other states worked according to an abstract logic beyond the 
influence of Iraqis. Dominant sovereignty was contained in and constructed through 
impermeable bureaucracies that ruled according to hidden laws and whose 
judgements had to be accepted as they were handed down. The importation and 
exercise of such techniques into Syria emphasised the hierarchy between sovereigns 
wielding sophisticated, technical apparatuses, and those ruled by less structured and 
disciplined administrations.  
The differing techniques used by different states yet again emphasized that 
sovereignty could be based on fundamentally different relations between population 
and government in different local contexts. The Syrian state conducted no elaborate 
pre-selection of Iraqis entering its territory, rather governing all persons on its 
territory similarly through techniques of insecurity and surveillance. North-Atlantic 
states on the other hand engaged in highly elaborate routines to select those Iraqis 
who would qualify as potential members of their citizenry and who they would bind 
themselves to in a relationship of rights and duties. This comparison pointed out that 
sovereignty in the US and Europe relied more heavily on the myth of democratic 
representation and that of the public’s ownership of the state; in Syria (and Iraq) this 
myth was of much less importance for the maintenance of sovereignty.  
This chapter will attempt to unravel these questions by firstly presenting an overview 
of how foreign states were present in Syria in the context of Iraqi migration. While 
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the IOM and UNHCR served as inter-state gatekeepers to enforce the borders of its 
members on Syrian territory, states also engaged in separate and distinct activities that 
inserted their sovereignty into the process of Iraqi migration. The second and third 
parts of the chapter consider the practices two states, the US and Germany 
respectively, and analyse their sovereignty-producing effects and techniques through 
their participation in Iraqi resettlement and humanitarian aid. As the governments of 
the US and Germany held opposed positions on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a 
comparison between their approaches to post-invasion Iraqi migration is particularly 
rich and enlightening. Analysing these two states’ approaches this chapter presents an 
argument of how state sovereignty is configured and reconfigured through trans-
national activities aimed at normalising migrants into the system of sovereignty. 
Discussions about the end or continuation of nation states in times of globalisation are 
put to rest by arguing that waxing, waning and paradoxical state practices are 
elements of modern sovereignty, which, why relying on the fiction of unity, is based 
on disparate and scattered interventions to uphold this fiction.  
Foreign states’ involvement in managing Iraqi migration to Syria 
In 2009/10 casual conversations with Iraqis in Syria frequently turned to the topic of 
life abroad. Many Iraqis had relatives and friends living in other countries, were 
looking forward to or hoping to emigrate themselves, either via the UNHCR 
resettlement programme or other immigration options offered by overseas 
governments.296 The situation of acquaintances, who had migrated a long time ago or 
shortly previously, were frequently discussed together with the personal situation of 
the speaker, why he or her had not followed suit, or what his or her own position 
towards emigration was.  Details of resettlement and immigration procedures were 
pored over and explained, including complaints about perceived discrimination or 
conspiracy theories about which countries preferred which type of Iraqi and what the 
reasons behind certain questions and requirements of immigration officials were. The 
countries most frequently mentioned in these conversations were the US, Sweden, the 
Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Canada, also Malaysia and Australia.  
Foreign states in Iraqi imagination 
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As emigration had been an important element in Iraqi society for decades and many 
Iraqis had experiences of work or study abroad, many interlocutors were aware of its 
positive and negative aspects.297 In 2009/10 some Iraqis had already returned to Syria 
after having been resettled, after failing to make ends meet in the US or simply not 
liking life abroad, and stories about these returnees were swapped and discussed. 
Nevertheless, many (by far not all) Iraq acquaintances had pinned all their hopes on 
emigration, either due to the lack of higher-education options in Syria, the lack of 
financial security to achieve a lifestyle on par with the previous situation in Iraq, 
perceptions that Syria did not offer a good future for children, fear of continuing 
persecution in Iraq, desire to join relatives abroad or also due to youthful curiosity 
about the world and love of adventure.  
Foreign territories and nations thus featured prominently in Iraqis’ thoughts about 
their future plans and lives. These foreign entities were associated with hope, and with 
overwhelmingly strong borders, which manifested in visa requirements, passports, 
interviews, letters of rejection and sheer distances and cost of travel, all contributing 
to feelings of humiliation and powerlessness. These feelings were illustrated by the 
following quote from an interview with a young Iraqi man, who compared his 
previous travel experiences to his current predicament:298 
 And most importantly, the Iraqi, when he travelled, for example we travelled a 
long time ago, we were respected. In the airport, at the borders, by the state - 
wherever we went we were respected. Now, there is nothing like this, at all. 
Where ever we go, there is no respect. You are Iraqi? What's that, Iraqi. Go, 
no...when we went to the airport, maybe they let our passports through 
immediately - now, if they hear Iraqi, you have to wait until last. Because you 
are Iraqi. Why is it like this? Wasn't the basis, when they entered, the liberation 
of Iraq?299 
The lack of acceptance of Iraqi passports and consequent lack of freedom of 
movement demonstrated to Iraqis the lack of sovereign clout of their state-affiliation. 
It demonstrated the lack of recognition that the Iraqi state, its government and 
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298 This man has now been resettled to the US 
299 Interview with Iraqi man, 17.01.2010 
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population received from other, more powerful states and confirmed an absence of 
care and interest from the Iraqi government in Iraqi migrants. More than any 
regulatory requirements or prohibitions of the Syrian state, the entry barriers to Iraqis 
of other states instructed Iraqis that they were sovereignty-less and raised the idea that 
as an Iraqi, it was necessary to obtain the protection of another government, even 
though emotionally the idea of abandoning one’s nation might be controversial and 
painful.300 The combination and fostering of the idea that a better life was possible in 
other states, and the hurdles that these states upheld for people with Iraqi papers 
created a powerful effect of sovereignty, and of a hierarchy between different 
sovereign states and their citizens. Those Iraqis wishing to resettle or emigrate were 
forced into a position of trying to comply with the numerous requirements of the 
foreign sovereign, and waiting, often for months or even years, for the sovereign 
decision without knowing what factors would influences its outcome.   
The above mentioned states allowed Iraqis entry to their territory and, at different 
levels, to their nation, via the UNHCR resettlement programme or other immigration 
options, such as skilled migrant schemes, family reunification or asylum claims. 
These programmes involved different activities by foreign-state officials on Syrian 
territory, through which the respective states’ sovereignty became present in Syria. 
While all processes required, at some stage, a ‘confessionary moment’ by Iraqis in 
front of an official from the destination state, in which all questions about a person’s 
life and conduct were permitted, the exact routines required by different states 
varied.301 The US, for example, which was the country accepting by far the most 
Iraqis through UNHCR resettlement, relied heavily on the IOM to process Iraqis who 
had been pre-selected by UNHCR, according to US government requirements. The 
IOM ran a ‘refugee processing centre’ exclusively for the US, where IOM staff 
concluded a range of services for ‘USRAP’, the United States Refugee Admission 
Program. IOM conducted interviews to verify eligibility and identities, to obtain 
biographic data and “elicit testimony of past persecution” in a “chronological 
narrative”; promising to enter “all required bio-data into the US State Department 
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Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WARPS) database”. Further, 
IOM staff would request the necessary security name checks from US government 
agencies and provide on-site assistance during “adjudication circuit rides” (i.e. 
country-visits during which officials would decide on Iraqi immigration requests) of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including “scheduling refugee 
appointments, managing case files, distributing DHS/CIS decision letters at the 
conclusion of the circuit ride and supervising interpreters”.302 Here, the IOM 
functioned as an outsourced branch of US government ministries, and channelled 
activities of the US state, which were carried out on Syrian territory and had a direct 
impact on the population living on this territory.303 This channelling through the IOM, 
an international organization to which most states were members (not Syria), had the 
effect of hiding the presence of the US, which only became more clearly visible in the 
last step of the process, when officials from the DHS arrived for their ‘circuit rides’ to 
interview Iraqi applicants and provide a final decision. The IOM became an 
institutional process that veiled state practices that stood in contradiction to the 
sovereign ideal of territorial exclusivity, and that in fact created a situation of layered 
sovereignties, in which the officials and politics of several states influenced the lives 
of the same people, living on the same territory, in a very direct way.  
The US was the only state to rely so heavily on the IOM for its resettlement 
processing. Other resettlement states, such as Germany or Norway, appeared more 
inclined to trust the UNHCR selection process, as their officials did not create 
additional steps through the IOM, but interviewed pre-selected Iraqis directly. Due to 
this closer cooperation with UNHCR, officials from these states would communicate 
their preferences to UNHCR before pre-selection took place, when they announced 
their state’s ‘resettlement quota’, i.e. the number of Iraqis to be accepted in a given 
year. For example, Norwegian officials informed UNHCR managers that they wished 
to receive 60% women through their quota, while Germany’s sectarian request for 
Christian Iraqis was firmly rejected by UNHCR – however then resurfaced, 
apparently reformulated as a focus on ‘religious minorities’.304 Through these 
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requests, the domestic sphere and politics of the various resettlement states influenced 
decisions to be taken by UNHCR clerks, which could have momentous impacts on the 
lives of Iraqis in Syria. As in the case of IOM, the institutional layer of the UNHCR 
served to blur the involvement of the sovereignty of foreign states in the management 
of Iraqi migrants in Syria, and presented the resettlement process through a single 
prism of humanitarianism and generosity.  
Other states, operating their immigration programmes, also contributed to the overall, 
important presence of unreachable territories in the minds of Iraqis. States such as 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Australia or the Gulf states allowed Iraqis access to their 
territories either via large financial deposits, investments, specific skills or marriage, 
and ran their immigration schemes through embassies and directly at their borders. 
The entry restrictions imposed by other Arab states, whose nationals in the past had 
frequently sought employment in Iraq, were often criticized by Iraqi interlocutors. 
Their restrictive policies also had a negative effect on Iraqi freedom of movement and 
empowerment, and possibly influenced the social composition of the Iraqi population 
in Syria. However they did not create, in the same way, layers of sovereignty on 
Syrian territory, which the multiple involvement of settlement and donor states, with 
the humanitarian agencies, produced via their categorisations and judgements on the 
sovereignty of Iraqis, Iraq and Syria. The particular combination of humanitarianism, 
securitisation of Iraqis and highly selective immigration practices exercised by donor 
and resettlement states transported these states’ sovereignty onto Syria soil. More 
importantly perhaps, it also constructed lived experiences in Syria according to the 
sovereign ideal and furthered ideas about what it meant to be a good sovereign, and 
which territories and populations could be considered more sovereign than others.   
Apart from emigration matters, foreign states were also present in the management of 
Iraqis through their financial support of UNHCR, the Syrian government and, to a 
lesser extent, international NGOs. Particularly through the support to UNHCR and the 
Syrian budget, foreign states channelled hundreds of millions of dollars into Syria 
from 2008 onwards, with the stated aim of improving Iraqi lives, and helping the 
Syrian state cushion the financial burden of hosting Iraqi migrants.305 The donations, 
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the majority of which came from the US, allowed UNHCR to provide monthly 
stipends to poor Iraqi families, enabled the World Food Programme to assemble bi-
monthly food packages and led to renovations in the Syrian education and health 
sector. Such money also paid the high salaries of foreign aid workers as well as the 
lesser salaries of the dozens, if not hundreds, of Syrian staff that the humanitarian 
sector had employed. Further, it lined the pockets of Syrian businessmen providing, 
for example, the contents of the food packages, or involved in associated transport 
services. The funds thus contributed to diverse social and economic developments in 
Syria, including the governance of Iraqis. More relevant for this analysis, the money 
supported a narrative and a construction of the Iraqi migration crisis that contained 
numerous, important elements of the sovereign ideal and sovereign hierarchies. In the 
process of writing funding proposals and providing the donations, humanitarian 
agencies and foreign states functioned as a sovereignty-producing apparatus, in which 
the superior sovereignty of the donors was never directly expressed, but became 
operationalised in the various regulatory and categorising regimes applied to Iraqis.  
Invisible sovereignty 
Nowhere in UNHCR publications aimed at Iraqis, nor during humanitarian service-
provisions, was it made obvious where the funds came from that made the assistance 
to Iraqis possible. This absence of communication was reflected in a corresponding 
lack of awareness amongst Iraqis about who funded UNHCR and other assistance 
schemes. The conversation that I had with an Iraqi young woman, while waiting for 
hours outside the UNHCR compound for an appointment, about assistance provided 
to Iraqis was representative for an overall confusion about the matter.306 She had been 
convinced that the social security funds provided to Iraqis in Sweden came directly 
from the Iraqi state. Rather than emphasising and advertising their involvement and 
donations to Iraqis, the governments of donor states used the UNHCR channel to veil 
this involvement and provide no clear information to Iraqis about the impact certain 
governmental decisions were having on their lives. Even more strongly than in the 
immigration/resettlement programmes,  in which the influence of foreign sovereigns 
was visible but kept highly unclear, the involvement of foreign states in Iraqi lives via 
the funding of humanitarian assistance was not made explicit, and remained hidden 
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from Iraqis. The chief mechanisms through which this effect was achieved were 
‘international’ institutions such as UNHCR and IOM, which appeared as independent, 
international actors without any particular state affiliation. The fact that their actions 
and decisions were strongly influenced by, or formed a cohesive apparatus with, 
foreign governments, was not made explicit.   
State officials, both Syrian and foreign, on the other hand had access to privileged 
knowledge about these financial structures, as had international aid workers and 
international media. This discrepancy highlighted a fascinated effect of this foreign 
money in the construction of Syria’s domestic and international sphere. While 
internationally, the request for and acceptance of foreign financial support allowed 
Syrian officials to participate in a range of discourses and activities that demonstrated 
Syria’s ability to act and behave like a sovereign state, domestically, it was the hiding 
of this money’s origin that allowed for the continuation of an unencumbered Syrian 
domestic space that, conceptually, remained the exclusive domain of the Syrian 
state.307 Yet the international awareness of foreign-state support for Iraqi migration 
involved a further paradox: while it confirmed the existence and legitimacy of the 
Syrian state, it also assigned the Syrian territory a particular identity within the 
hierarchy of sovereigns. The hosting of Iraqi migrants was used to construct Syria as a 
generous state and nation, but the acceptance of foreign funds to deal with this 
migration also identified Syria as a country in crisis and located it closer to being a 
developing country than a fully fledged sovereign.308 
The involvement of foreign states in Iraqi migration management in Syria was 
complex and varied, demonstrating how the messy, lived reality of sovereignty 
created paradoxes and contradictions to the sovereign ideal. Foreign states’ influence 
on crucial turning points of Iraqi lives in Syria created a real and imagined web or 
layer of sovereignty for Iraqis to navigate. The opacity surrounding these states’ 
involvement only heightened the sovereign effect, by keeping Iraqis waiting and 
guessing, about which element of their identity to emphasise when approaching one 
particular sovereign. Through their funds, donor and resettlement states supported the 
humanitarian portrayal of Iraqi migration, however interviews and selections of 
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resettlement requests revealed a more openly ruthless side, in which Iraqis were 
treated as potential security threats and financial burden rather than victims in need of 
aid. Resettlement and emigration processes combined sovereign power’s caring and 
threatening elements, and emphasised, at different times, different aspects of Iraqi 
existence as it suited.  In this way, one of the crucial sovereign powers of all the states 
involved in Iraqi migration was revealed, namely that of constructing, portraying and 
representing Iraqi lives selectively and as official channels saw fit. This process 
remained possible through a rich mix of mechanisms that led to the invisibility of 
many facets of Iraqi lives in Syria, including the highly selective manner, in which 
Iraqis themselves chose to portray themselves when interacting with state officials.   
After presenting this overview of how foreign states participated in Iraqi migration to 
Syria, we now move on to a more specific analysis of an involvement of two donor 
and resettlement states, the US and Germany. In addition to considering these two 
states’ activities in Syria, the analysis will reflect on the intertwining of domestic 
political debates about Iraqi migration, with the techniques used by state officials 
abroad. Once again, migration emerges as a crucial field of production for 
sovereignty’s external and internal spaces that involved the conceptual location of the 
nation, as well as being rooted in the geographical limitations of territory.  
Germany and Iraqi migration 
Germany was a small-to-medium sized player in the field of onward Iraqi migration 
from Syria. By July 2010, 2,046 Iraqis had been resettled to the country from Syria, 
compared with 14,250 to the US, 907 to Australia and 102 to France.309 Aside from 
resettlement, the other main route for Iraqis to access Germany at least on a temporary 
basis was by claiming asylum; in 2010, 12,093 Iraqis claimed asylum in Germany, of 
which on average around 50% would receive at least some form of temporary leave to 
remain.310 As will be elaborated below, the treatment of Iraqis in Germany highly 
depended on which regulatory ‘stream’ they accessed the country; for example at the 
same time that the German government decided to accept 2,500 Iraqis from Syria via 
UNHCR resettlement, Iraqi asylum seekers already in Germany were having their 
residency permits revoked or their claims rejected. The German state did not operate 
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one immigration policy towards people of Iraqi nationality, but a complicated and 
contradictory jungle of laws and bureaucratic procedures, often operating 
independently across different state bodies, that became mobilised according to the 
different ways in which Iraqis approached the state.311 This situation emphasised the 
importance of understanding sovereignty not simply in monolithic, spatial terms, but 
as a web of human interactions, which are guided according to a particular political 
rationality and through their outcomes create sovereignty’s particular form of human 
organisation.312 
Among the Iraqis that I encountered in Syria, Germany was not frequently mentioned 
as destination, however often enough to feature on the mental map of possible 
emigration. Three of my interlocutors had acquaintances or relatives living in 
Germany, of which two had been resettled and one had migrated many years ago. One 
of the resettlement cases was mentioned during a conversation at the house of an Iraqi 
family in Jaramana, who were desperately waiting to be resettled and had grown 
frustrated and angry after repeated and unexplained delays. They spoke about a 
single, female acquaintance who had been resettled to Germany even though, in their 
assessment, she had not been in particular need: 
He spoke at length about the chaos and intransparency of the UNHCR 
operations in Syria. (…) More than once the case of one of their friends was 
mentioned, who received resettlement in Germany – and came back after a 
month, taking the immigration stamp that is valid for three years and then 
coming back to Syria, because she did not like it in Germany. ‘She does not need 
it!’ the wife exclaimed and the husband repeated this story as an example of the 
perceived randomness of the resettlement choice. 
In this quote, Germany’s decision to resettle a single woman from a religious 
minority, which met the humanitarian criteria of helplessness and fear, was essentially 
revealed as a fake. The presumed persecuted woman, apparently unable to integrate in 
the hostile host state Syria, nevertheless preferred her vague sovereign status there to 
residency in the presumed ‘proper’ sovereign Germany. On the other hand, her three-
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year immigration status in Germany provided her with an income (from the German 
state) and a secure exit-ticket, should political developments in Syria, where she did 
not enjoy the same legal assurances of residency, threaten her stay. The two separate 
sovereign spaces of the Syrian and German state were created – and overlapped, in 
the existence of the woman in question - via the different governance techniques 
applied to migrants in the two countries. The Syrian mechanism of broad, but 
unpredictable tolerance, and the highly selective, but (temporarily) guaranteed 
existence in Germany interacted to created a layered governance of Iraqi migrants 
who could, in the best case, navigate these two spaces of sovereignty to their 
maximum advantage. But the family desperately waiting to be selected for 
resettlement by the German state’s sovereign choice, experienced the other side of 
German sovereignty’s ‘janus-face’: that of unfettered, not-to-be influenced, secretive 
decision making, of exclusion, of barriers, of threat and violence.313 The limitation of 
the number of Iraqis who were to be accepted through resettlement thus contained 
several of state sovereignty’s principal and contradictory manifestations: the power to 
care, the power to select, the power to exclude and in the extreme case, the power to 
decide over life and death, which, in the worst case, non-resettlement could result in. 
Crucially, this was a sovereign, unquestionable power, as Iraqis could not seek 
justification for decisions, could not question or influence the resettlement-criteria and 
could not even find out many basic facts about the process of their resettlement file.314   
Constructing domestic sovereignty 
Different German sovereign spaces became visible and interacted through the 
involvement of the German state in Iraqi migration. This became clear when 
considering several developments related to Iraqi migration that took place in German 
domestic space at the same time as Germany became involved in Iraqi migration to 
Syria. Shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which the German 
government had not supported, German authorities began revoking the refugee or 
asylum status granted to Iraqis living in Germany, which had been awarded in 
recognition of their well-founded fears of persecution from the Iraqi government. The 
German government interpreted refugee law as allowing such revocation if the 
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conditions in the refugee’s home country, which had led to her recognition as refugee, 
had disappeared, due to ‘significant and permanent changes’. The removal of the 
Saddam government was considered as such a change and as having removed the 
repression that had justified the refugees’ claim and status in Germany.  
Despite public criticism from UNHCR and the unique position that the German 
practice presented in the EU, between 2003 and 2011 around 20,000 Iraqis had their 
refugee-status revoked.315 Paradoxically, the withdrawal of permits continued at the 
same time as other, newly arriving Iraqis in Germany were increasingly being granted 
temporary leave to remain, upon being recognised as having a legitimate asylum or 
refugee claim.316 Permit withdrawal did not lead to immediate departure or forced 
deportations of Iraqis from Germany; for example, between 2003 and 2006, 473 
Iraqis were forcibly deported from Germany, according to government statistics.317 
Forced deportations were only possible when a number of regulatory conditions were 
met, and even supporters of the withdrawal-policy, such as Germany’s conservative 
party CDU, acknowledged humanitarian reasons for not deporting Iraqis into the 
conflict zone of Baghdad.318 But importantly, the revocation of the refugee-status 
signalled that this person no longer had a right to fall under the protection of the 
German sovereign, and had no special connection anymore with the German nation, 
territory or government. This person had become, according to German officialese, 
‘ausreisepflichtig’, roughly translatable as ‘legally obliged to depart’. In 2011, the 
European Court of Justice broadly confirmed the legality of Germany’s position. 
This contradictory practice of revoking some Iraqis’ status, at the same time as other 
Iraqis were being granted asylum can be explained with reference to the sovereign 
ideal, and with reference to the implementation of this ideal as a lived reality through 
bureaucratic practices and power. With reference to the sovereign ideal, the rejection 
of previously accepted Iraqi refugees can be explained as an attempt to re-create the 
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correct, sovereign relations, after a temporary, illogical glitch, which the temporary 
inclusion of Iraqi migrants into German sovereignty had presented. This anomaly, 
which had been justified by the presumed anomaly of a government that persecuted 
the people on its territory instead of protecting them, was withdrawn as the removal of 
the Saddam government was assumed to have ‘re-instated’ the sovereign ideal in Iraq. 
The practices of German immigration authorities and their bureaucracies319 were 
linked to attempts to maintain the German state according to the ideas of the 
sovereign ideal: the German nation as a homogenous group of persons with unique 
links to German territory and government. The legal expelling of Iraqis via re-
categorisations and issuing of letters and documents, even as they physically 
remained on German territory, functioned in classic sovereignty-preserving terms as 
marking the internal boundaries of the German nation, defining the other and the 
external, and exercising the continuous exclusion of it.320   
Constructing international sovereignty 
But how can the contradiction be explained that at the same time, new arrivals from 
Iraq were recognised as refugees, and Germany’s then foreign minister pushed for 
Germany’s unprecedented participation in UNHCR’s resettlement programme in 
Syria, offering generous resettlement terms for 1500 Iraqis? To explain these 
developments it is necessary to consider the international space of the German state’s 
sovereignty.321 The international performance of German state sovereignty was not 
focused on generating the conditions of possibility for the sovereign ideal by 
implementing the internal borders of Germany’s population and territory. The 
participation and demonstrations of German state officials in the conceptual space of 
the international instead aimed at confirming Germany’s role as that of a powerful, 
but good, democratic and legitimate sovereign with the moral principles befitting of a 
liberal government. This performance aimed at confirming Germany’s external 
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borders, however not the physical borders on the edges of German territory, but rather 
the projected borders of the realm of the German state’s sphere of action, which could 
include territories outside of those allocated to the German state. As the following 
paragraphs will argue, the high-profile and even staged participation of Germany in 
UNHCR’s international programmes performed the German state’s role as that of a 
generous and good sovereign, as fulfilling the responsibilities that come with being a 
great power. Just as Syrian state officials, who seized on the Iraqi communities in 
Syria as an opportunity to demonstrate the integrity and legitimacy of the Syrian 
sovereign, German officials seized on the Iraqi resettlement cases to perform 
Germany’s benevolent role in international affairs, which could include activities 
outside of German state territory.  
The press coverage surrounding the departure and arrival of the first resettled Iraqis to 
Germany emphasizes how this particular ‘international affair’ boosted the 
construction of Germany as a safe and generous sovereign haven. UNHCR 
spokespersons lauded Germany’s ‘effort’ stating that “Germany is providing a very 
positive example which we hope will inspire other European countries to consider 
resettling Iraqi refugees during 2009”.322 Another UNHCR representative added that 
"Germany has set an important example to ensure that especially vulnerable Iraqi 
refugees can plan their future life in peace and safety. The resettlement of these 
refugees is a valuable contribution to international refugee protection and the 
commitment and support received by the German authorities and civil society deserve 
our explicit appreciation.”323 In stark contrast to the behaviour towards those Iraqis 
threatened with deportation, the first contingent of 120 resettled Iraqis received a 
personal welcome from the interior minister of one of Germany’s federal states, who 
welcomed them with the words “we have prepared everything to make you feel 
comfortable”.324 In a related statement, Germany’s national ombudsman for 
integration called on the population to receive the Iraqis with open arms, as it was a 
principle of humanity to quickly help people seeking protection. The signal to be sent 
to refugees was to be: you are welcome.325 It is noteworthy, that Germany’s 
participation in the resettlement programme resulted from the high-profile efforts 
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made by Germany’s then interior minister to convince European countries to help 
persecuted Iraqis, especially Christians. In fact, the minister carried his lobbying on 
the question so far that the Iraqi government eventually requested less publicity on the 
matter, as it considered the refugee-issue as negative publicity, highlighting the failure 
to achieve security in Iraq. 
Overlapping sovereignty 
These various examples show that Germany’s participation in resettling Iraqis from 
Damascus, which led to activities by German officials in Syria that influenced the 
integration and identity of Iraqis living there, was closely linked to the construction of 
German sovereign space, both domestic and international. ‘Overlapping’ sovereignty 
in this sense did not simply refer to a situation in which actions by different states 
took place on a single territory. Instead, overlapping sovereignty rather explained, in a 
slightly crude metaphorical way, they way in which the constructions of the 
sovereignty of different states were necessarily intertwined and influence each other. 
If the way that the Syrian state included Iraqis in its population and territory (a 
question directly linked to how Syrian sovereignty was created) differed, this would 
change the opportunities for the German state to perform its sovereignty towards 
Iraqis. In conjunction with the moral and legal aspects of the sovereign ideal, which 
worked as a yardstick of correctness, legitimacy and stability, these overlapping 
constructions created a dynamic hierarchy in which those sovereigns who performed 
the sovereign ideal most perfectly, could draw power and resources from this 
performance, which also legitimised their intervention into the sovereign spheres of 
less well-performing sovereigns.  
In Syria, Germany’s participation in the resettlement programme resulted in the 
categorisation and selection of Iraqis according to humanitarian, integration and, 
although this was not made explicit, religious criteria.326 From the point of view of 
sovereignty, it was telling that the interactions and negotiations preceding Germany’s 
accession to the resettlement programme took place between officials from Germany 
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and UNHCR, without the explicit involvement of the Syrian state.327 Without further 
investigation about the actual daily-life situation of Iraqis in Syria, German officials 
accepted that Iraqis in Syria faced no prospect of integration and were ‘sovereignty-
less’, thus making an intervention from another sovereign legitimate and desirable. 
Germany’s power to intervene in Iraqi lives (and thus in the construction of the Syrian 
body politic) in this way resulted directly from the construction of Iraqis as located 
outside of sovereignty and the judgement that Syria’s ‘protection’ of Iraqis was non-
existent or at least insufficient. The superiority of German sovereignty also emerged 
from the particular understanding of ‘protection’ as a legal connection with a 
sovereign (which Syria did not offer) and was thus linked to the different ways in 
which the German and Syrian state exercised their governance. The apparent fairness 
and transparency of Germany’s bureaucratic apparatus, offering stability and 
integration, was contrasted with Syrian randomness and instability, an opposition that 
was, as demonstrated by the experience of Iraqi interlocutors, often nullified in daily 
life experience.  
Nevertheless and crucially, Germany’s superior qualities as a sovereign could not 
have been performed if not many Iraqis had been extremely keen and willing to be 
resettled to Germany and if UNHCR would not have been able to ‘fulfil’ the 
resettlement quota allocated by the German state. The fact that many Iraqis explained 
their willingness to resettle with the hope of stability and material support, as well as 
better life chances for their children, showed not only that the performance of German 
sovereignty was successful, but that the German state indeed governed those people 
qualifying for citizenship in a way that promised greater prosperity and personal 
freedoms. This governance, which was linked to far-reaching and complex 
differences between the Syrian and German state, was part and parcel of the German 
state’s success and strength, and reflected the Syrian state’s much weaker success in 
establishing itself as the key focus of loyalty and identity for the people living on its 
territory.  
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The US and Iraqi migration 
In 2009/2010 the US was the country receiving by far the largest number of Iraqis via 
UNHCR resettlement. In Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, the US government ran additional, 
special immigration programmes for Iraqis who had worked as translators for the US 
army or affiliated contractors, which had resulted in their persecution (it was not 
possible to apply for this programme from Syria). Further, Iraqis could also claim 
asylum from within US territory. Between January 2007 and July 2010, 14,255 Iraqis 
departed from Syria to the US through UNHCR resettlement; according to US 
government statistics, from 2008 to 2010 inclusive, a total of 50,676 Iraqis received 
asylum in the US.328 Syrian resettlement cases thus made up, on average, around a 
quarter of all Iraqi refugees received by the US during these years.  
As most of their resettled friends and relatives had been sent to the US, and as a 
number of my interlocutors themselves already had prospects of being resettled there, 
the US was the most frequently discussed immigration option encountered during 
fieldwork. US cities to which resettlers might be sent were discussed, together with 
the conflicting information about the financial support refugees might receive, which 
appeared to be frequently changing and varied according to US federal state.329  
While interlocutors hoping for resettlement to the US sometimes expressed a muted 
excitement about travelling, the general attitude was that of long-term waiting amid 
uncertainty whether the hoped-for announcement, and eventually the tickets, would 
truly arrive. UNHCR (or IOM) only informed Iraqis days before their departure that 
their resettlement date was due. Questions about the discomfort that Iraqis might feel 
when being offered resettlement in the country that many perceived to lie at the root 
of Iraq’s problems were only rarely raised. This was particularly ironic in cases when 
Iraqis described the actions of US forces as closely connected to their fear and 
ensuing flight. Instead of expressing outright rejection of the US, interlocutors 
repeatedly indicated that they considered it the US’s responsibility to help Iraqis, and 
thus had no problem with accepting US aid or resettlement, indeed sometimes 
considered it as their right. The following quotes demonstrate this perception.  
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OK - they wanted to change the Iraq for the better. But now we haven't seen 
anything good at all. There is nothing good. OK - America entered Iraq and is 
not concerned about the situation of the Iraqis, what is happening with people, 
every day thousands are killed, a million have died, they are displaced, forced to 
leave their work, their work - all these things are not important to them. But 
when they entered at the beginning it was all to liberate Iraq. So yes, they are 
responsible to support Iraqis and to give them help because they have done this. 
It is necessary that they carry the responsibility.330 
One young woman, when asked about the personal sacrifices that some Americans 
were making to help Iraqi refugees, said: 
…but they are the fault of all our problems! They have made all the problems for 
us, in Iraq, not only now, but for decades! (…) But it is so little, compared with 
the problems that they created for us.  
These quotes provide food for thought about the understanding of state sovereignty 
that interlocutors themselves maintained, and a brief elaboration of how this 
understanding related to the constructions of US sovereignty through the resettlement 
programme. On first glance, the willingness of Iraqis to accept US responsibility for 
their welfare matches the humanitarian idea of ‘protection’. Similarly, the acceptance 
of continued US intervention in their lives and the acceptance of US-territory as a 
place of metropolitan safety and peace appeared to follow and enforce the post-
colonial narrative of the US (and Europe) as superior sovereigns. With regards to such 
opinions, it appeared that  the modern ideal of sovereignty was successfully 
transmitted through the US participation in resettlement. But, importantly, underneath 
these similarities, other ideas raised in interviews and conversations pointed towards a 
very different belief among Iraqis about what sovereignty meant. A number of 
responses and opinions indicated that interlocutors understood sovereignty in a more 
paternalistic or perhaps absolutist way, with different implications for how 
sovereignty’s social relations should and would be lived, than those expressed by the 
(post)-modern ideal. This reading of Iraqi views about sovereignty could also explain 
the broad acceptance of US responsibility for Iraqi welfare among interlocutors. 
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A further extract from the interview drawn on above was: 
For example, why is the father responsible for the family? Isn't it that the 
government, which is bigger, is responsible for the people? Yes, it is necessary, 
they are responsible. They have to support and help the Iraqis and find a 
solution for them.331 
This expression of a fundamental distinction and separation between government and 
people also appeared during casual conversations. One Iraqi interlocutor reflected on 
how governments of European countries cared for their citizens abroad, in the case of 
arrest for example, while Middle Eastern governments did not, expressing an 
understanding of governments as caretakers over whose actions people had no 
control. Intrigued by an apparent lack of understanding of how taxes and public 
finance worked in other states, I occasionally asked Iraqi acquaintances about who 
they considered as the owner of public spaces, such as roads and parks. Invariably, the 
answer was that these items belonged to the government. These answers pointed 
towards a perception of sovereignty shaped in a political context in which the notions 
of citizens, civic responsibility and of the government as representative of the 
population did not appear. Iraqis’ clearly had experience of fundamentally different 
social relations underpinning state sovereignty (already analysed in relation to the 
Syrian state above) than those of the sovereign ideal. 
Returning to the analysis of how US sovereignty appeared in Syria, it was important 
that the differing Iraqi perception of how government, population and territory related 
to each other, limited the transmission of the liberal and humanitarian portrayal of US 
sovereignty presented in the official rhetoric surrounding resettlement. For example, 
as elaborated above, according to official rhetoric, the selection of resettlement cases 
was based on ideas about the needs of persons considered as being outside of 
sovereign space. The pervading silence about the political circumstances surrounding 
Iraqi displacement in this rhetoric served to depoliticise Iraqi migrants. But according 
to Iraqis’ understanding of sovereignty, the selection of resettlement cases was the 
unfettered decision by a sovereign, whose ultimate motives would necessarily remain 
hidden, as secrecy and lack of representation were ‘natural’ elements of sovereign 
power. Further, Iraqis remained highly aware of the politics of their migration, and 
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considered it as the very basis of their relationship with the US state. Unlike the 
underlying logic of the resettlement programme, which focused on forging new US 
citizens out of resettled Iraqis in order to allow them access to secure, sovereign 
space, Iraqis did not consider themselves in this way.332 Rather, the US was 
considered as a type of patron who, after intervening disastrously in Iraqi lives, now 
should take responsibility to help.  
Constructing domestic sovereign space 
As in the case of Germany, the US’ involvement in managing Iraqi migrants in Syria 
made different US sovereign spaces visible, emphasised how imagined borders 
between such spaces were created, and how these distinct spaces encountered each 
other. In particular, this concerned the construction of domestic and international 
conceptual space. US involvement in Iraqi migration was closely linked to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and its increasingly disastrous aftermath. Iraqi migrants were a living 
proof that the desired results of the Iraq war were not being achieved and indeed had 
proved a horrible failure. As has been noted by Geraldine Chatelard, the foremost 
analyst of Iraqi migration in the last decades, global awareness of what amounted to a 
recent spike in ongoing Iraqi emigration, and the framing of this emigration as an 
unprecedented refugee crisis, was shaped by the activities of US-based humanitarian 
organisations. The lobbying and awareness-raising around the issue of Iraqi refugees 
taking place in Washington, DC created a ‘global refugee agenda’ and was closely 
linked to US domestic politics, as it served to point out the failure of the Bush 
administration to bring order and stability to Iraq.333  In particular the failure to 
adequately protect Iraqis who had supported the US army, and had become targets for 
insurgents as a result, placed pressure on the US government; in response the special 
visa-programme for such persons was created. The successes and failure of this 
programme were monitored by the media, as was the fate of displaced Iraqis in 
general.334 During  2009, dozens of research reports and hundreds of media stories on 
Iraqi displacement appeared, often linking the issue to the US-led invasion.  
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The emergence, or ‘making visible’ of different US sovereign spaces in this process 
once again draws attention to the paradoxes of US sovereignty, which appeared as a 
cause of Iraqi insecurity as well as the rescuer of Iraqis. Re-enforcing the distinction 
between a dangerous outside and a secure inside, the Iraqi asylum programmes 
became a field in which the various ‘faces’ of US sovereignty were separated and 
interacted. As actions by US state officials and soldiers had clearly contributed to 
making the ‘outside’ dangerous, how could the separation between domestic and 
international be upheld? The maintenance of these conceptual spaces in the face of 
events in apparent contradictions, pointed on the one hand to the power of the 
‘territorial trap’ intrinsic to contemporary beliefs about the way sovereignty is rooted 
in defined territory.335 On the other it demonstrated how the apparent contradictions 
were solved: via the narrative that the pre-existing dangerous outside (Iraq) proved 
too dangerous even for the essentially pacifying hegemon (the US). This narrative 
underpinned much of the analysis of the US’ engagement in Iraq (and Afghanistan) 
and consequent ‘military overstretch’.336 This powerfully suggestive story blended out 
the historical involvement of other states, including the US, in these ‘outside’ places 
and successfully upheld the idea of territorial exclusivity, which should be and was 
only broken in self-defence, when the dangerous ‘outside’ was threatening the 
peaceful ‘inside’ (which was, of course, how the 2003 invasion of Iraq was 
justified).337 It further explained how the potential instability that Iraqi refugees 
presented for the integrity of US sovereignty could be successfully nullified through 
the resettlement and asylum programs, in which US territory (and thus sovereignty) 
could be again confirmed as a source of peace and stability. In this sense, the US’ 
involvement in managing Iraqi migrants in Syria (and the Middle East region) had to 
be considered as a sovereignty-affirming involvement, despite its extra-territorial 
character. As already briefly described above, this extra-territorial character was 
partly obscured through the reliance of US ministries on the IOM to conduct large 
parts of the emigration process.  
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US presence in Syria 
At the time of field research, diplomatic relations between Syria and the US were 
improving, although the US did not have an ambassador to the country. The 
resettlement of Iraqis required, as the last step, an interview with an officer from the 
US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), who thus had to be physically present 
in the country. DHS committees regularly visited Syria for this purpose and interview 
appointments depended on this schedule. The final interview with a DHS official was 
the ‘make-or-break’ moment of a resettlement case, as all the previous selection by 
UNHCR clerks and IOM officials could be nullified by the decision of the DHS 
interviewer. Correspondingly, Iraqi interlocutors expressed nervousness and 
excitement once the DHS appointment had been announced. One Iraqi friend told me 
about a dreaded DHS official known among his Iraqi friends as ‘Barbara’, who had 
rejected many Iraqis on grounds of credibility. According to my friend and other 
informants, ‘credibility’ was the most common reason for rejection; this would be 
indicated on the rejection letter by a tick in the box called ‘credibility’. Interviews, 
which were completely unpredictable and could be highly intrusive or superficial, 
were set up in a way to detect a lack of credibility, for example by interviewing 
husband and wife separately.338 It struck me as peculiar, how US state sovereignty 
appeared personified in the official named ‘Barbara’. As a human being, Barbara was 
a precise, yet moving and temporally unstable location of US sovereignty, physically 
de-territorial, but, through her US citizenship, conceptually linked to and 
representative of US territory. As a gate-keeper to Iraqi access to US territory and the 
US nation, Barbara also presented a moving border post that would only sometimes 
appear on Syrian territory to allow for a crossing of this border. In this way, the role 
played by Barbara summarised and went to the heart of the fiction of modern 
sovereignty and its fixation of territory, population and government as an inseparable 
entity.  
In addition to its presence in the resettlement process, the US state played a role in 
managing Iraqi migration through its enormous and fundamentally important funding 
of the humanitarian effort focused on Iraqis. The US was by far the largest funder of 
UNHCR’s total budget, contributing around five times more than the two next biggest 
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donors, Japan and the EC, each. In 2010, the US contributed around USD 712 million, 
Japan USD 143 million and the EC 118 million, out of a total of around USD 1.9 
billion in contributions.339 With regards to UNHCR’s operations for Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, the US’ funding covered an even larger percentage. A 
2009/10 report indicated that the US funded between 40% and 50% per cent (and 
possibly more) of UNHCR’s budget for the region.340 In Syria, this money funded the 
expansion of the wider humanitarian sector (including NGOs, most of which received 
at least part of their funding via UNHCR), which at the time was nearly exclusively 
focused on Iraqi migration. As UNHCR’s budget, unlike other UN agencies, 
depended to a large extent on voluntary contributions, the influence that contributing 
states have over the organisation is comparatively large.341 
The difficulty that focused research encountered when trying to unearth US’ financial 
contribution to UNHCR’s country budgets demonstrated very well how the 
‘institutional channelling’ of extra-territorial state practices hid overlapping sovereign 
jurisdictions. Although contributions to UNHCR’s budget were heavily weighted 
towards a handful of states, the organisation presented itself as a unitary actor and as 
representative of the international community of all member states, and by extension, 
their populations. Notably, in official and public communications of UNHCR about 
the Iraqi refugee crisis, the organisation often praised the Syrian government for its 
cooperation, however did not thank its biggest donor, the US, for its continued and 
crucial support. Apart from the overall stability to the sovereign ideal that UNHCR 
thus achieved, the obscuring of US involvement was also more immediately 
expedient for the US government. The separation of domestic and international spaces 
through the filtering of US money through UNHCR’s structures served to veil the US’ 
financial intervention in a territory considered as belonging to an enemy state by 
many US politicians, and the controversial, growing budgetary support to UNHCR.342 
As mentioned above, in 2009/10 the US’ diplomatic relations with Syria were 
warming, however far from strong. This was evident from the absence of a US 
ambassador in Syria since 2005, a classic, diplomatic performance of the sovereign 
ideal, through which a break-down of positive relations between two unitary states is 
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signalled. This break-down had been prompted by US officials’ belief that the Syrian 
government had been involved in the assassination of the former Lebanese prime 
minister Hariri; the Syrian support for the Lebanese party and military organisation 
Hezbollah exacerbated the crisis. The sending to Syria of millions of dollars in aid 
money at this low point in diplomatic relations therefore not only presented a 
challenge in terms of sovereign stability, but could have also drawn criticism for the 
US government from its critics; especially as the expanding humanitarian budget 
clearly also benefited the Syrian government and public sector facing an economic 
crisis at the time. This explanation of how the extra-territorial expansion of US 
sovereign space became neutralised and depoliticised through the organisational 
structures of UNHCR, points to some of the political (and thus power-related) 
functions that the sovereign ideal fulfils.  
The combination of the US’s participation in the resettlement programme, and its 
funding of UNHCR was an enormously powerful construction of US sovereignty; 
demonstrating on several levels the US’ power to intervene in Iraqi lives across 
several state territories. Interestingly, as argued above, some aspects of this power 
were highly visible, while others remained hidden. The opening of US borders to 
deserving Iraqi refugees was mediatised internationally and also very widely known 
among Iraqi interlocutors. This aspect of US involvement in Iraqi migration both 
served to neutralise the negative political fall-out of the US’ failures in Iraq, and 
simultaneously re-created the notion of the US as the locus of peace and stability, as 
the rescuer of Iraqis. As in the case of Germany, the creation of the US as a 
resettlement demonstration included a superior judgement of US sovereignty, as it 
implied that Iraqi or Syrian sovereignty did not properly extend over Iraqis, nor 
included the capacity to offer Iraqis protection. Yet the actual, physical interventions 
on Syrian territory required from US state-representatives to conduct the resettling of 
Iraqis to the US, which would have visibly undermined Syrian territorial control, was 
veiled. Rather than setting up extra-territorial branches of the various ministries 
involved in resettlement in Syria, the US government heavily relied on the IOM to 
conduct most of the pre-selection of Iraqis, which portrayed the operation as an 
international effort. Similarly, as analysed above, the US’ vast financial support of the 
humanitarian effort focused on Iraqi migrants was obscured, to similar effect. Yet 
clearly, the heavy financial involvement with UNHCR at least opened a channel of 
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knowledge for US officials into the domestic Syrian space, which, due to the political 
circumstances, was of high strategic importance yet remained comparatively closed to 
US influence. 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the involvement of other states in the management of Iraqi 
migrants in Syria. Foreign states were present in this management through their 
participation in the humanitarian efforts focused on Iraqis, as well as through standard 
immigration programmes. Given the high visibility and awareness of the humanitarian 
aspects among Iraqi interlocutors, the analysis of this chapter mainly focused on the 
donor states. The two main areas in which donor states were active were the UNHCR 
resettlement programme, through which Iraqis were allowed to migrate further on 
humanitarian grounds, and financial support for a range of humanitarian projects.  
The participation of foreign states in these programmes created extra-territorial 
interventions that were contradictory to the sovereign ideal, as they influenced on how 
the Syrian state was able to manage to population living on its territory. One way 
through which the extra-territorial character of these interventions was veiled was via 
the institutional channelling of foreign states’ power through UNHCR and IOM. Both 
of these organisations served as gate-keepers and extra-territorial border guards for 
the foreign states’ participation in managing Iraqi migrants. Not only did they 
negotiate the terms and conditions under which these states would conduct their 
interventions, they also conducted the pre-selection of potential resettlement 
candidates and a host of bureaucratic and security measures required by the 
immigration policies of the participating states. This form of gate-keeping and 
institutional channelling made it possible to blur the nitty-gritty involvement of the 
sovereignty of foreign states in the management of Iraqi migrants in Syria, and 
presented the resettlement process through a single prism of humanitarianism and 
generosity by an abstract international community.   
To provide further insights into how the involvement of foreign states was linked to 
the construction of different spaces of sovereignty, details about the interventions of 
two states were presented, Germany and the US. The German government had 
opposed the invasion of Iraq, so unlike the US, was not considered a source of Iraqi 
displacement with a direct responsibility to assist refugees. Still, Germany’s high-
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profile lobbying of European states to accept displaced Iraqis via UNHCR 
resettlement delivered a boost to Germany’s international sovereignty, as it confirmed 
Germany as a location of peace and compassion. Germany’s unprecedented 
participation in a UNHCR resettlement programme was publically lauded by UNHCR 
in press releases and the first resettled Iraqis were welcomed to Germany by senior 
German politicians to a media fanfare. Yet this construction of Germany’s 
international sovereignty was contrasted by the ironic fact that at the same time, 
thousands of Iraqis in Germany, who had previously been accepted as asylum-
seekers, were having their residency permits revoked. The revocations were justified 
by the argument that the conditions in Iraq, which had previously resulted in a 
justified fear of persecution for these Iraqis, had permanently changed through the 
US-led invasion. Unlike the resettlement process, this development was linked to the 
construction of Germany’s domestic sovereign space, in which the boundaries of the 
nation had to be continuously made visible in order to maintain the physical 
manifestation of the sovereign ideal. The different and sometimes contradicting 
treatment given to Iraqi migrants approaching the German state via different 
bureaucratic channels also emphasised how the state and its sovereignty were 
constructed through a maze of regulatory procedures and management techniques, 
rather than through a single locus of power.  
The US’ participation in resettlement and in the financing of humanitarian relief for 
Iraqis was linked to the failure of the US-led war to pacify and stabilise Iraq. Iraqi 
refugees were a living proof of this failure and US lobby groups pressured the 
government to help displaced Iraqis, especially those who had become targets for 
assisting US forces. The involvement of the US thus relied on a contradictory 
situation in which the country was at the same time the source of Iraqi insecurity and 
protection. This apparently ironic situation was linked to US state-practices through 
which ‘external’ and ‘internal’ sovereign spaces were constructed. US violence was 
performed in spaces considered outside of US sovereign territory, which were 
portrayed as dangerous and threatening to US stability. US violence was justified as a 
source of pacification and self-defence; this myth was even upheld in the face of the 
demonstrated, opposite result of US intervention in Iraq. Insecurity and danger in 
post-invasion Iraq was not considered by the US government as a consequence of US 
violence, but as a result of the great danger, irrationality and evil that existed beyond 
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the peaceful US sovereign space and which had been underestimated at the beginning 
of the war. Theories about the US’s ‘military overstretch’ or miscalculated tactics 
displayed this approach, which continued the myth about the US as an essential 
source of peace. Allowing Iraqi migrants access to US territory in this way did not 
contradict constructions of the sovereign ideal, as Iraqis could still be considered as 
accessing the US’ peaceful realm without the realisation that the US at the same time 
had destroyed Iraqis’ peace in the first place.   
The perspectives and opinions of Iraqi interlocutors about resettlement, humanitarian 
aid and sovereignty were also considered in this chapter. In particular, the acceptance 
by interlocutors of US responsibility to assist Iraqis, rather than an outright rejection 
of further US interventions in their lives, pointed to an understanding of sovereignty 
at odds with the sovereign ideal. In several interviews, Iraqis described the US as a 
paternalistic power, who had intervened disastrously in their lives and now held the 
responsibility of the powerful to offer what little improvement could be had. In these 
statements, the relationship between government and population was viewed a kind of 
paternalism, in which the government’s actions were broadly independent of the will 
of the people, however could be judged as good or bad. This portrayal indicated 
perhaps that the states of which interlocutors had experience (mainly Iraq and Syria) 
relied much less on the myth of popular representation as a technique of upholding 
domestic sovereignty. Overall, the involvement of foreign states in the management 
of Iraqi migration to Syria revealed a complex web of state practices through which 
the different spaces of sovereignty were maintained. 
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Chapter 7 Migrants, Refugees, Citizens, People: Iraqis in 
Syria 
 
 
This penultimate chapter is dedicated to the stories, opinions and reflections of the 
Iraqi interlocutors who helped conduct the research upon which this thesis rests, as 
well as to those friends and officials who granted time and interviews. One goal of the 
chapter is to present their diversity and creativity, and to deliver a more nuanced 
analysis of ‘Iraqis in Syria’, which, until this point, has been wielded as a rather 
general category. Remaining with the overall theme of the thesis, the chapter will 
examine how my interlocutors considered their relationship with the state, with Iraq, 
with Syria and with notions such as nation and territory. Most importantly, it will seek 
to demonstrate how specific actions of interlocutors undermined or confirmed the 
constructions of sovereignty applied in the management of Iraqi migration to Syria, 
and what this meant for how sovereignty appeared in daily life. In this manner, the 
chapter provides insights into the limits of the sovereignty-constructing interventions 
that Iraqis faced on a day-to-day basis, a crucial aspect of this thesis’ overall analysis 
of how sovereignty became a reality in the context of Iraqi migration. Through the 
highly individualised responses to various, sovereignty-related forms of control, 
biopolitical techniques and bureaucratic requirements, which are described in detail in 
this chapter, Iraqis frequently spoiled not only the hoped for effect of power, but also 
the images and reputations of the state and non-state institutions wielding it. The 
chapter also demonstrates how compliance with sovereignty-related power 
transformed Iraqi lives in their most intimate aspects, and shows how biopolitical 
techniques truly blur any distinction between public and private, extending the space 
of what is generally understood as ‘public’ politics.  
More than any of the preceding sections, this chapter showcases the merits of 
ethnographic research for theory-building in international relations. Without the 
significant time spent on ‘hanging out’ with interlocutors and the writing of detailed, 
daily field notes it would have not been possible to glimpse the fleeting moments in 
which the effects and contestations of power manifested themselves. While interviews 
may help flesh out the context of a research setting and are crucial for the quick 
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obtaining of information, they cannot help researchers understand the ‘daily-life’ 
effects of sovereignty-construction. Only one of the important observations laid out in 
this chapter was collected through an interview. 
This chapter’s content thus weighs in favour of the narratives of my Iraqi 
interlocutors. The style of writing and analysis makes heavier use of the ethnographic 
data collected during field research and necessarily differs from those of previous 
chapters. Conversations and interviews are clustered around three themes of 
relevance. The three themes are: (1) conformity, (2) contestation and (3) disobedience 
and deception. The first theme, conformity, analyses changes in behaviour and self-
governance of Iraqi interlocutors in reaction to bureaucratic structures related to their 
migrant status. This section argues that the basis of these bureaucratic structures could 
be found in ideas about the sovereign ideal (stipulating a homogeneous and healthy 
nation, for example) as well as in neo-liberal technologies of risk management and 
control. The effect of these structures was to create particular exclusions and barriers, 
according to which Iraqis had to change their daily-life behaviour so that they could 
become accepted, for example, as immigrants to the US. The second theme, 
disobedience and deception, highlights how Iraqis manipulated the categorisations 
and exclusions that were applied to them by humanitarian organisations in Syria. 
While disobedience and deception did not amount to open resistance, such actions 
nevertheless weakened the efficiency with which ideas about sovereignty could be 
translated into lived reality and were a form of Iraqi agency that spoiled the 
characterisations of weakness and passivity thrust upon them by humanitarian 
rhetoric. This section also highlights  moments in which the randomness of sovereign 
decision-making, ostensibly based on fairness, knowledge and justice, was revealed. 
Finally, the third theme, open resistance and contestation, focuses on moments in 
which Iraqis either directly argued against the way they were governed, or in which 
they voiced analyses and opinions that stood in stark contrasts with the sovereign 
assumptions applied in this governance.   
My Iraqi interlocutors comprised a group of around 80 persons, out of which I saw 
around 20 repeatedly and regularly. This group included persons with highly 
divergent lifestyles and personalities, running from the devout, motherly and smiley 
friend with six children to the high-strung, eccentric and gay fashion-designer, to the 
confident, flirtatious and jolly teenager. It included individuals horribly scarred and 
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down-trodden by recent violence, who could not arrange themselves with life in exile, 
as well persons quite happy with their life in Syria, who were not looking to move 
elsewhere. A key experience drawn from researching among this group was that Iraqi 
migrants in Syria reflected the whole, complex range of Iraqi society, and that the 
reasons for flight and continued exile were also diverse (however frequently involved 
violence). Violence and crime had become wide-spread in post-invasion Iraq, and did 
not amount to a targeted persecution of this or that group, but to a breakdown of 
social order that affected people across class and religious boundaries. The diversity 
among recent Iraqi migrants to Syria, and their diverse reasons for remaining in exile, 
also showed the non-violent social developments that pushed and pulled Iraqis to 
migrate, not least the simple opening of the border and the newly found, relative ease 
of travel.343 
This wide variety among a relatively small group of people made short analytical 
shrift of any classifications according to age, gender, class or any of the other, 
standard sociological markers. Iraqi acquaintances mirrored the richness of human 
existence and their experiences formed part of the paradoxical conditions and ideas of 
political life organized according to modern state-sovereignty, in a post-colonial 
situation. The following sections show how Iraqis navigated these paradoxical 
conditions and how precisely the richness of their human existence clashed with or 
transformed through the demands of sovereignty-constructing power. 
Conformity 
The following paragraphs will analyse instances in which Iraqis changed their lives in 
order to conform to regulations through which state and humanitarian actors 
attempted to manage Iraqi migration in an orderly way, which meant in a way that 
allowed for the continuation and reinforcement of sovereignty’s political and spatial 
organisation. The relevance of these episodes, apart from that they give an interesting, 
overall insight into Iraqi life in Syria, concerns the forms of power that were applied 
to Iraqis due to their situation as migrants. Applying a broadly Foucauldian analysis, 
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it becomes possible to analyse these moments of conformity and to effectively carve 
out the techniques and locations of power and how they affected interlocutors.344 
The most visible incident of such conformity that I came across during fieldwork 
concerned the father of a lovely Iraqi family with six children, who lived in very poor 
conditions close to my flat in the suburb Jaramana. Through the activities of an Iraqi 
social activist called Firas, this family had been put in contact with some foreigners, 
especially due to the artistic talents of the family’s two oldest daughters, who had 
exhibited in several art exhibitions in Damascus and abroad. The family, here referred 
to as the ‘Abu Mahmud’ family, could not return to Iraq due to the hostility of the 
wife’s family to the mixed-religious marriage, which had surfaced since the onset of 
violent sectarian strife in Iraq. Now, they were hoping for resettlement to the US, a 
process they had been working and waiting on for several years. One of the reasons 
for the long delay had been Abu Mahmud’s health and weight problems. Iraqis with 
no relatives or friends in the US to act as their resettlement sponsors were allocated 
such a sponsor, for example a charity or a refugee support group. Yet such sponsors 
were reluctant to receive people with potentially expensive health problems, which 
were flagged during the mandatory health check that was conducted during 
resettlement registration.345  
One afternoon when I was visiting the artistic sisters, the parents returned and we 
started speaking about resettlement. Abu Mahmud explained how the year before, a 
doctor had conducted the resettlement health-check on him. At that time, he had 
weighed 120 kilos and had been a heavy smoker. (As a proof, one of his daughters 
even brought an old photograph, showing a very round, heavy Abu Mahmud.) The 
doctor had written a report to the IOM, stating that Abu Mahmud’s health was very 
bad; this had very much complicated the resettlement procedure and caused a severe 
delay. However since that time, Abu Mahmud’s health had vastly improved, he had 
lost a lot of weight through a programme of daily running and exercising (now in fact, 
Abu Mahmud was one of the skinniest men I knew in Syria). He had quit smoking 
and ate much more healthily. After one year, Abu Mahmud returned to the same 
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doctor, who then issued a report that his health was fine and that he could travel. So 
now everything should be ready; Abu Mahmud did not understand what was causing 
the delay. He had called the IOM and UNHCR quite regularly, however did not 
receive any substantial news. It had been eight months now since the post weight-loss 
resettlement interview. Both Abu Mahmud and his wife repeated how the waiting was 
tiring them and causing a lot of worry.346  
Thinking about and analysing the structures, ideas and individual actions that led to 
Abu Mahmud’s physical transformation reveal an enormously complex, transnational 
web of actors and of power. The US health system, perceptions of risk management 
and statistics about cardiovascular disease combined with ideas about productive 
human life, the individual power of the doctor to issue the report, and biological 
controls on the possibly diseased outsider, before s/he was allowed to access national 
territory.347 The techniques of power that enticed Abu Mahmud to improve his health, 
revealed  a curious mix of what Foucault referred to as ‘disciplinary’ power and that 
what he broadly called ‘securitization’ or ‘bio-power’. The disciplinary element was 
present in the selective procedure, according to which being overweight and smoking 
not only prevented Abu Mahmud, but his whole family, from being resettled. Yet as 
Abu Mahmud was free to choose between remaining fat or being resettled, there was 
also a distinct ‘laissez-faire’ element in the process.348  
The overall goal of the procedure, namely the acceptance of only at least relatively 
healthy people into the US nation, was indicative of modern ideas about the healthy 
body politic and bio-political population management that Foucault has so well 
described as first emerging during the 18th century.349 But the arguments of Abu 
Mahmud’s potential sponsors, that accepting an overweight man was too great of a 
financial risk, spoke much more about neo-liberal developments, in which more and 
more elements of social life previously controlled by the state become ruled by 
market logic and risk calculations. There was no guarantee that an overweight man 
would become sick, or that his slimmer version would remain healthy; these were 
calculations based on knowledge of health statistics and cost-analyses of differed 
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ailments, similar to those regularly carried out by health insurers. Abu Mahmud’s 
‘life-style change’ thus was clearly linked, and only explainable in reference to 
modern, and neo-liberal, forms of power and ideas about state and nation, and directly 
connected to techniques of power that maintained modern state sovereignty in the 
US.350  
Residency Permit 
Another important area of conformity I encountered related to the obtaining of a 
residency permit from the Syrian state. Although there appeared to be few instances 
of Iraqis being deported for not having such a permit, almost all interlocutors made 
important efforts to obtain one and keep it up to date. As laid out in chapter three, one 
possible explanation for this was that the residency permit was the only clear 
bureaucratic performance that Iraqis could undertake to demonstrate that they were 
willing to conform to the rules laid down by the Syrian state, and in this way 
demonstrate their allegiance and legality. Yet the permit was also necessary for 
interactions with the humanitarian sector and to receive health care, schooling and, 
occasionally was asked for by potential employers. This latter point was highlighted 
during the following episode.   
One of my Iraqi friends was a very cool young man in his early 20s called Hassan, 
who was the only Iraqi I knew who did not appear very concerned about the residency 
permit.  One day Hasan was visibly excited and happy, because he had received an 
offer to work as a waiter at a popular bar in the old city, a pleasant place at which he 
spent a lot of time as a customer. He had asked the (Syrian) owner for work and had 
been told to come to the bar that night at seven thirty. Hasan said that he was very 
happy because he very much needed money, and because it was a good place to work. 
Hasan was mainly concerned about what to do with this hair (which he wore in a 
large, curly ‘afro’), because the owner had mentioned it, and that he would have to tie 
it back in one way or another. Humorously, we discussed several options. Hasan was 
incredibly vain about his hair and received a lot of positive attention for it, especially 
from foreigners and more importantly perhaps from girls, so I could see that he 
understood his hair as something that that made him special.  
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Hasan speculated that maybe after two or three weeks he would be able to just leave 
the hair, which I told him I doubted, telling him that it was probably a health 
regulation or something similar. He also, somewhat bizarrely from my perspective, 
said that he wanted to tell the owner that it would be better if he drank some alcohol 
at work, as he worked much better then. Not much, Hasan added, just two or three 
glasses of Arak, that he was more lively and active. I, amused, cautioned him that that 
might not be something to float immediately, and also expressed scepticism about 
whether he would really work better after having drunk Arak. I said that if I were him 
I would tell the owner that of course, I would do anything with my hair that is 
required, and of course I never drank while on the job and so on, which in turn made 
Hasan laugh. As the afternoon wore on, I noticed Hasan checking his watch several 
times, and eventually he left early to ensure that he would be at the bar at seven thirty. 
Later, at around nine thirty, I was at another friends’ house, that of a Mexican girl 
who had invited me to come over to watch a movie. She had told me on the phone 
that Hasan was coming as well, which surprised me. Sitting on her wonderful terrace 
overlooking the old city and the Mount Qasīūn, she told me that she had bumped into 
Hasan on the street and he had been very excited about his new job. Then she bumped 
into him half an hour later again, and she asked him why he was not at the job. She 
said that there had been a problem because Hasan only had an expired residency 
permit. Hearing that, I felt terrible, as I knew how excited Hasan had been about this 
new opportunity; at the same time I worried that maybe there was a bigger problem 
relating to the permit.  
Later, Hasan turned up and told me what had happened: the owner of the bar had 
asked for his passport, and asked him about his residency permit. Hasan told him that 
he indeed had a permit, but that it was old, i.e. expired. The owner replied that Hasan 
needed a valid permit to work with him, and also that he would give his details to the 
government. Hasan seemed to be unclear about what that meant. He said that he 
would renew his permit the next day, and that the owner would then employ him; on 
the other hand he also said that apparently the other Iraqis working at the bar had 
some sort of official piece of paper saying that they were allowed to do so. Overall 
during the conversation Hasan seemed confident that he could work out the permit 
issue, saying more than once that he would sort it out the next day.  
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I asked Hasan what had happened with his permit, and why he had not renewed it. He 
told me, lowering his voice and switching partly to English, that his permit had 
expired one month ago. He had then not renewed it, because he thought that he was 
going to ‘travel’ (i.e. be resettled) anyway. I later pressed him a bit on this, and he 
told me, again lowering his voice, that he had not known for what reason he could 
claim a permit after the old one had expired, which had been for ‘health reasons’. 
Hasan thought that he could get a new permit through his two younger siblings, who 
were in school, which was a reason the whole family could obtain a permit. So he had 
called his parents and asked when they would be renewing their permit; it turned out 
that they were going to renew it in two months. So he decided to wait and go to renew 
it with them, because then he would get a one year extension. But now, because of the 
job, he would go and get one the next day. ‘Kuss Ukhta al-Iqama!’ he exclaimed.351 
As the ‘Abu Mahmoud’ episode above, Hasan’s story revealed intertwining relations 
of power at different levels of the state and social apparatus. It highlighted once again 
how the Syrian government did not use iron-clad bureaucratic and legal procedures to 
enforce the state’s sovereignty; Hasan had been confident to live for several months 
with an expired permit, until an opportune moment arose to renew it conveniently. As 
long as he would have been able to ensure no contact with Syrian officialdom, his 
plan would have probably worked without problems. Yet through his initiative of 
finding a job, he entered into an arena of life of greater concern to Syrian state 
institutions and thus increased his risk of becoming visible to government officials. 
Hasan’s expired permit was not picked up by a ministerial software-system that 
would issue him a letter to the address he was registered to, as it would have in a state 
with a high level of technology to manage its population. Instead it was noticed by a 
potential employer, who owned his business and who refused to hire Hasan without a 
valid residency permit. This refusal might have been a risk-management strategy, as 
certain ministries and security services irregularly conducted raids of businesses to 
check for foreign workers, presumably as a way to demonstrate concern with the 
labour market (there was some public discontent that Iraqis may be taking Syrian 
jobs) and to create opportunities to solicit bribes and remind business owners of the 
state’s power. Hasan’s potential employer, the bar owner, was aware of this risk and 
sought to minimize it by only employing Iraqis who had a valid residency permit. 
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Interestingly, no mention was made about an actual work permit, even though 
Hasan’s passport, like that of all Iraqis, had a stamped sign stating that he was not 
allowed to work in Syria. Once again, the state’s presence in Syria was created 
through ambiguity of rule, which necessitated a constant, and time consuming 
investigation of the current state of regulations, which created a very different effect 
of sovereignty than that of transparent, if unbendable, legal or bureaucratic rule.  
In the Syrian context of weak bureaucratic structures, the state became evident 
through the random and changing application of state rules by people who wielded 
some power to do so. State-governance was a constantly shifting set of rules that 
could appear in a different guise at every new step in life. Threateningly, the sanction 
for non-conformity with governance-rules could also shift: in Hasan’s case the 
sanction was not having a job, in other cases it could be a bribe, imprisonment or even 
deportation, or simply constant fear of being discovered. In other cases there might be 
no sanction at all. As in the case of Abu Mahmud, the technique of enforcement that 
urged Hasan towards renewing his permit was a mix of discipline and laissez-faire; 
disciplinarian in the sense that Hasan could only work this particular job with a 
permit, laissez-faire in the sense that Hasan was free to choose not to apply for 
employment, and take the risk of not renewing his permit.  
Considering these very particular, personal and micro-occasions emphasized that the 
construction of state sovereignty, i.e. the construction of state presence as an ultimate 
force to comply with, occurred through different techniques of power in different 
local contexts. This knowledge advances theoretical understanding of how 
sovereignty can be maintained as such a durable form of political organization, and of 
how sovereignty can adapt to important transformations in distribution and character 
of power. Understanding that sovereignty can exist in the context of very different 
social relations between population and government is also useful in furthering 
conceptual and political clarity on the relationship between the abstract ‘sovereign 
ideal’ and the varied, messy and contextual reality of sovereignty in physical life. 
While governments may mobilize and reference the sovereign ideal in a variety of 
different ways to construct their state’s sovereignty in some instances (especially 
during practices in spaces designated as international), in others, this ideal may be 
hardly recognizable from practices used by the same government to enforce its state’s 
sovereignty in other areas of life. From a more narrow, political point of view, 
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awareness that sovereign exclusions ran along different lines in different sovereign 
spaces would also be useful, as it would, for example, allow humanitarian 
organisations a much more nuanced and applicable understanding of where 
‘protection’ was needed and how it could be most usefully created. 
The following section looks at how interlocutors consciously contested and discussed 
certain managerial systems applied to them as migrants, and the sovereign exclusions 
that these systems contained. 
Contestation 
During my field work, I came across numerous expressions of discontent with the 
way Iraqis were being treated by international agencies and foreign states. The most 
frequent of these complaints concerned UNHCR and its chaotic, inconsistent 
categorization and services provided to Iraqis. The  lack of transparency surrounding 
UNHCR’s decision-making bred conspiracy theories and frustration. The Syrian 
government on the other hand was often praised by Iraqi interlocutors, who expressed 
gratitude for Syria’s open borders and the access to schools and health services. The 
following paragraphs discuss instances of contestation not of this relatively basic 
kind, but have been selected for their notability; either, because they show moments 
in which interlocutors disagreed with important aspects of the sovereign ideal, or 
because they describe actual clashes between Iraqi migrants and those governing 
them. These observations serve to analyse and understand yet again elements of the 
power and violence contained in the governance of Iraqi migration, and their relation 
to sovereign constructions. 
As already mentioned above, for around three months, as a volunteer teacher for a 
small NGO, I taught a seminar to a group of six young Iraqis between 18 and 22 years 
old. The seminar focused on different representations of Iraq in academic and popular 
texts, and discussions often concerned questions of nation and statehood. One 
afternoon, towards the end of a session, I asked the students whether they themselves 
felt Iraqi and how they defined their identity. Interestingly, the responses were very 
mixed. One young woman, who had already lived in Syria for five years, very clearly 
stated that she definitely felt Iraqi and was proud of her Iraqi identity. Another young 
woman, Rana, who had arrived in Syria only several weeks ago, was the most 
outspoken in saying that she did not feel Iraqi. Rana also quite passionately 
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questioned why people should have an identity attached to them just because they 
were born in a certain place. She felt that she had not found a place that was ‘home’ 
yet and that home was a place where you felt good and where you liked the ways of 
society. Iraq and being Iraqi for her was all about the traditions that were so strong in 
Iraq and that curtailed her life. I asked her whether nationality and nationhood not 
precisely transcended these traditions, but she did not agree. Rana was very vocal in 
expressing her dislike of being associated with a place whose rules and way of life she 
did not agree with. Rana’s friend Widat, who had also only left Baghdad around two 
months ago, tended to agree with her.  
The other students put up some resistance against Rana and Widat’s position. Hamud 
said that in other places people would treat you as a foreigner, to which Rana 
answered that one had to wait and see, whether this would really be the case. Hamud 
responded that here, in Syria, one could already see that this was the case. Another 
student called Amir probed Rana, asking her: “Then, where is home for you?”, to 
which Rana simply answered that she did not know yet where her home was, as she 
had not found a place to call home. An intense discussion had developed, as each 
student clearly felt strongly about this question of Iraqi identity. It was interesting 
how the majority of the students tried to convince Rana, who was openly straying 
away from Iraq, that indeed she was an Iraqi at heart and should acknowledge and 
celebrate this nationality. Yet Rana remained unconvinced. Further, it was notable, 
(yet inconclusive), that Rana and Widat had both experienced more time in Baghdad 
after the occupation and had only recently been introduced to the experience of being 
migrants, while the rest of the group, who expressed strong feelings of being Iraqi, 
had already spent several years in Damascus. Rana’s emotional distance from Iraqi 
identity and Iraqi nationhood not only went against dominant feelings of patriotism 
and national pride prevalent among Iraqi interlocutors. By questioning the necessity 
and requirement to develop positive attachment to the place one was born in and 
associated with, she contradicted one of the most fundamental assumptions of the 
sovereign ideal. By openly admitting that she had not yet found a place she was 
willing to attach herself to so closely as to base her identity on it, she indirectly called 
for a right to choose one’s nationality, in the emotional and patriotic sense, according 
to preference. This perspective stood in complete contradiction to the assumed unity 
of territory, population and government at the heart of the sovereign ideal.  
 226 
Another, interesting episode from these seminars occurred on a different afternoon, 
when a remarkable discussion was sparked during the reading and deconstruction of 
an extract from the book ‘The Lion in the Sand’ by Gerald Butt. ‘The Lion in the 
Sand’ contains the memories of upper class British about life in the Middle East 
during the mandate period. I had chosen the text as an example for (from my 
perspective) dreadful, orientalist portrayals of the Middle East. To my astonishment 
all students in the group stated that they had enjoyed the text, partly because it was 
easy to read and understand. They had found the reading enjoyable and funny. I hid 
my surprise (if not to say shock) and asked the group what they had liked about it. 
Several students pointed out various instances in which the author described positive 
aspects of Arab behaviour, for example the ability of Arabs to distinguish between a 
government, and a person who was a subject of this government. This observation 
referred to a section of the article describing an anti-British riot by school boys, 
during which the boy’s British teacher decided to flee. During the teacher’s attempt to 
depart, his car stalled. In response, the rioting boys swarmed around the car to help 
the teacher, pushing his car home while chanting anti-Churchill slogans.  
While I had interpreted this passage as a patronizing example of illogical and silly 
behaviour by Arabs, the students perceived it as an example of Arab kindness, and 
ability to distinguish between a person and their government. Reflecting on this 
question, a small discussion ensued about the students’ relationship with Americans 
and the US-led occupation of Iraq. Some students argued that their relationship with 
Americans was good, and separate from the policies of the US government. Amer 
pointed out that he had 96 American friends on the social networking website 
Facebook. But Hamud argued that if he saw an American as a soldier, he was against 
him, and that an occupying force could never, ever respect the culture of the country 
that it was occupying – simply by the fact that it was an occupying force. This 
position received some support. Karima also came out strongly against the Bush 
administration, as it had been its decision to occupy Iraq. Partly due to the instruction 
received from the directors of the NGO on behalf of which I was teaching, which 
included avoiding overtly political discussions, I steered the discussion back to the 
text.  
The second point that the students used an example of how ‘The Lion in the Sand’ 
described Arabs in a positive light was its consistent repetition of Arab people as 
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highly generous and hospitable, which delighted and surprised the European 
colonialists. The students expressed some pride in this ‘Arab’ trait, which they agreed 
with. As I was keen for the students to consider the text more critically, I tried to steer 
them towards applying some of Edward Said’s methods of analysis, which the 
seminar had discussed the week before. Further, I asked the group about what they 
had learned about the colonial period in school (both in Iraq and Syria, as some 
students had attended secondary school in Damascus), which brought on some 
interesting points. Clearly, the students felt some embarrassment and sheepishness to 
talk about their former education. Some started by making general statements such as 
“it was all negative, they [the British and the Americans] were the thieves who 
wanted to steel our oil, who were going to take away our culture and so on”, adding 
discrediting remarks about the teaching they had received in Iraq. Amir added that 
there had never been any discussion, that they just learnt the facts from the books and 
repeated them at the exam. Overall, it was clear that they did not feel very 
comfortable talking with me about the way that the ‘West’ and colonialism had been 
taught to them at school. They discredited the teaching strongly and when I did 
managed to get them to tell me some things they had been taught, they repeated a few 
points but made it clear that they themselves did not believe in them.  
At the end of the class, I gave them, very briefly, my interpretation of ‘The Lion in 
the Sand’, pointing out our different positionality, and how interesting it had been for 
me to hear what they had to say about it. I said that I had focused much more on the 
negative ways in which Arabs were represented in the text, on passages in which 
violence and silly, childish behaviour were associated with Arabs. I pointed them to 
paragraphs in which Britain’s overall role in the Middle East was presented as a 
benevolent source of order, criticizing this portrayal. After listening to my 
interpretation, the students were quiet, until Rana said, with some passion, but also 
laughingly: “Yes, what you say is also true, but we see these matters differently, 
because we are fed up with focusing on the negative!”  
To me, as a field researcher, this episode principally highlighted the way that my 
interlocutors and Iraqi fellow-students contested my own assumptions, attitudes and 
projections about them. Regarding myself as a critical thinker, politically supportive 
of the emancipation of people in Middle East, and critical of (post)-colonial and racist 
stereo-typing, my mind was primed to detect demeaning, orientalist attitudes. It 
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therefore came as an even greater shock when my Arab friends and students enjoyed 
and thought highly of a text, which, from my perspective, was rife with orientalist 
condescension. Rather than drawing negative lessons from ‘The Lion in the Sand’, the 
students focused on aspects of it that made them feel good, and happy and proud to be 
Arabs. And even more interestingly, the lesson that they considered as emerging from 
the episode of the rioting school-boys, was the ability of Arabs to distinguish between 
their anger about the politics of a government, and their position towards an 
individual ruled by this government. The, from my perspective, arrogantly amused 
tone of the author that I had picked up on as an indication of his patronizing view of 
‘silly’ and ‘irrational’ Arabs, had been completely lost on them. This latter point was 
relevant for the analysis of state sovereignty, as it again pointed to local 
manifestations about how state sovereignty was lived, understood and felt about in the 
Middle East. The British author and I perceived the discrepancy between the school 
boys’ singing of anti-Churchill songs and their helpful attitude towards the British 
teacher as illogical and surprising, because an effective analysis of colonialism should 
have (from our perspective) understood the British teacher as a representative of 
British sovereignty, along the lines of the ideal unity of government, territory and 
people. Yet from the perspective of the Arab school boys and the Iraqi students, this 
connection was far from obvious, which indicated that in their minds, sovereignty did 
not stipulate such unity, or any form of representative link between government and 
people.  
The other interesting moment of contestation was delivered in the seminar’s punch-
line, which lay in Rana’s retort that they were ‘fed up’ with the negative view of the 
West that had been spoon-fed to students under Saddam Hussein. The students had 
experienced the worst form of intervention and aggression by the US and the UK, 
which in many ways confirmed the ‘anti-colonial’ teaching they had received in Iraq. 
Yet their resentment against the authoritarian and dogmatic teaching received during 
the Saddam government also ran deep. Not wanting to mimic the opinions that they 
had perceived as being forced upon them during earlier schooling, and indeed 
expressing embarrassment of having conformed to it, the students interpreted ‘The 
Lion in the Sand’ in the opposite manner. The students’ position thus reflected the 
different forms of violence that had sadly been visited on them through the various, 
and particularly aggressive forms of state-sovereignty enforcement they had 
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experienced. The US-led invasion, based on the most brute-form of sovereign 
violence and hubris, had exposed the students to deadly manifestations of state power, 
as well as displaying to them the apparent weakness and ‘badness’ of the Iraqi nation, 
territory and state. The experience of this violence mobilized resistance to US 
constructions of Iraq and opposition to the continued presence of US soldiers on Iraqi 
territory. Yet the oppressive experiences the students had experienced through the 
Iraqi government previous to the invasion also meant that they felt resistance to the 
ways in which Iraqi state sovereignty had been forced into their lives, for example 
through dogmatic education, to which no resistance had been tolerated. Various 
constructions of sovereignty, in this case extreme and highly visible, shaped the way 
students’ considered their Iraqi identity, their stance towards the US invasion and 
reaction to how the Middle East was represented in different texts.  
Turning now to a very different, and perhaps more sobering incident of contestation 
and opposition of Iraqis against the migration-governance applied to them, the 
following paragraphs describe a visit to a UNHCR processing centre.352 At this 
centre, where a number of administrative and bureaucratic procedures concerning 
UNHCR’s Iraq programme were undertaken, every Tuesday Iraqis could ask about 
the status of their resettlement file. One day, a young Iraqi woman and I visited the 
centre together to enquire whether there was any news about her file. As we were 
aware that there would be hundreds of other people approaching the centre that day, 
we prepared for a long wait and arrived at around 7:30 am, when there were already 
200-300 people standing in front of the centre, a relatively make-shift building 
constructed from plywood and metal containers. As the hours wore on and the heat 
increased, with no shelter or sitting area provided, some women around us began to 
become restless.353 Since the early morning, a UNHCR employee, a young Syrian 
man, had been acting as a form of crowd-controller. At first, he had handed out paper 
slips with numbers that allocated a place in the queue. As the day wore on, he became 
more and more aggressive and agitated in his announcements and attempts to 
convince people without numbers to return home.  
The longer we waited and the hotter it became, the more anxious and unhappy the 
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353 The waiting crowd of perhaps 600 people was separated into men and women; both groups had a 
separate entry. It was notable that the men were processed much faster, possibly due to a greater fear 
that men would not meekly accept the bad conditions and the hours-long wait. 
 230 
slowly diminishing crowd of women became. We had now been shouted at several 
times by the UNHCR employee, who would appear about every 45 minutes to let the 
next set of people (“All numbers below 160 please step forward!”) into the building. 
Several times he had angrily shouted that people without a number should not wait 
but go home, that people from areas other than Damascus were not going to be served 
here, and that there were “NO MORE NUMBERS!” today and so forth. He was 
looking harassed, even though the crowd was relatively calm. We were noticing that 
the men were being processed faster; despite there having been many more men than 
women at the beginning of the day, at the end, the last hour perhaps, there were only 
women left. I wondered whether the men were being processed faster because they 
were assumed to become aggressive more quickly in protest against the wait and bad 
treatment. 
The sun was getting hotter and more signs of exhaustion appeared in the crowd. One 
woman was sitting on a single plastic chair with her handbag over her head to shield 
against the burning sun. Then an old woman in a black abaya started becoming anrgy 
about not being able to stand in the sun any longer, saying loudly to the UNHCR man 
that this was not an appropriate treatment and adding “We are not Jews!” which made 
my friend laugh. After the UNHCR guy had argued with her and she kept shouting, a 
Syrian soldier dressed in uniform and carrying a gun, who had already intervened a 
couple of times when minor scuffles had broken out, walked up to the old woman and 
quite rudely told her to calm down, which she eventually did, still standing in the sun. 
I was struck by the fact that neither the UNHCR employee, nor the guards, nor the 
soldier, suggested any way of alleviating her pain, or offered to bring her a chair from 
inside the building, or some water or any form of assistance. The soldier’s appearance 
sorted things out. A related, memorable instance was a calm discussion between the 
soldier and a woman in which I just overheard him saying “You don’t have a 
residence permit?” and saw the woman talking to him in a calming-down, 
sycophantic manner. The effect of this discussion was that the bystanders, who had 
been pressing down on the entrance, moved away (me included) to avoid the soldier 
and the discussion.  
Unlike the previous episodes, this visit to the UNHCR site described a very visible 
experience of exclusion, and of boundaries being forced into the lives of Iraqis in 
Syria. It also instructed about the ultimate violence and force that backed up these 
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boundaries, which taught Iraqis that they were sovereignty-less and without a 
government-protector. The attempts by waiting Iraqi women to complain against the 
treatment handed out to them by UNHCR, were noteworthy as they voiced 
disagreement with the actual rules of the UNHCR’s game. In this way they 
qualitatively differed from attempts to defraud UNHCR (discussed below), which 
were rather efforts to manipulate the rules in one’s favour. Yet the complaints 
observed during the long wait were perhaps chiefly striking for their weakness. 
Despite the considerable discomfort of an hours-long wait, standing in the sun without 
water or shade, hardly any signals were made to the UNHCR clerk that the women 
had had enough or demanded help.  
Throughout its rhetoric, the UNHCR described Iraqi refugees as innocent victims in 
need of help, and described itself as the agency in charge of delivering compassionate 
assistance. This rhetoric suggested that the agency was Iraqi refugees’ interim 
protector to ensure that the citizenship rights of sovereignty-less refugees would be 
met. Yet the treatment experienced while attempting to access a service (resettlement 
enquiries) that the UNHCR had created on its own volition, enforced more than any 
other situation that I observed in Syria the impression that Iraqis were not sovereign 
subjects but non-sovereign lives under the power of whichever agency interested in 
governing them. Given this discrepancy, much more protest than feeble complaints 
described above could have been expected. The weakness of the protests could clearly 
be explained in reference to the Syrian context, and the manner in which the UNHCR 
relied on Syrian internal security forces to regulate and quell any visible complaints, 
as was demonstrated by the intervention of the Syrian soldier. Iraqis knew that any 
form of vocal complaining could land them in hot water with Syrian authorities, who 
would not tolerate any form or sign of unrest or social instability and would come 
down hard on any person involved. The fact that even the complaints of an old 
woman in her 70s, who raised her voice after hours in the heat, were not treated with 
compassion but provoked the intervention of a security guard, showed how delicate 
the situation was. In Syria, where elderly persons were generally treated with 
particular respect, the incident was doubly remarkable, and showed the reaction when 
‘elderly persons at risk’, in UNHCR parlance, strayed from their assigned post of 
meek victim to a demander of rights. The convergence of UNHCR bureaucracy and 
Syrian state violence in the disciplining of potentially unruly Iraqis once more showed 
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how the conventional dichotomy of authoritarian and liberal power was blurred in 
practice, and highlighted the violence that ultimately backed up liberal forms of 
power when they were put to the test.  
The above discussed episodes only show a small selection from numerous 
observations of Iraqi contestation and protests, which albeit remained generally small-
scale, private and under the radar. Other minor and major contestations included, for 
example, the ad-busting of the UNHCR’s logo, which shows two hands shielding a 
sexless human figure, by an Iraqi friend. He digitally manipulated the logo so that the 
two hands opened and left the figure unguarded. Another interlocutor, a gay Iraqi man 
in his early 40s, openly attracted attention through his highly camp wardrobe and 
mannerisms, in this way contesting a whole host of dominant notions applied to him 
as an Iraqi migrant man in Syria. The students at ISP engaged in innumerable acts of 
small and larger protests, whether it concerned deliberately crossing set-in-stone rules 
when the directors were not looking, or eloquently voicing disagreements with the 
NGO’s principles and base-line assumptions. The broad lesson that could be gleaned 
from these observations, in addition to the theoretical questions of power and 
sovereignty, was that migrant-governance emerged out of a thick, and dynamic, 
interaction between actors mobilizing their power to influence each other. This power 
could lie in expensive bureaucratic structures and assumptions about the other as 
powerless, or in the ability to manipulate these assumptions and contradict them. Yet 
it was only from the interaction of people and their different ways of influencing each 
others’ actions that the overall ‘power’ or effect of power appeared.  
Deception and disobedience 
The following, last section of this chapter focuses on episodes in which Iraqi migrants 
applied various forms of trickery and deception to undermine and manipulate the 
governance applied to them by various actors in Syria. In the UK (as in other 
European countries), migrants are often negatively stereotyped as fraudsters and 
cheats, who misrepresent their situation to selfishly obtain benefits and residency 
permits. It is not at all my intention to support this blanket, and often racist, 
assumption about migrants, which I firmly reject. The following analysis of how 
deception formed part of power relations related to state sovereignty is not aimed at 
creating any form of moral judgement over those who consciously deceived. The 
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power and assumptions found in humanitarian programs aimed at Iraqis themselves 
also contained, in a less visible way, deceptions and lies about these programmes’  
links to vested interests that had little to do with Iraqi welfare. From this perspective, 
it appeared as a hardly avoidable outcome that the interactions between Iraqis and 
humanitarian actors were riddled with half truths and misrepresentations.  
One early, dark and rainy evening in January 2010, I was riding a public minibus in 
central Damascus together with one of my Iraqi friends, a young woman called 
Karima.354 We were both on our way home from the flat of the NGO Iraqi Student 
Project (ISP), where I had taught a seminar to a group of Iraqi students. As we 
chatted, squeezed into the backseat of the serviis, Karima’s mobile rang. She took the 
mobile from her bag, looked at it, sighed, and obviously did not want to answer. She 
said: “It’s the UN, but they are calling for my aunt, she gave them my number. I don’t 
want to answer them.” She explained that her aunt had gone to Baghdad after her 
three-month residency in Syria had expired, and that she had given Karima’s number 
to the UNHCR in case they would call. “I don’t want to answer because I don’t want 
to lie to them”, Karima said. I asked whether the UNHCR were not allowed to know 
about her aunt’s expired residency, but Karima explained that it had to do with 
another matter.  
Her aunt, who had obtained her three-month residency for health reasons, did not 
want to obtain a residency permit through UNHCR, as she wanted to return to Iraq 
regularly. Obtaining a permit via the UNHCR protection paper included a stamp into 
the passport stating that a return to Iraq was not possible, as one was supposedly 
threatened in Iraq. Karima said: “She has her daughter there [in Baghdad], and also 
she and her husband worked and now they are retired so they receive a pension, 
which she wants to collect.” Karima added that her aunt did not want to tell the 
UNHCR that she was in Baghdad because before, when the aunt had staid in Syria, 
she had received money from the UNHCR: “They were old, so they received money”, 
Karima said, adding “yes, they were greedy, you don’t want to be a relative of people 
like that, they took everything they could get, even the food, they received food and 
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money from the UN when they were here and then they lived off this money and did 
not spend their pension, they were here and spent this money on touristy things.”355  
Karima’s mobile rang again; this time she answered. I heard her explain that there 
were two numbers for the person the caller was looking for; that this was Karima’s 
number, which had been provided when the other person did not have a phone. She 
said that she did not know what was going on with that person and that anyway she 
did not have a clue. Then she hung up. Karima had been speaking quite fast and 
slightly grumpily, it was clear to me that she did not enjoy doing this and that she was 
annoyed with her aunt for putting her into this situation. Nevertheless, she told me 
very freely about the cheating committed by her aunt (although once we left the 
serviis, it was also clear to me that she did not want the other friends who were this us 
to hear about it, as we changed the topic). 
In the backseat, Karima continued talking about her aunt: “Then one day the UNHCR 
called and said that my aunt had received resettlement to Sweden.” I exclaimed: 
“Wow, so they got what everyone wants!” and Karima said “Yes, what everyone 
wants.” I asked why her aunt had been selected, and Karima said that she had no idea 
and that she also did not understand why they were selected, as her aunt and uncle 
were old and had very good lives in Baghdad, collecting USD 1500 in retirement 
money and living in a big house in a good neighbourhood and that they were safe, as 
they had had no association with the military or the former government. “They are 
having the life that we used to have in Baghdad, they used to be our neighbours and 
they live in a good neighbourhood. The money they collect is really good. Other 
people are in a much worse situation.” She explained that her father had been a pilot 
in the military, and therefore had been in a very bad security situation after the war. (I 
later learned that her father had disappeared, in all likelihood killed by militants due 
to his association with the former government’s army). Karima expressed a lack of 
understanding that her aunt and uncle were selected despite their age. “He is so old, 
over 70. They should send people who can still make something out of their life. Why 
do they want to start a completely new life in Sweden, with a new language, a new 
everything? They are old.”  
                                                
355 This section based on Fieldnote 190110. 
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This episode summarises several complex layers of deception, misunderstanding and 
disagreement in the relationship between Karima, her aunt and the UNHCR. Its 
emphasis lies on the aunt’s successful manipulation of the UNHCR’s humanitarian 
‘priority profiles’ (which included the category ‘older person at risk’), to her and her 
husband’s benefit. The deception, which presumably involved hiding from UNHCR 
clerks the facts of her pension and property in Baghdad, and her frequent return-trips 
to the city, not only resulted in cash benefits paid out in Syria, but also to a 
resettlement ticket to Sweden, which would include additional benefit payments from 
the Swedish state. More importantly for our analysis, Karima’s aunt’s deception 
resulted in a failure of the UNHCR’s stated goal to resettle only those refugees with 
the greatest needs, for whom integration or return was permanently impossible. Not 
only was return to Iraq an evident option for the aunt, but her state-pension and 
trouble-free travel powerfully dispelled UNHCR’s construction of a refugee as a 
‘sovereignty-less’ person, a person without the protection of a state. Clearly the aunt 
had a stable, and at least partly positive relationship with the Iraqi state. Through the 
aunt’s deceit, the effect of the UNHCR’s intervention on Iraqi daily life was turned 
into something completely different than what was portrayed in the UNHCR’s 
publications; the organisation’s powerful constructions about Iraqis’ ‘needs’ were 
revealed as mythical, or at least badly implemented. Further, the image of UNHCR as 
an all-knowing, fair, quasi-sovereign was shattered.  
While Karima disapproved of her aunt’s behaviour, which she characterised as 
‘greedy’, she also criticised the UNHCR’s role and selection process that enabled her 
aunt to magnify her deceit from cash support to receiving resettlement. Echoing the 
opinions of several observers I encountered during field research, Karima disagreed 
with the UNHCR’s focus on vulnerabilities, which selected people with few skills and 
opportunities for a life abroad. The selection was considered as illogical and unfair, 
not only resettling people who might in fact be better off remaining in Syria, as they 
lacked the skills to succeed in a foreign environment, but also depriving those who 
could indeed make the most of resettlement of a chance to begin a new life abroad. 
Instead of achieving the image of a compassionate and generous protector, the 
UNHCR appeared as an illogical, unfair, unpredictable and random patron-sovereign, 
who was not using available resources in the best possible way. Karima also drew 
attention to the potentially fatal effect of the UNHCR’s political preferences in 
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choosing beneficiaries. Pointing out her aunt’s relatively secure situation, Karima 
compared it with the heightened danger that her father had found himself in, due to 
his position as a retired pilot in Iraq’s former army. Karima’s father’s association with 
the army had not only been a prime reason for her family’s near-immediate flight to 
Syria after the invasion in 2003, but had, in all likelihood, also resulted in his murder 
on the border between Iraq and Syria, where militias maintained blacklists of former 
officers. As discussed in chapter four, the UNHCR’s programmes explicitly excluded 
persons associated with the former regime, who were suspected of having participated 
in war crimes or crimes against humanity. This essentially political choice was lost on 
Karima, who as a consequence perceived UNHCR criteria not as focused on the most 
vulnerable and endangered refugees, but as incomprehensible and strange. Yet the 
actual, quasi-sovereign right of UNHCR to categorize and select Iraqis, and decide, 
via resettlement, on their location and citizenship, was not questioned. As most 
interlocutors, she accepted UNHCR as a power-that-is, without wondering about the 
organisation’s legitimacy or raison d’être, indicating a relationship to government and 
authority not shaped by ideas and expectations of representation, but of 
unpredictability and beyond influence.  
Karima, who had a great sense of humour, was also a good source on the ways in 
which the students participating in the ISP programme sought to undermine or 
contradict the heavy, quasi-parental authority that the ISP’s directors (a husband and 
wife team called Gabe and Theresa) attempted to extend over them. The ISP 
environment was governed by certain rules, which were displayed on posters around 
the apartment, admonishing students to be on time, not hang around outside the 
entrance to avoid attention, to listen attentively to fellow students and so forth. In 
particular Theresa tried to impress certain values and ideas, one of which was her 
strong dislike of any romantic attachments by the students, which in her view would 
impede studies and should wait for later. Nevertheless, as the following extracts show, 
behind the director’s backs, crushes and erotic tensions were a constant, and popular 
theme among the ‘ISP kids’. These tensions may not show an obvious link to 
constructions of state sovereignty. Yet as the power over the Iraqi students that Gabe 
and Theresa were able to obtain was closely linked to they way sovereignty awarded 
more or less powerful positions to people according to their citizenship (see chapter 
six), it was noteworthy to observe how the students sought to undermine this power in 
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the most minimal way, which allowed them to maintain small spaces of freedom and 
independence from the ISP directors’ overwhelming presence in their lives. As 
described in chapter six, several times the ISP directors expelled students from the 
programme for unclear, and minor digressions of the rules, creating fear and 
insecurity among the students. Even little misdemeanours, or simple expressions that 
one might not agree with the director’s prescriptions, where therefore considered 
risky; a further reason why any mocking or disobedience had to be kept strictly secret. 
In this sense, the strategy to (secretly) emphasize activities that the directors’ strongly 
disapproved of showed an example of how even the smallest areas of life could 
become arenas in which applications of power, linked to sovereign constructions, 
were contested.  
One weekend afternoon I had invited a group of friends for a late biryani lunch to the 
flat I shared with another student. Karima also joined, and at some point we began 
chatting about ISP. Somehow we started chatting about Ian, one of the former 
volunteer teachers who spent around two years with ISP, and who had recently 
travelled back to the UK. I said that he had told me he was travelling to Sweden, 
because after all that was where his fiancée lived, who, scandalously, was a former 
ISP student. I said this with a grin, to inform Karima that I knew about this 
controversial and slightly taboo story. Karima laughed and said that he had told the 
directors that he was going to the UK, but that he probably lied and was in fact in 
Sweden. In the next couple of minutes we filled each other in about how much we 
knew about the incident, Karima confirming that Ian had said that he had immediately 
fallen in love with the girl, who was later resettled to Sweden. We both giggled and 
smiled throughout this conversation, aware that it was a ‘naughty’ thing that Ian had 
done, as a romance between a foreign ISP teacher and an ISP student was even worse 
that a regular romantic attachment an ISP student may have. It was clearly something 
that the directors were not happy about, especially as only Iraqi students without a 
chance of getting resettled were supposed to join the programme. I also said that I had 
been told that Ian had converted to Islam and Karima then added that ah, maybe that 
was why he had always asked them things about Islam, like how one prayed and 
things like this (again smiles and giggles).  
Karima then started talking about erotic tension between the volunteer teachers and 
ISP students, asking whether I knew who Andrew was, one of the teachers, with 
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slightly red hair, who was quite good looking. She said that when he first started 
teaching, all the girls were fancying him: “You know how Shiriin and Rana are, they 
really liked him – but even I liked him!” It had then had come as a huge 
disappointment, when in the second or third week, he had mentioned that his 
girlfriend or fiancée was coming to visit. Karima – for comic effect – sighed 
dramatically, grimaced and repeated how all the girls had been disappointed when he 
said that (indirectly of course pointing out the hope/dream/fantasy that they must have 
had about themselves becoming his girlfriend). Karima carried on talking about a new 
female teacher called Seema, saying that she was very attractive and that the boys all 
thought that she was good looking. The director Theresa had told the young men in 
advance: “There is this new teacher, Seema, she is very good looking, but don’t look 
at her like that!” Karima repeated this at least twice, raising her voice in a strict tone 
to mimic Theresa, saying that Theresa had repeated “but don’t look at her like that!”. 
I answered that this was a silly move, because it would get everyone even more 
curious and excited about the new teacher, to which Karima replied “Of course!”. In 
fact, she added, after that episode, fellow-student Hamud had said that he now was 
already in love with Seema, even though he had never met her! I then asked whether 
all the ISP students were single and didn’t get a straight answer out of her, her answer 
was like this: “No, no, they are seeing people. Theresa always says to us ‘Don’t see 
anyone, don’t have a boyfriend, don’t get married before finishing your studies’, but 
no one can do that…four years in college…how can you…”. 356 
These undercurrents, which were kept strictly secret from the ISP directors by talking 
about them in Arabic and out of class, could be read as small attempts to weaken the 
overwhelming and decisive power that the directors wielded over the students’ future. 
Such expressions of opposition to the directors’ vision of how Iraqi students should 
and could achieve a good and successful life, revealed the power structures inherent 
in the presumed liberating and self-less NGO programme. They showed that rather 
than fostering an atmosphere of truthful, trusting learning and intellectual growth, the 
ISP programme attempted to shape the participants according to very narrow ideas of 
what constituted acceptable behaviour. While these observations did not teach 
immediate insights into questions of sovereignty, they highlighted the intense power 
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relations contained in humanitarian aid projects, and how power was contained in 
well-intentioned ideas and imaginations. 
Employees of humanitarian organisations were aware of the deception attempted by 
some Iraqis. One afternoon I was having coffee at the house of a Syrian friend who 
had worked at the IOM for several months, dealing directly with Iraqi resettlement 
cases. My friend’s  aunt (here referred to as ‘GA’), who volunteered at a small, Syrian 
charity working with Iraqis, was also present. GA had taken the post of volunteer 
(which awarded a small stipend), after she was suddenly fired from her previous job 
in the public sector, in retribution against her husband’s human rights’ work (her 
husband, a human rights lawyer, was at the time of the interview serving a three-year 
prison sentence). GA started talking about her work, immediately mentioning that 
there were a lot of problems and a lot of corruption. She claimed that Iraqis engaged 
in false and corrupt behaviour in order to obtain aid. She described how since the 
UNHCR started providing money to women whose husbands had been killed, married 
Iraqi women with children moved to Syria with fake death certificates for their 
husbands, to claim the aid. While the husband continued working in Iraq, the woman 
claimed the extra money in Syria. GA's eyes were wide open when talking about this 
and she was relatively animated. Her outrage about this behaviour appeared moderate 
to me, it was more a description of facts about life, rather than an angry rant. "There 
are lots of problems" she said repeatedly. GA added that once the nuns started 
providing aid in Masakin Barza (an area of Damascus), Iraqis from all over the city 
start going there to claim aid. Another scam that she described related to UNHCR aid 
provided to victims of domestic violence, in which women came and claimed that 
their husbands beat and abused them, even if this was not the case.357 
Another perspective on apparent fraudulent behaviour was offered by a UNHCR 
official, who during an interview highlighted how the organisation was highly 
sensitive to a perceived, constant threat of fraud on behalf of Iraqis, and how 
bureaucratic structures were put in place to minimize the perceived danger of 
cheating. He explained:   
At the same time exactly because there is such a high number, we have to ensure 
that there is enough control measures to exclude possibilities of fraud. Because 
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like I said, exactly because these people are so desperate, there could be a lot of 
potential fraud attempts. And this ranges from, you know, identity fraud, people 
coming up with stories that have never happened, people coming up with fake 
children or family members that have died, which they said made them leave the 
country, people coming up with a lot of false documents and also attempts to 
contact various people in UNHCR, in IOM, outside, in government bodies, in 
immigration departments for example, and offering bribes. And I can relate to 
that, I can understand where that desire comes from, because for each of these 
refugees … every time on Tuesdays, I’m there every day and it's very interesting 
because it helps you get the vibe of what's the feeling among the community, you 
will have a lot of people telling  you ‘I am the most deserving’. And you can  
understand why they are saying that. (…) 
Now the way resettlement works here, is again one measure to exclude fraud. 
The resettlement unit is quite big, it's about 60 people and we don't do self-
referrals. So we don’t select which cases we are going to look at. We get these 
cases preselected by other units of UNHCR. So we have this first step done by 
other units, so that offers us a degree of protection. (…) 
We have a scheduling team. The scheduling team randomizes the selection of 
case workers and interpreters for particular cases, which again excludes any 
possibilities for the interpretation team to decide which case should go, and 
decide who should deal with that. So that also does not happen. Then the case 
worker is selected randomly, the interview is conducted, after the interview the 
case worker recommends to the seniors, not a decision but a recommendation, 
whether this case should go ahead with resettlement or not. If that 
recommendation is approved then the case will be sent to our regional hub. The 
regional hub in Beirut then does another check of the case and then the case is 
submitted to the resettlement country.358 
In this account, the Iraqi population does not appear any longer as the downtrodden 
and traumatised community that is presented in NGO and UN publications, and media 
reports. Instead, Iraqis are described as a population that is mischievous and 
treacherous, which had to be kept under strict disciplinary control so as not to 
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undermine the supposed fairness of the systematic delivery of humanitarianism. These 
extracts highlighted once again the disciplinary element contained in the aid 
bureaucracy, and the expectations about the attitudes and behaviours that beneficiaries 
should display. The turn towards increasingly draconian measures to discipline and 
enforce humanitarian bureaucracy has been documented since the earliest days of 
humanitarian activity in the Middle East.359  
Relating these observations to questions of sovereignty, it became clear that Iraqi 
deception also posed an important dilemma for UNHCR’s primary, sovereign logic, 
on which its interventions in refugee lives were based. Iraqis’ fraud attempts not only 
dispelled the fiction of a partnership of solidarity between humanitarians and 
beneficiaries, but also undermined the idea that Iraqis could become sovereign 
citizens, who understood their relationship to government as one of rights and duties, 
in which the government was understood as a part of the population via 
representation. If Iraqis would lie to the UNHCR, who was acting as their care-taker 
sovereign as long as they were left without any other sovereign protector, how could 
they hold the potential to become honest citizens on whichever foreign territory that 
would eventually offer them a ‘durable solution’? Iraqi deception undermined a whole 
host of humanitarian fictions about refugee-hood, which were linked to modern 
sovereignty, and upon which the humanitarian edifice rested.  
In this regard it was interesting to compare the way the Syrian volunteer GA spoke 
about Iraqi deception, with the descriptions given by the interviewed UNHCR 
official. GA spoke about the various scams she had witnessed quite neutrally, but still 
with a degree of disgust and rejection. She clearly did not consider the Iraqis’ 
behaviour as particularly surprising, yet judged it morally and broadly as a human 
failure. Her narrative was unsympathetic to Iraqis, whose image emerged as 
unpleasant and deceitful, especially as they were, in her view and in summary, 
stealing from nuns and volunteers. The UNHCR manager on the other hand 
immediately offered an explanation of Iraqi behaviour that fitted into the 
humanitarian narrative: Iraqis deceived, because they were desperate. Going further, 
and presenting an image of fundamental similarity and solidarity between him and the 
Iraqi ‘beneficiaries’, he stated that he understood Iraqis’ behaviour, adding that he 
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would be acting in the same way if he were in their situation. Instead of engaging in 
moral judgement, the UNHCR management used apparently neutral, technical 
solution to the rationally understandable, but problematic Iraqi deception. Education 
through leaflets and explanations during appointments, discipline and bureaucratic 
control-measures were devised to minimise the opportunities and possibilities that 
Iraqis might engage in fraud. But evidently, UNHCR also had to keep this aspect of 
Iraqi behaviour under wraps: nowhere in any UNHCR publication on Iraqi refugees 
was the problem of frauds, lies and deceit discussed, even though it was clearly a 
major concern that had led to operational restructuring, as well as to mistakes in 
selection procedures. Manipulation, secrecy and deceit were thus a significant feature 
in the daily-life encounters between Iraqis in Syria and humanitarian governance. 
These moments formed part of the emerging governance and management of Iraqi 
migration. As Iraqis tried to manipulate and deflect humanitarian governance and 
power, organisations reacted with bureaucratic changes, further education or sanctions 
aimed at making Iraqis conform with humanitarian ideas and rules.  
Conclusion 
If all people who I encountered during fieldwork were difficult to categorize, the Iraqi 
interlocutors that I sought out were even more so. This group of around 50 men, 
women and children came from very different backgrounds, pursued different 
lifestyles and had wildly different personalities. Considering this diversity it appeared 
meaningless to attempt to analyse this group according to standard categories such as 
gender or wealth; rather my research soon began to focus on how interlocutors dealt 
with the condition they all shared, that of being exiled or migrants in Syria. This 
shared condition placed all interlocutors into the focus of sovereignty-constructing 
power, which was applied to them by various institutions and organisations. How 
interlocutors reacted to this power, how they conformed to, contested and disputed it 
in the day-to-day was the focus of this chapter. These interactions on the one hand 
demonstrated the effects of sovereignty-constructing power on intimate aspects of 
Iraqi lives, but on the other also showed the limits of this power, which appeared 
whenever Iraqis’ words and actions contradicted or undermined it. As the 
observations and analyses of this chapter showed, such undermining took place in 
direct and indirect ways. Directly, when Iraqis engages in behaviour and voiced 
opinions that weakened and criticised fundamental notions or routines demanded 
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from them by state and non-state agents. Indirectly, when such non-conforming 
behaviour forced ostensibly liberal agents of power to reveal the violence that 
ultimately backed up their non-violent techniques of bureaucracy and service-
provision. Such momentary destruction of the self-image and self-portrayal of 
humanitarian agents shattered their portrayal as a meek protector of right-less Iraqis, 
and instead revealed their connection to and application of a certain understanding of 
sovereignty, in which Iraqis in fact where not holders of sovereign right, but non-
sovereign lives over which these humanitarian agents could claim control.  
Iraqis’ reactions to the bureaucratic, biopolitical and violent forms of power focused 
on their lives were individual, rather than organised. They arose mostly out of 
‘instinctive’ frustrations and rejections of daily-life experiences with sovereignty-
constructing power, rather than conscious efforts to weaken or change such power. 
These individualised reactions could be in part explained with the individualised 
nature of many of the biopolitical techniques of power highlighted in this chapter, 
which targeted Iraqis very specifically according to their particular situation 
(demonstrating one of the benefits of such techniques, which, in the absence of 
collectivity, are much more difficult to reveal as power, and are much harder to 
resist). The absence of organised responses was also connected to the Syrian context, 
in which any form of social organisation was a likely target for government 
suppression. But beyond these contextual insights, this observation contains important 
methodological and theoretical implications and emphasises how power that is 
diffused through daily-life is met with what James Scott perhaps first referred to as 
everyday strategies of resistance.  While Iraqis’ everyday strategies may not have had 
the potential to overturn orders of rule, their observation and analyses were 
nevertheless important to understand where the limits of sovereignty-constructions 
lay. The ethnographic approach of this thesis played a key role in making these 
strategies visible, which may have easily been missed by other research methods 
focussing only on documents or interviews. 
Reflecting this importance of ethnography, this chapter’s structure and writing style 
differs from previous chapters in the way that pride of place is given to extracts from 
field notes and interviews, which present a variety of interlocutors’ perspectives and 
opinions. By grouping observations according to three themes, (1) conformity, (2) 
contestation and (3) deception, arguments were presented about how Iraqis related to 
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humanitarian and state governance, and to the way that state sovereignty was 
produced by governing institutions.  
The first theme, conformity, highlighted a case in which an Iraqi man was informed 
during the resettlement process that his poor health, due to overweight and smoking, 
was problematic. Each resettlement case required a sponsor in the US; if there were 
no relatives or friends, a case would be assigned to a charity or migrant-support 
group. Yet no organisation was willing to accept persons with potentially expensive 
health risks, as such costs might have to be covered by the sponsor. In response to the 
negative result of the health check, the Iraqi man in question began a regime of 
exercise and stopped smoking, with the result that after one year, he successfully 
passed the resettlement health check, and his case, which also involved his wife and 
children, was able to proceed. A second example of how Iraqis conformed with 
migrant-governance concerned the story of an Iraqi friend hoping to be hired as a 
waiter, and the requirement to obtain an official residency permit from Syrian state 
authorities for this job. After not planning on renewing his residency for a few 
months, the friend decided to renew it immediately, in order to be able to work. Both 
events were characterised by an interesting conversion of disciplinary measures and 
laissez-faire conditions shaping Iraqi life: both men could have chosen not to be 
resettled, or not to take a job, yet when opting to do so, a set of controls had to be 
obliged with. Further, the examples emphasised that local manifestations of state 
sovereignty could differ in terms of the type of power through which they were 
maintained. In the case of the man requiring a new permit, the fact that his permit had 
expired did not register with Syrian state institutions, but was pointed out and 
enforced by a private business man.  
Contestation, the second theme of the chapter, collected several observations in which 
Iraqi interlocutors directly contradicted or disputed aspects of how they were 
governed as migrants in Syria. Specifically, these observations focussed on moments 
in which interlocutors voiced criticisms about ideas or concepts that related to the 
sovereign ideal or other sovereignty-related constructions. In particular, two 
discussions during a seminar with a group of Iraqi students were illuminating. When, 
on one occasion, students were prompted to consider their national identity, very 
different positions on the question of ‘being Iraqi’ emerged. In particular, one young 
woman held a minority position by contesting the necessity to identify with one’s 
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hereditary nation, in this way disagreeing with one of the most fundamental 
assumptions of state sovereignty. During a second discussion, the students surprised 
my own assumptions and projections about them, highlighting that the positionality of 
researcher and interlocutors might not be the same. 
Finally, the third theme, deception, emerged as an important topic in interlocutors’ 
relationship with the UNHCR; frequently interlocutors complained about the way 
people misrepresented facts during UNHCR interviews, or reported themselves about 
fraudulent portrayals of heightened suffering that were considered as upping one’s 
chances with the agency. The UNHCR in turn had put in place bureaucratic 
procedures such as randomization and double-checks to prevent fraud; in an interview 
a UNHCR manager spoke at considerable length about these concerns. In another 
relevant instance, Iraqi students participating in an NGO programme secretly 
contravened the rules and ideas set up by the NGO’s directors. While outwardly 
pretending to agree and live by these rules, behind the directors’ backs students 
frequently engaged in behaviour they knew was considered undesirable. These two 
examples showed ways in which Iraqis manipulated and played with humanitarian 
forms of governance employed by UNHCR and NGOs. In the case of the UNHCR, 
deceptive Iraqi agency also undermined the organisation’s portrayal of Iraqis as meek, 
would-be citizens, who were seeking to become responsible and productive subjects. 
Further, it showed that Iraqis did not concur with, or were even aware of, these 
UNHCR’s constructions, and instead considered the UNHCR as an often unfair and 
unpredictable patron-sovereign, who did not use resources particularly wisely or 
logically.  
This chapter only presented a small selection from a wider pool of  observations and 
quotes in which interlocutors critically or humorously undermined different forms of 
power applied to them. The overall governance of Iraqi migration to Syria emerged 
from this interplay of regulation, contestation and violence in the human encounters at 
UNHCR centres, Syrian state offices and NGO projects. Power was located in 
different locations and resources: in humanitarian bureaucracies and money, in the 
ability to manipulate or conform, in state repression and control. The interactions in 
this field of migration management were infused with constructions of state 
sovereignty, as ideas about migration, territory and nationhood led to shifting 
boundaries and exclusions for Iraqis in their lives in Syria. The fusion of the different 
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manifestations of sovereignty of the Syrian state, the humanitarian sector and Iraqis 
themselves ultimately led to the local form of state sovereignty as experienced by 
Iraqi migrants in Syria at the time of field research.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
When trying to explain a puzzling event in international politics  through academic 
enquiry, one may quickly discover the limits of academic disciplines. The complexity 
of phenomena that occur inside, on and outside of national boundaries cannot be 
approached via one discipline alone. Similarly, the connection between the mundane 
and exceptional life-experiences of human beings, generally the subject of 
anthropological enquiry, and broader theories that attempt to explain patterns of 
behaviour across the globe, generally the focus of IR, is not frequently made within 
one academic discipline. The phenomenon of state sovereignty, which has been the 
focus of this thesis, is one such puzzling event that straddles disciplinary divides.  
 
This thesis has drawn on a range of academic traditions to explain the manifestations 
of state sovereignty in a particular context: that of Iraqi migration to Syria. Most 
academic writing on state sovereignty attempts to explain it as an independent source, 
location or moment of absolute power. This thesis argues that this approach is 
methodologically and theoretically misguided, as it remains within the logic of 
sovereignty and therefore cannot explain its occurrence. In other words, such writings 
fail to enquire about the historical and social developments and constellations that 
enable the belief in and manifestation of the state as the ultimate source and arbiter of 
power in a territorially limited population. Instead they accept this belief and situation 
as given and simply search within them for a yard-stick that can allow academics to 
recognise the limits or actions of sovereignty’s power.  
 
This thesis has instead approached state sovereignty as a particular and historically 
contingent form of social organisation and behaviour, which produces the state as the 
location of sovereignty, as well as the belief in and exercise of sovereignty as such. 
Today, state sovereignty is the hegemonic way of thinking about how to organise 
human society across the globe. This hegemony is based on the one hand on a 
powerful, conceptual ideal of sovereignty, as visually captured by political maps of 
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the world or the set-up of the UN General Assembly, in which each state consists of a 
unified, defined territory, a homogeneous, national population, and a government that  
represents this territory and population. This ideal is closely bound up with powerful 
ideas about what constitutes political life and what constitutes good politics. On the 
other hand, the actual lived experience of state sovereignty is enforced and produced 
in a large variety of local contexts, which stand in various relationships to the ideal of 
sovereignty. In these local contexts, state sovereignty emerges as a necessarily 
‘messy’ and complex lived experience, in which differing techniques of power, forms 
of population management and governance create the dominance of the state. 
 
An important point for the arguments of this thesis is that the division of global space 
into domestic and international spheres of action is itself an effect of the hegemony of 
state sovereignty’s social organisation. To understand this division as such an effect, 
it is necessary to analyse how different forms of behaviour are understood by humans 
to signify domestic and international space, and how, for example, complex 
bureaucratic routines teach humans about this division. The famous ‘inside/outside’ 
divide upon which sovereignty rests is created through daily-life human performance, 
habits, requirements and violence. Human beings learn to identify geographic 
locations as domestic or international through the practices that state sovereignty’s 
social organisation requires from them.   
 
The increase in Iraqi migration to Syria in the aftermath of the catastrophic, US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, quickly became an international political phenomenon 
involving the Syrian state and its neighbours, the international humanitarian sector 
and its North Atlantic funders, and of course a minimum of several hundred thousand 
Iraqi migrants. The management of migration by international and domestic political 
institutions has been widely recognised as closely related to state sovereignty, both in 
terms of its ideal and its local manifestation. Large-scale migration undermines the 
notion of the assumed-natural unity of territory, population and government and often 
results from a situation that is paradoxical from the perspective of the sovereign ideal, 
in which a government is not protecting, but persecuting the people living on its 
territory. The creation of international refugee-law and the UN’s High Commissioner 
for Refugees thus came as a necessary afterthought in the 1950s, when it was realised 
that the firming up of state borders into self-determined entities did not result in 
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islands of peace, but often in large-scale displacement. The UNHCR treaties sit like a 
patch on international law, to fix a problem that had not been envisaged by the 
architects of the post Second World-War order.  
 
The importance of strangers who can be continuously identified as outsiders and 
excluded from the domestic order has also been widely recognised as a crucial 
element in the maintenance of the domestic sovereign order. To maintain the fiction 
and lived reality of a territorially and nationally delimited state, all states operate 
some form of migration control. The orderly management of migration performs a 
state’s control over its territory and population, while chaotic refugee camps and large 
numbers of un-managed migrants signify a state’s loss of control and beckon 
international, humanitarian intervention. Large-scale migrations are frequently 
portrayed in international and domestic rhetoric as threats to international peace and 
security, and wealthy states mobilise extraordinary resources and violence to control 
migrants’ bodies and agency.  
 
The involvement of a number of different, domestic and international, powerful actors 
in the management of Iraqi mass-migration to Syria therefore presented a highly 
relevant and interesting opportunity to study how this management contributed to the 
maintenance of state sovereignty, both on the conceptual and physical level. One of 
the key findings of this thesis is that indeed all actors examined – the Syrian state, 
humanitarian agencies and foreign states – required some form of behaviour from 
Iraqis that marked them as different from people holding Syrian passports (or, in the 
case of onward migration, other nationals). Either through simple bureaucratic routine 
or more elaborate confessions of suffering and fear, Iraqi were forced by all 
‘managing partners’ to perform their exclusion from the Syrian nation and territory at 
some point. Yet interestingly, the degree and intensity of the performances required 
by different actors strongly varied and made use of different techniques of 
enforcement and power. A detailed analysis and interpretation of these differences 
found that they were related to the different way in which these different actors 
enforced and produced state sovereignty, which was ultimately related to the different 
degrees of importance and truth they awarded to the sovereign ideal.  
 
In terms of this thesis’ location within an academic literature and its specific 
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contribution to this literature, its critical analyses of sovereignty as an experience of 
daily-life encounters most closely places it within the sub-discipline of critical, post-
structuralist IR writing. This field has produced a significant body of work that 
interrogates the production of the social and spatial dimensions of sovereignty, often 
drawing on a Foucauldian tradition to examine the ‘micro-capilleries’ of power 
through which these dimensions are constructed. The daily-life aspect of power, 
through which sovereignty is produced, is, has been increasingly recognised and 
reflected by critical IR scholars, who also draw on insights from anthropology for 
their approaches. 
 
The production of ‘outsiders’ – be it to the nation, the national territory or other 
sovereign categories – is, within this literature, an established element of sovereignty 
and frequently, critical IR scholars’ works investigate the situation of migrants and 
refugees in the sovereign edifice. This thesis’ mobilisation of Iraqi migration to Syria 
as a context to investigate the production of sovereignty thus fits well into this field. 
 
With regards to this thesis’ contribution to the field of critical IR, its key strength lies 
in the detailed ethnographic data that is convincingly used to demonstrate the 
workings of sovereignty-producing power in daily life. While critical IR scholars 
often draw on elements of ethnographic and other empirical research to back-up and 
emphasise their theoretical arguments, more large-scale ethnographic studies, which 
are fully embedded into a critical IR framework are relatively rare. Further, this 
thesis’ mobilisation of strong regional and country-specific knowledge, including 
local language skills and long-term residency in the country of research, make it a 
particularly rich and useful application of a critical IR approach.  
 
After an introductory chapter that reviewed the sovereignty-related, academic 
literature on which this thesis is based, the second chapter provided an overview of 
the physical and social research setting in Damascus, the research methods, and a first 
analysis of how the Syrian government governed non-Syrian populations living in the 
capital city. Chapter two also provides first insights into how the Syrian government, 
to construct the Syrian state’s domestic sovereignty, intervened in areas of daily-life 
(such as the visual space in different neighbourhoods) to manage different population 
groups categorised as strangers.  
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Chapter three focused in greater detail on the Syrian state and its management of Iraqi 
migrants. The key finding of this chapter was that while in international interactions, 
i.e. at international conferences abroad or in exchanges with UN or foreign audiences, 
Syrian government representatives performed the Syrian state’s sovereignty according 
to the sovereign ideal, the management of Iraqis in the domestic setting reflected this 
ideal only weakly. Contrary to expectations based on the sovereign ideal, Syrian state 
institutions distinguished only weakly between Iraqis and people with Syrian 
documents. To explain these weak state-mechanisms of exclusion of Iraqis from the 
Syrian body politic by the Syrian government, this thesis argued that the way the 
Syrian government produced the Syrian state’s domestic sovereignty was based on 
different social and political relations than those stipulated by the sovereign ideal. 
Rather than rely on intricate bureaucratic routines whose set-in-stone power results 
from their abstract source in an apparently popular-determined constitution and legal 
system to distinguish who belongs to the nation, the Syrian way of sovereignty did not 
mobilise a myth of national identity and will in this way. As is elaborated throughout 
the thesis, this point goes far beyond the more common analyses of authoritarianism, 
which focus on the government’s capture or ownership of the state. Instead, this 
thesis’ analysis draws attention to how differing modes of sovereignty-production, 
which rely on different technologies of power, create violence and exclusions in 
different areas of society and individual life. This realisation goes beyond the 
dichotomy ‘authoritarian-liberal’ and allows for a much more incisive perspective on 
how states across the world maintain sovereignty against significant odds.  
 
Turning to the humanitarian sector, chapter four and five focused on the programmes 
of the UNHCR and international, humanitarian NGOs that formed part of the overall 
management of Iraqi migration to Syria. The key finding of these chapters was that 
these programmes proceeded from an assumption that the position of Iraqis in Syria 
was as assumed by international refugee law, which is based on the sovereign ideal. 
Iraqis in Syria were considered as occupying a position outside sovereign space, and 
therefore without life-saving protection; they were understood to exist in a situation in 
which the assumed-natural bond of sovereignty between citizen and protective 
government had been broken. This perspective on Iraqi existence in Syria (and 
previously in Iraq), which was only possible by turning a blind eye to the fact that the 
Iraqi population in Syria was surviving quite well despite its ‘vague’ sovereign status, 
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fundamentally influenced the form and content of UNHCR’s programmes aimed at 
Iraqis.  
 
The two areas of humanitarian programming examined more closely for this thesis 
were the UNHCR’s resettlement programme and the broad range of humanitarian 
services extended to Iraqis via UNHCR and NGOs (largely focused on financial/food 
aid, education and health). Humanitarian rhetoric portrayed Iraqi migrants’ existence 
as flawed, frequently referencing psychological problems, promiscuity (through 
prostitution) and potential for violence, as attributes of Iraqi migrants. Such problems 
were consistently related to the fact that Iraqis were migrants, i.e. located outside their 
presumably natural location inside their national territory. The relatively stable 
existence of Iraqis in Syria was thus not taken as an indication that the assumed unity 
of territory, government and population was fictional, but was ignored in order to 
present Iraqi existence as an instance in which this unity had been tragically broken, 
and required international intervention to restore.  
 
The interactions between the humanitarian sector and the Syrian state were a further 
focus of chapters four and five. These interactions showcased how international and 
domestic spheres of sovereignty were produced through separate practices. 
Concerning international sovereignty, the presence of international humanitarian 
actors, which had only been allowed onto Syrian territory since 2007, was a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, this presence signalled to foreign observers Syrian 
openness to civil society and an interest in the welfare of its population, thus 
strengthening Syria’s image abroad as a good sovereign. On the other hand, this 
presence also indicated that the Syrian government was not able to manage its internal 
affairs independently and required external help to maintain stability and security. As 
has been pointed out in development-critical literature, humanitarian assistance 
identifies the ‘sovereign borderlands’, those territories outside the fully sovereign 
realm. These interactions also highlighted how transformations to techniques of 
power can occur through the interactions between the global humanitarian sector, 
generally an agent of liberalism, and post-colonial states: while Syrian government 
institutions adapted certain processes in reaction to the expectations and ways-of-
doing of the humanitarians, the latter also adapted their strategies to the Syrian 
setting. A related finding of these chapters was that the depoliticising, technical 
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rhetoric and programmes of humanitarian actors made an adaptation to the Syrian 
environment astonishingly easy, despite these actors’ often proclaimed support for 
human rights and popular empowerment.  
 
Chapter six focused on the involvement of foreign states in the management of Iraqi 
migration to Syria, in relation to the construction of sovereignty. This involvement 
was paradoxical. For although, as laid out above, international efforts focused on 
making Iraqi migrants’ lives conform to the sovereign ideal, the cross-territorial 
intervention of foreign states into the Syrian body politic contradicted the principle of 
territorial exclusivity, a cornerstone of idealised state sovereignty. By managing the 
resettlement procedures of the donor states, UNHCR and IOM functioned as 
apparently neutral gate-keepers of sovereignty, which veiled the sovereignty-
contradicting, direct interventions into the Syrian-based population, on Syrian 
territory, that donor states were carrying out. Once again, this finding highlighted how 
the humanitarian sector, far from undermining or weakening state sovereignty, 
transported the values of and protected the hegemony of the sovereign ideal.   
 
Finally, chapter 7 focused on how Iraqi interviewees and interlocutors conformed to 
and contested the sovereignty-producing power in their daily lives as migrants in 
Damascus. The chapter used different examples of various techniques of power used 
by state and non-state institutions and provided nuanced details about how Iraqis 
reacted to these. By emphasising episodes that either demonstrated Iraqi conformity 
with, disobedience or open resistance to sovereignty-constructions, this chapter 
delved in greater details into specific micro-techniques of power through which Iraqi 
lives were made to conform to state sovereignty in daily-life encounters. The chapter 
showed the limits of these micro-techniques, which appeared in instances when Iraqi 
behaviour and opinion contradicted or out-did their desired effects and/or underlying 
assumptions and categories.  By closely relating ethnographic observations with 
theoretical analysis, this chapter further showcased the relevance of ethnographic 
research when researching power in daily-life and highlighted a number of this thesis’ 
key contributions to academic literature and research.  
 
Significance  
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The arguments and empirical evidence presented in this thesis offer several new 
insights into how state sovereignty is maintained as a key organising principle of the 
global population, despite the weakening of direct state intervention in economic and 
social affairs. The thesis shows that while in theory and in the dominant imagination 
of global common sense, sovereignty awards to each state similar characteristics, in 
practice, different states translate their sovereignty into highly different social and 
political relations, and governance techniques. This means that although most states 
manifest themselves through similar material attributes, such as border crossings, 
government buildings, administrations, or a representative at the UN General 
Assembly, their less tangible presence in the lives of people living on their territory 
will manifest itself in highly diverse ways. This realisation means that writing and 
theorising about sovereign power in general, as if it is the same all over the globe, is 
of little use. In fact, state sovereignty and the belief in the existence of such a thing as 
sovereign power (as originating from the state or not) should be regarded as a 
historical and context-bound development, which originated in Europe and spread to 
the rest of the world through adoption, but mostly through domination. This is not to 
say that state sovereignty and sovereign power does not exist. It is to argue, that 
seeking the meaning, location or manifestation of universal and ‘true’ sovereign 
power is misguided if it concerns the intimate relations between state and human 
being (and not more general statements about the need for states to conform to certain 
norms at the international level). The understanding, manifestation, governance effect 
and domination of state sovereignty will vary in different contexts and can only be 
meaningfully understood through local, empirical enquiry.  
In line with these broader insights into how sovereignty is constructed as the world’s 
currently hegemonic way of organising politics, this thesis’ central significance lies in 
its portrayal and analysis of how this construction takes place concretely, in a 
concrete setting. Against the mainstream understanding that sovereign power 
becomes apparent in moments of significant violence, under exceptional 
circumstances or indeed when humanity is reduced to bare life, this thesis argues that 
the power of sovereignty, while not excluding these extraordinary moments, mostly 
appears as something quite different. The thesis’ various chapters offer a clear and 
accessible example of how large-scale, abstract ideas about sovereignty were 
translated into forms of power that manifested themselves as seemingly banal, daily-
life encounters and transactions. Further, it showed, through the provisions of 
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documented, concrete examples, of how liberal interpretations of sovereignty and 
their associated techniques of power are inserted into post-colonial settings via the 
programmes and employees of humanitarian organisations. In this way, the thesis 
demonstrates the connection between the apparently banal ‘daily-life’ and global 
structures of power and domination, which are more easily visible and usually 
considered the stuff of international politics. The persistent belief that states are the 
natural and normal way for human beings to organise their society is the key 
manifestation of sovereign power, it’s conceptual ‘backdrop’ so to speak. This belief 
is made tangible through innumerable practices of, inter alia, bureaucracy, education, 
law and violence that remind human beings continuously of the existence and power 
of the state. Far from only appearing in moments of exception, the state’s sovereignty 
appears constantly in daily life, by shaping most of its aspects. 
 
The realisation that sovereignty is constructed in and through our daily lives  is also 
significant for academic and political analysis less concerned with questions of 
theory. It shows that to understand a political context, it is necessary to investigate 
how state-population relations function precisely in people’s daily lives, and not to 
take for granted the assumptions of the sovereign ideal, according to which each 
person is a citizen and state-society relations are governed via some form of 
representation. To most astute regional analysts this might appear glaringly obvious, 
but the detailed analysis of humanitarian intervention in Syria presented in this thesis 
shows how shockingly easily UNHCR and international NGOs rolled out abstract, 
seemingly universal assumptions about population, territory and government in 
relation to Iraqi migrants in Syria, where they simply did not apply. This misplaced 
confidence in the sovereign ideal led to an apparent, perceived lack of necessity to 
conduct any official analysis of state-society relations in Syria and to adapt local 
programming and management of refugees accordingly. Further, it resulted in forms 
of programming that not only reproduced the broader forms of domination contained 
in humanitarian action, but created perhaps unnecessary, additional forms of 
discrimination and perceived unfairness that undermined the validity and belief in 
humanitarian actors. This example shows that the dominant academic and political 
belief about sovereignty as a universal form of rule have indeed very practical, and 
detrimental, political effects.  
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The points made in this thesis highlight a further, highly important effect of state 
sovereignty, which concerns global, often post-colonial structures of power. In 
particular chapter 6 shows that the separation of the globe’s territory into seemingly 
independent and exclusively ruled units can act as a ‘fig leaf’ behind which the 
intervention of powerful states can be concealed. In Syria, the influence of other states 
over the management of Iraqi migrants in Syria was channelled through international 
institutions nominally representative of the international community as a whole. This 
allowed for the importation into Syria of detailed bureaucratic techniques of migration 
management, and notions of politics, that had very little to do, and were occasionally 
opposed to practices of the Syrian state, without any visible undermining of exclusive 
Syrian rule over Syrian territory. Mini-islands of foreign states’ administrations were 
created on Syrian territory without a visible undermining of official Syrian state 
sovereignty. The myth of national independence and popular self-determination, 
which continue as powerful governance mechanisms in global and local politics, and 
are closely connected to the sovereign ideal, remained intact in this arrangement, even 
though in practice they did not. This arrangement, which allowed both for the 
continuing of the transnational domination of powerful states and of local power 
structures, was an effect of the international system of state sovereignty, which 
includes the apparently representative system of the United Nations that upholds the 
idea that all states (and therefore people) are somehow equally independent. The 
convenience that this system presents for the global and local status quo of power can 
be understood as one of the principal reasons for why an end to, or evening fading 
into significance of  state sovereignty, is profoundly unlikely in the foreseeable future.  
 
Finally this thesis shows how, despite the nominal equality and similarity of all 
sovereign states there exists even within the sovereign logic a kind of yardstick 
against which the sovereignty of states is measured. The lack of attention that the 
sovereignty-contradicting interventions of foreign states on Syrian territory in relation 
to Iraqi migration attracted were one indication of this hierarchy, in which states 
wielding more sophisticated technologies of power were allowed to transgress 
sovereign divides with impunity. Paradoxically, there exists in the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism and liberalism more broadly a set of values according to which a 
state becomes regarded as more or less sovereign (and therefore more or less entitled 
to independence and exclusivity of rule over its territory). This set of values goes 
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beyond being simply functional as a state, i.e. exercising control over territory and 
population, but includes questions of morality and care, as well as standards of 
technology and material power. Despite the difficult diplomatic status of the Syrian 
state on other issues, Syrian state agents were able to seize on Syria’s ‘kind and 
generous’ treatment of Iraqi migrants as a way to increase Syrian sovereignty, even to 
the extent that diplomatic ‘enemies’, such as the US, could transfer large amounts of 
money to Syria without this raising significant contradictions.  
 
This thesis reflects a growing awareness, reflected in academic writing, the media and 
fiction, that all is not well in the world of humanitarianism. Criticism of the 
humanitarian sector ranges from accusations of hypocrisy and waste, to analyses that 
regard it as vehicle through which transnational technologies of power are inserted 
into local contexts. This thesis tends to belong to the latter, yet with an awareness that 
power never flows uni-directionally, but emerges from complex social interactions. 
This means that, as touched on above, the humanitarian sector is also transformed in 
and by local conditions, which influence its transnational reach. The humanitarian 
sector is a social, economic and political assemblage of technologies that perpetuates 
the above-mentioned post-colonial domination, not necessarily simply of North 
Atlantic actors, but of a model of human life, on which the North Atlantic is based 
and which it does best. As I hope this thesis has shown, one aspect of this model is the 
sovereign ideal, which is used by humanitarian actors as a yardstick against which to 
measure the legitimacy of societies, and in how far they should be allowed to govern 
themselves. More research and critical analysis of humanitarian work, its growing 
professionalization and merging with state or government agencies is needed to better 
understand the effects of its power. Also, as I do not want to dismiss the positive 
human characteristics of solidarity, commiseration and outrage at human suffering 
that urge many to become humanitarian workers, such research could inspire the 
search for better, more basic and less teleological forms of assistance to the 
oppressed.  
 
With regards to avenues for further research, this thesis’ point is largely 
methodological: too much IR writing is conducted as grand literature reviews from 
the armchair, by people who have never done anything else but academia. It takes a 
rare genius to produce something meaningful through this method. Often, this method 
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produces writing about ‘the other’ that is offensive and arrogant. But at its best, the 
ability and power of intellectual reflection present in the IR discipline, has produced 
crucial insights into how to conduct critical analysis and interrogation of key, 
‘common sense’ concepts long used to describe the world. On the other side of the 
disciplinary spectrum, too much regional-studies/anthropology writing is undertaken 
without an eye on or ambition for developing a wider social theory about the observed 
phenomena, or even conducting critical analysis. The best of such method produces 
highly informed, journalistic political/social/economic analysis or fascinating 
descriptions of far-away places. Yet to advance social or international theory in order 
to understand better the political developments and power constellations that lie 
behind observed events, it is not enough to rely on participant observations or long-
term fieldwork. Strong academic analysis requires the best elements of both 
disciplines: a solid grounding in theoretical knowledge and a desire to advance critical 
interrogation, and a keen eye and collection of human experience.  
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